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Abstract
Two concerns are prominent in engineering ethics pedagogy and, together, pose a
conundrum for ethics educators: 21st century technologies raise daunting ethical
questions that require a strong engagement with and understanding of ethics by
engineers; at the same time, however, engineering students don’t care much about
studying ethics. Ethics instruction, however, seems nonresponsive to these issues. It
continues to rely on Western ethical theories using case studies to analyze professional
engineering conduct. And, although instructors want better student learning outcomes,
assessment continues to use quantitative measures of ethical knowledge and ethical
reasoning skills which disregard students’ emotional engagement with ethics and
underestimates ABET’s Engineering Criterion 3(f) which requires that engineering
students have an understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities. In the end,
dissatisfaction with instruction and student learning outcomes persists.

Given the epistemological foundations of engineering – that engineering is applied
science using knowledge that is universal, objective, certain, and discoverable through
reason – it is unsurprising that engineering ethics is taught the same way science is
taught using a linear, positivistic, problem-solving approach that assumes reason will
yield correct and usually quantitatively determined answers to ethical questions. In this
dissertation, I argue that, contrary to the dominant thinking passed on to generations of
students that engineering is applied science and, as such, largely ethically neutral
beyond safe and efficient design, the practice of engineering actually arises from a
contingency model of knowledge and is, correspondingly, imbued with both uncertainty
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and ethics. I contend that the way we teach engineering ethics must change if we expect
different learning outcomes from undergraduate engineering students.

In this research, I introduce an engineering ethics pedagogy informed by
phenomenology, the study of human meaning from the standpoint of experience.
Students are asked to research the phenomenological question, “what is it to be an
ethical engineer?” and employ principles of hermeneutic phenomenology to interpret and
understand that experience. Quantitative measures test changes in students’ ethical
sensitivity and ethical reasoning skills, and qualitative methods informed by philosophical
hermeneutics are used to assess changes in students’ emotional engagement with
ethics and their understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities.

I draw two principal conclusions from my work on this project. First, a one-credit ethics
course using a phenomenology-informed engineering ethics pedagogy can contribute to
undergraduate engineering students’ improved ethical sensitivity, ethical reasoning
skills, emotional engagement with the study of ethics, and understanding of professional
and ethical responsibility. Second, qualitative assessment revealed that we educators of
engineering ethics are not attuned to what is important to our undergraduate engineering
students. While we are intent on imparting ethical knowledge, our students worry about
how they will fit into the world of engineering as ethically competent professionals when
they move from undergraduate student to practicing engineer. This is a gap we must fill
if we expect our students to graduate with an understanding of their professional and
ethical responsibilities. A phenomenological approach to engineering ethics education –
where students are given the opportunity to investigate, encounter, and understand the
real, lived experience of what it is to be an ethical engineer – can help fill this gap.
xi

Introduction
The ancient Greeks left us with an ambivalent – and often contentious – legacy that
contrasts two kinds of knowledge – one generally associated with Plato and Aristotle
which holds that knowledge is universal, transcendent, unchanging, objective, certain,
and discoverable through reason, and a second originally associated with the Greek
Sophists which holds that knowledge is changeable, contingent, constructed, shaped by
values and ideology, and perhaps unknowable at all. This dualism, which has persisted
for over two and a half millennia, accounts for differences in how we understand, value,
and use knowledge. The former, which includes scientific and technological knowledge,
is understood as objective, provable, quantitative, and governed by first principles. By
this view, the universe is a highly ordered place and knowledge, as part of that universe,
is ordered as well. There is a place for everything and everyone, and pursuit of this order
and knowledge of it are the highest good for humans to pursue. This is also an
exclusionary position because its adherents often argue that anything else – things that
cannot be proven or known with certainty – is simply not knowledge. In his day, Plato
labeled these other practices “rhetoric” and mocked them as “cookery,” “flattery,”
“routine,” and “irrational” – a pejorative characterization of rhetoric that holds today. Over
time, this first view of knowledge prevailed and, importantly, was privileged because it
was and is perceived as trustworthy, credible, certain and, therefore, true.

During the Enlightenment and the ensuing age of industrialization, this view of
knowledge was used to justify a sweeping and enduring shift in the classic ancient
Greek conception of the universe. Certainty was endorsed as the absolute criterion for
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knowing what is true and real – Descartes’s “Cogito ergo sum” characterizes this as well
as any other Western thinker. With the continuing discovery of human capability to use
the principles of science to dominate nature and utilize the Earth’s resources in ways
previously unknown, people started to see the world as a place for them to control and
use as they please without much regard for the order of things or the consequences.
This contrast between modern technology and Greek craft is part of Heidegger’s
message in his mid-20th century lecture, The Question Concerning Technology. Thus
began the movement toward a view of science as ethically neutral, a view that was
extended to the professions and technologies that use science as well (Goldman).

The professions that are concerned with or employ science and technology – principally
STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) fields – are, not surprisingly,
privileged by a world that values certainty and reason. And this attitude of privilege
extends to the education and preparation for entering these professions. Engineering
programs, in particular, have been and remain firmly entrenched in the position that,
because scientific and technological knowledge is both privileged and particular to
certain professions, engineering students should be concerned with studying the things
that will help them develop engineering skills (Colby and Sullivan, Bucciarelli). Further,
because it employs ethically neutral science knowledge, engineering is declared a
largely ethically neutral profession outside safe and efficient design; beyond this, ethical
decisions should be left to others such as managers and policy makers (Goldman).
Thus, the thinking goes, engineering students have little need for and should not be
expected to study non-scientific knowledge such as rhetoric or ethics unless it
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contributes to the technical skills of engineering (see Michael Davis, “Rhetoric, Technical
Writing, and Ethics”; Russell; Latour).

This thinking was confronted head-on when, in 2000, ABET adopted Engineering
Criterion 3(f), a new accreditation requirement that students who graduate from
accredited undergraduate engineering programs must have “an understanding of
professional and ethical responsibility.” This deceptively modest mandate upset the
longstanding tradition of engineering education’s resistance to non-scientific coursework
for engineering students and undermined its deep-rooted position that engineering
students have little need for this type of knowledge or skill. Engineering programs now
had to find ways to provide their students with the requisite understanding of
professional and ethical responsibility and prove it to ABET. Engineering programs have
had 15 years to contend with EC 3(f) and, by most accounts, actual outcomes for
students remain unsatisfactory (see, for example, Colby and Sullivan). Ethical reasoning
skills of undergraduate engineering students are below those of their peers (Carpenter,
Harding, and Finelli). Most engineering students do not think that the study of ethics is
important and do not want to take ethics coursework (Newberry); engineering faculty for
the most part do not want to and do not know how to teach ethics (Pine); intended
learning outcomes for students are vague; and assessment of student outcomes for
ethics is often nonexistent or meaningless (Colby and Sullivan).

More recently, two concerns have come to dominate the discussion in engineering ethics
pedagogy and, together, pose a conundrum for ethics educators: 21st century
technologies raise daunting ethical questions that require a strong engagement with
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ethics by engineers (Pine); yet engineering students still don’t care much about studying
ethics (Newberry). Most ethics education researchers agree that these concerns are not
being adequately addressed by current ethics pedagogical practice (see, for example,
the study by Colby and Sullivan). Nevertheless, although there is some tinkering here
and there, ethics instruction has not changed and is still premised on the assumptions,
first, that ethics must be taught as science knowledge is taught using a linear, objective,
positivistic, problem-solving approach that assumes pure reason will yield correct and
usually quantitatively determined answers to ethical questions and, second, that learning
outcomes for ethics knowledge must be quantitatively measurable for assessment
purposes.

In this Introduction, I make several broad assertions about the epistemological
foundations of engineering, the attitudes and approaches of engineering programs
toward engineering ethics education and assessment, and the student outcomes being
achieved. These claims may seem harsh and perhaps unjustified at this point,
particularly to an engineering audience. But I explain and support each claim in later
chapters of this dissertation where full contexts and nuances pertaining to these thorny
issues are addressed and clarified. I ask the reader’s patience, indulgence, and
continued reading.

In this dissertation, I will argue that the prevailing traditional approach to engineering
ethics pedagogy does not adequately prepare students for the ethical responsibilities of
engineering practice. Briefly, my arguments are:
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The claim that the profession of engineering is ethically neutral is mistaken. To the
contrary, engineering design practice is imbued with ethics (Bunge, Bucciarelli).
Engineering design is driven by uncertainty and value judgments such that engineers
are not mere technicians who design things in isolation from consequences in the world.
Although history has managed to convince us otherwise so that engineering continues to
be perceived as an ethically neutral science, engineering is much more accurately
characterized as a sophistic or contingency form of knowledge and practice (Goldman).

Nonetheless, engineering education programs continue to operate as if ethical training
for engineering students requires little more than doing what is needed to secure ABET
accreditation. There remains widespread conviction among faculty – and a
corresponding indoctrination of students – that the ethics of engineering are limited to
the efficient design of safe products. Several consequences follow from this assumption.
First, the learning outcomes established by engineering programs for undergraduate
engineering students reflect this assumption and appear to be accreditation-driven and
not motivated by a commitment to prepare students as much as possible for the
authentic experience of being an ethical engineer in the world they enter on graduation.
Although educators argue that they want engineering students to care about making
ethical decisions, the objectives and performance indicators established by engineering
programs do not reflect this outcome.

Second, because most engineering ethics coursework is modeled on science instruction
methods using standardized case studies, students expect that engineering ethics
problems have unambiguous answers that can be resolved by the application of rules
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and quantitative decision methods (Burbules, Wike, Harris). Engineering students may
improve their ethical reasoning skills (the ability to apply ethical principles to sets of
problems) – though the evidence here does not strongly support this outcome – but they
certainly do not improve their sense of the importance of ethics, their awareness of the
potential scope and ambiguity of professional and ethical responsibility, and their
understanding of and commitment to being ethical engineers (Conlon and Zandvoort).
The myth that the sole function of engineers is to work as individual isolated agents
(alone or as a team unit) whose ethical decisions are limited to matters involving safe
and efficient designs is thereby perpetuated (Herkert “Ways of Thinking about and
Teaching Ethical Problem Solving: Microethics and Macroethics in Engineering”).

Third, engineering program assessment methods and data to establish that graduating
engineering students actually have “an understanding of professional and ethical
responsibility” are frequently vague and unreliable (Colby and Sullivan). I argue that
ABET’s Engineering Criterion 3(f) is severely underestimated by most engineering
programs. The mandate has two requirements: an understanding of professional
responsibility and an understanding of ethical responsibility, a much broader obligation
than is generally undertaken by engineering programs. But engineering programs and
engineering faculty perceive ethics as something that is not assessable, and this attitude
is reflected in both assessment methods and resulting data, making it nearly impossible
to know if the criterion is being achieved.

My dissertation research aims to address these concerns. I propose and test (1) a
phenomenological approach to engineering ethics pedagogy that can improve not only
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students’ ethical reasoning and sensitivity but also their emotional engagement and their
understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities, and (2) a qualitative
methodology to assess whether this engagement and understanding are being achieved
by students.

The Research Idea
This research project was borne of my own frustration with the tedium of teaching
undergraduate engineering ethics at Michigan Technological University. Early on, I
understood that most students signed up for my one-credit 3000-level elective class
because they realized, in their final year as undergraduates, that they were one credit
short to graduate. Each year, I surveyed the class and learned that this was their prime
motivation for taking my ethics class. They expected the class to be easy and boring.
And I made certain it met their expectations.

I did this by teaching ethics the way it is usually done. I assigned a standard engineering
ethics textbook with a traditional approach to ethics instruction that draws on the three
main Western ethical theories: deontology (rules), consequentialism (utilitarianism), and
virtue ethics. The platform universally employed to teach students how to apply ethical
knowledge is the case study and, typically, students use some version of a heuristic to
work through a step-by-step, linear ethical decision-making process to arrive at and
justify the “correct” ethical decision. Case studies in engineering ethics are plentiful and
classic: the space shuttle Challenger and Columbia disasters, the Ford Pinto gas tank
explosions, the Hyatt Regency skywalk collapse, the Bhopal chemical spill, to name a
few of the most well-known, as well as fictional depictions of ethical dilemmas in made-
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for-the-engineering-classroom films such as Henry’s Daughter, Gilbane Gold, and
Incident at Morales.1 Ethical decision-making models specify a multi-step process that
defines the problem, identifies available alternatives, evaluates the alternatives
(applicable rules, stakeholder consequences, costs and benefits, etc.), makes the
decision, implements the decision, and evaluates the impact of the decision.

Dutifully, my students applied this ethical knowledge to the assigned case studies,
identified what the engineers did wrong, and came up with the right ethical decisions.
Each student’s written explanation of the decision-making process and how it was
applied in a particular case was nearly identical to every other student’s explanation.
Their responses were, I thought, remarkably similar to a mathematics assignment in
which there is usually only one way to solve the problem correctly, and the student must
solve the problem that way or the answer is not correct. This made grading easy, of
course, but the teaching and the student work products were rote and unimaginative. So,
even if this teaching experience was uninspiring to me and to my students, I supposed
that, if they could identify ethical issues, resolve them, and provide a rationale for their
decisions, they must be “getting it.” Learning objective accomplished.

In a recently discovered essay written by Isaac Asimov and published in MIT Technology
Review, Asimov asks how people get new ideas. He suggests that creative people are
those who are “capable of making a connection between item 1 and item 2 which might

These three films were produced for use in engineering ethics instruction by the National
Institute for Engineering Ethics online at www.niee.org. Each film is a fictional depiction of
multiple and often escalating ethical problems that arise in engineering practice. The films include
suggested discussion questions and extended analyses of recommended ethical decision-making
considerations and processes.
1
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not ordinarily seem connected” (Asimov n.p.). In the case of my engineering ethics class,
two unrelated things happened – coincidentally – to trigger the idea that engineering
ethics could and should be taught differently and that I should reexamine my
expectations of student learning outcomes. First, as part of my own commitment to
staying abreast of the field of engineering ethics education, I read an article written by
Byron Newberry entitled, “The dilemma of ethics in engineering education.” Newberry,
an engineering professor who teaches ethics as part of his engineering design course,
argues that engineering students should achieve higher levels of moral development. He
observed that his engineering students were adept at applying ethical principles to sets
of problems – what he termed intellectual engagement and particular knowledge (or
ethical reasoning) – but that his students failed to emotionally engage with the study of
ethics. He defined emotional engagement as “developing a student’s desire, on an
affective level, to recognize, to care about, and to resolve ethical issues” (344). Year
after year, his students performed well on their ethics assignments and actively
participated in class discussions but, nevertheless, they consistently rated the ethics part
of the class as “the least interesting, the least useful, and the most trivial” (347). This
was a key insight. Newberry was describing my students.

I returned to the classroom and asked my students about the curriculum materials we
had been using. That seemed as good a place to start as any. I was honestly surprised
to learn that nearly everything in my course was a repeat of the condensed version they
received in first year Engineering Fundamentals coursework, including the films, and that
whatever standard case studies had not been included in Engineering Fundamentals
had been covered in other engineering classes. Nothing I presented was new. When I
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asked about the importance of engineering ethics to them, students said that ethics was
not interesting and that, although engineers have a professional obligation to protect the
public health and safety, engineering ethics was not all that complicated – just follow the
NSPE Code of Ethics, use decision models to arrive at a proper decision, and report
anyone who engages in unethical conduct. These responses seemed to confirm
Newberry’s observations. The question, however, was where to go from here. How could
I get my students to care about engineering ethics and being ethical engineers?

The second thing to happen was that, as a beginning PhD student in Humanities, I was
introduced to phenomenology, a philosophy that is concerned with the ontological
question of being. Phenomenology is a philosophy that studies essences. It holds that
human consciousness is consciousness of something, that people are thinking
experiencing subjects who are not mere physical objects that respond to stimuli
explainable by objective science but who are in the world and interact with the world to
both give and derive meaning from it. We are, as Merleau-Ponty wrote, embodied
subjects (Merleau-Ponty). Phenomenology is grounded in the real, lived world of
experience. Similarly, phenomenological research seeks to discover and describe the
essences of human phenomena, of human experience. Phenomenology does not seek a
scientific, theoretical, or causal explanation of experience but, instead, describes the
phenomenon and interprets it in order to express a general understanding about the
essence of the experience (Orbe; van Manen, Researching Lived Experience).
Phenomenology is particularly useful to study professional experience because “it tries
to place the researcher in the perspective of the research participants in order to
understand their experience and feelings, thus unveiling what it means, from their point
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of view, to be in the situation within the experience” of that person (Sadala and Adorno
288, emphasis in original). In other words, to understand and find meaning in that
experience, to care about it.

In the spring of 2011, I made the connection between item 1 and item 2 and then posed
this question: could studying engineering ethics from a phenomenological perspective –
where students investigate and discover the essences of what it is to be an ethical
engineer within the everyday lived experience of engineering practice – result in stronger
emotional engagement by students with the study and practice of ethics? Could such an
approach possibly make them care more about engineering ethics, making ethical
decisions, and being ethical engineers? A brief search of the literature disclosed no
research about this approach to engineering ethics pedagogy. Either this was a creative
and novel idea with the potential to help transform engineering ethics education and
therefore worth exploring, or good reasons existed why this research had not already
been done. So the first question for my research materialized: could a phenomenological
approach to engineering ethics pedagogy make a difference in students’ emotional
engagement and understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities?

The Context to Go Forward: A Rudimentary Pilot Study
When ENT3958, Ethics in Engineering Design, was offered in the fall semester of 2011,
I had fully redesigned the course to attempt a sort of phenomenological approach to
engineering ethics instruction. I no longer used a text because I could not find one that
adopted the approach I had in mind. Instead I asked myself what materials the students
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could read and what activities could they pursue that would help them discover and
understand what it means to be an ethical engineer. I collected a set of writings from a
wide range of authors that addressed, for example, culturally comparative engineering
ethics, engineering values, and the relationship between ethics and technology. Aside
from a brief review in class of ethical theories, there were no assigned readings on
ethical theories, case studies, or decision models. I concluded that the best way to find
out about being an ethical engineer would be to talk to engineers, so my assignments
also required students to interview a practicing engineer (or one who had worked outside
academia for some period of time) about what it is to be an ethical engineer. The
principle work product of the students would be an essay in which the students take into
account and reflect on all their work from the semester and use it to describe how they
interpret and understand the everyday lived experience of what it is to be an ethical
engineer.

I also wanted to assess whether this approach increased student engagement with and
understanding of ethics. The instrument I chose was the Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2),
a widely used measure of ethical reasoning skills (Rest et al.; Thoma). The DIT-2 is a
multiple choice test consisting of a set of five (non-engineering) scenarios presenting
various ethical dilemmas without obviously right answers. I administered the DIT-2 as a
pre-test during the first week of the semester and as a post-test at the end of the
semester. I selected the DIT-2 in part because it was used by many others to measure
ethical reasoning of engineering students but, beyond that, I did not fully understand – at
that time – that it wasn’t designed to measure anything more than ethical reasoning
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skills, whereas I was concerned with emotional engagement. But, it turned out, using the
DIT-2 was a good enough place to begin.

At this point, I need to diverge a bit and discuss an ethics study that was occurring
concurrently at Michigan Tech but about which I was then unaware, the Survey of
Engineering Ethical Development (SEED) project.2 This project conducted a nationwide
assessment of the ethical development (ethical knowledge, reasoning, and behavior) of
undergraduate engineering students. A total of over 4,000 undergraduate engineering
students from 18 institutions, including Michigan Technological University, participated in
the SEED study.3 Questions from the Fundamentals of Engineering Exam were used to
measure ethical knowledge, the DIT-2 was used to measure ethical reasoning skills; and
a survey of various volunteer and pro-social or anti-social activities in college and high
school was used to measure ethical behavior.

Results from the SEED study were ready for dissemination in late 2011 and each
participating university was invited to a workshop to receive results and participate in a
SEED was a multi-year project funded by the National Science Foundation (EEC# 0647460,
0647532, and 0647929) and headed by Principal Investigators from Lawrence Technological
University, California Polytechnic State University, and the University of Michigan (Finelli et al.,
“An Assessment of Engineering Students’ Curricular and Co-Curricular Experiences and Their
Ethical Development”; Harding, Carpenter, and Finelli). The study was intended to measure
student ethical development across all undergraduate engineering years and does not
differentiate by or account for the level or degree of ethical education students have received. In
this respect, the SEED study offers a broad snapshot – an average – of the current ethical
development of U.S. undergraduate engineering students at the 18 participating institutions.
3 The participating institutions were: Doctoral (Very High Research): Iowa State University,
Pennsylvania State University, Purdue University, University of California at San Diego,
University of Michigan, University of Texas at Austin; Doctoral (High Research): Michigan
Technological University, Missouri University of Science and Technology, North Carolina A & T
University, North Dakota State University, University of North Carolina at Charlotte; Master’s:
California Polytechnic State University, Lawrence Technological University, Tennessee
Technological University; Bachelor’s: Bucknell University, The Cooper Union for the
Advancement of Science and Art, Ohio Northern University, Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology
2
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dialog about how engineering ethics education could be improved. All the principals
involved in the project from Michigan Tech declined to attend and so, eventually, the
invitation made its way to me in my capacity as an instructor of engineering ethics. I
accepted and attended the workshop. I left the workshop with two new pieces of
knowledge: first, the SEED study found that “The mean Michigan Tech P and N24 scores
are significantly different from students at all other institutions, indicating those students,
on average, have higher levels of moral development than Michigan Tech students”
(Carpenter, Harding, and Finelli 44, emphasis in original). This was shocking,
embarrassing, and troubling information. However, although Michigan Tech students
performed below the DIT-2 averages compared to the other 17 universities, the mean
DIT-2 scores for all engineering students at all of these schools were still at the low end
of national norms for all college-aged students (Table I.1).5 Thus the workshop focus
was to identify best practices for improving engineering ethics education. Second,
except for the facilitator who also served as one of the project’s principal investigators, I
was the only non-engineering faculty member at the workshop, and the implications of
this became apparent during our discussions on how engineering education could be
improved. All the attendees were dismayed by the SEED results and there was
consensus that engineering ethics education had to somehow change. Nonetheless,
recommendations on best practices could be summarized as “obviously, we have to do
more of what we have been doing.” I was in the middle of my pilot engineering ethics
course with no results on student outcomes to report, but I described the redesigned
The N2 and P scores are the two quantitative measures of a subject’s ethical or moral
reasoning skills. The N2 was developed and became part of the DIT-2, which was the successor
to the original DIT. The N2 score is represented as being a better indicator of ethical reasoning
skills, although the P score is still used.
5 Michigan Tech students were on par with their peers in terms of ethical knowledge and in terms
of their pro- and anti-social behaviors in high school and college (Carpenter, Harding, and Finelli).
4
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course and what I hoped to achieve with it. I suggested that, if assessment results were
positive – and I wouldn’t know this until the end of the semester – this could be a
promising approach for engineering ethics education. The reception was one of
unequivocal and unanimous skepticism and, in some cases, outright dismissal. I left with
the impression that the status quo in engineering ethics education will not be easily
challenged or changed, even in the face of research such as the SEED study that
suggests what we are doing is not adequate.

The semester ended and the results of the pre- and post- DIT-2 test scores arrived.
They showed that the ethical reasoning skills of my students improved by 23% (mean
N2 scores) and by 19% (mean P scores) (Troesch). I was stunned by these results.
Table Intro.1 shows the comparisons of mean pre- and post-test P and N2 scores for my
class (ENT3958), the SEED project scores for Michigan Tech students, for all other
students participating in the SEED study, and the national norms for all college-aged
students.
Table Intro.1
DIT-2: A Comparison of Ethical Reasoning Scores
DIT-2

ENT 3958

NSF SEED Project
DIT-2 National Norms
for College-Aged Students6

Score

Pre- PostTest
Test
(n=20) (n=16)

MTU
(n=238)

17 Other
institutions
(n=~3700)

P Score

30.10

35.75

29.9

32.9

P scores range from 32.2 to 37.8,
increasing with age during college.

N2
Score

28.59

35.28

29.7

32.4

N2 scores range from 31.1 to 36.9,
increasing with age during college.

Norms for the DIT-2, including standard deviations, are periodically reported by the University of
Alabama Center for the Study of Ethical Development (Chung et al.; Dong; Bebeau and Thoma).
Standard deviations are not given in this table because no standard deviations were provided in
the SEED Report delivered to Michigan Technological University.

6

15

The mean pre-test N2 and P scores for my students were consistent with the overall
mean scores of Michigan Tech students in the SEED study, in other words, below
average. This was particularly concerning because my students were all preparing to
graduate and, based on age alone, should have performed above the average of
students from across all grade levels. However, post-test P and N2 scores for my
students were substantially higher than the scores for both Michigan Tech students and
students from the other 17 institutions in the SEED study and were much more in line
with the national norms for all college-aged students.

These results were encouraging, but several qualifications must be noted to place them
in context. First, students in the SEED project and in the national DIT-2 database took
the DIT-2 only once as contrasted to the pre- and post-test structure of ENT3958. The
SEED and national norms scores do not take into account and do not try to account for
any ethics instruction students may or may not have received. There was no intervention
(ethics instruction) introduced and the impact of ethics instruction was not tested as part
of the SEED study. Second, the SEED students were from across the entire spectrum of
undergraduate education, from first through final years, whereas my students were
nearly all seniors. Third, as to the ENT3958 results, the number of subjects – the class
size – was small. Only 20 students completed the pre-test and, of those, only 16
completed the post-test. The project design was quasi-experimental in that there was no
random selection of participants. To begin, enrollment in the ethics course is a selfselecting process. Additionally, participation in the DIT-2 was voluntary and anonymous,
and that could impact results (this was true of the SEED test as well; out of the ~800
students invited from Michigan Tech to participate, only 238 actually took the test).
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Fourth, there were no control groups of students for comparison to the ENT3958
students; there was no group that took no ethics course at all and there was no group
that took an ethics course with traditional instruction methods. So, without knowing how
these two control groups might perform on pre- and post-tests under comparable
conditions, it’s not possible to conclude with certainty that the improved DIT-2 scores
were caused by instructional method.

Perhaps the most important challenge to me was measuring student learning outcomes.
I used the DIT-2 as the measure of improvement but this test is intended to measure
ethical reasoning skills, not emotional engagement or understanding of professional and
ethical responsibilities. And it was student emotional engagement and understanding of
ethics that I hoped to improve and measure. So, although it was good news that my
engineering students’ ethical reasoning skills had improved to levels higher than their
engineering peers at Michigan Tech and more in line with their engineering and nonengineering peers nationally, this was not the principal outcome that I wanted to study
and measure. The definition and measurement of emotional engagement with ethics and
understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities, it turns out, would be the most
complex and difficult problem I had to face. This became the second research question I
address in this project.

When I conceived this idea to design an engineering ethics course using
phenomenological principles and methods, I thought my project – in both theory and
implementation – was relatively uncomplicated. Over the past three (nearly four) years,
I’ve come to understand how naive I was. Creating an engineering ethics pedagogy that
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emotionally engages students in the study and practice of ethics and that improves their
understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities requires us to ask and
deliberate some fundamental questions. Failure to do so will leave us in no different
place and with no better student outcomes. Indeed, part of the reason why engineering
ethics instruction does not significantly change may be because these questions are not
being engaged in meaningful, useful ways. I suggest that the most central set of
questions is: why do engineering students need to study ethics; what is it we want our
engineering students to be able to do with the ethics instructions they get; and what
should ethics education prepare them for? I further suggest that answers to these
questions depend on who we ask – engineers or ethics scholars – and the answers are
rooted in the millennia-old epistemological divide about the nature and privileging of
knowledge, perhaps making agreement on any “best practices” for engineering ethics
curriculum design next to impossible. Necessarily, this is where I begin my inquiry in
Chapter One.

Overview of Chapters One through Six
Chapter One sets forth the theoretical background for my research. I begin with a
critique of the epistemological foundation that is the historic context for the current state
of engineering ethics education. I argue that the nature of knowledge in Western
thought largely divides into a dualism that pits knowledge as universal, transcendent,
unchanging, certain, eternal, and discoverable through reason against knowledge as
constructed, contingent, temporary and changeable, uncertain, emerging from the
intersections of competing and often conflicting community values, interests, and needs,
shaped by ideology, and perhaps unknowable at all. From here, I argue that there is a
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nexus between how we understand and value knowledge and how we teach engineering
ethics. Because engineering practice is considered to be a productive knowledge or
technē that uses the knowledge of science or epistēmē, the prevailing attitude is that
engineering practice is, therefore, ethically neutral. Engineers are skilled designers of
technology; ethics, though not completely irrelevant, is the province of managers and
public policy makers. Although ABET mandated some sort of engineering ethics
knowledge when it adopted Engineering Criterion 3(f) as a condition for engineering
program accreditation, there remains widespread conviction and practice that meeting
this criterion amounts to little more than introducing the students to the NSPE Code of
Ethics and training them to apply this code to a variety of engineering design issues. I
argue against this stance and claim that engineering is imbued with ethics and that
engineering practice is largely driven by uncertainty and value judgments.

Assessment research shows that undergraduate engineering students are not prepared
to face the ethical challenges they will face as practicing engineers. They lack strong
ethical reasoning skills and they are not emotionally engaged with the study and practice
of ethics. I argue that this is, in part, because of the way that engineering ethics is
understood and the way it is taught. Accordingly, engineering ethics education should be
designed so that graduating engineering students have a meaningful understanding of
their professional and ethical responsibilities. I critique the ethics learning objectives that
are established by engineering programs, and I examine the history of engineering
ethics instruction in the context of three questions: (1) whether the emergence of ethical
questions posed by modern technology is only a 21st century phenomenon, (2) whether
engineering education should include the study of ethics, and, if so, (3) why current
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engineering ethics pedagogy fails to adequately prepare our engineers for their
professional and ethical responsibilities as engineers and citizens?

I conclude Chapter One with a brief review of the ontological and epistemological
significance of rhetoric to engineering, philosophy, and engineering ethics. I argue that
rhetoric is part and parcel of our being, and this is no less so for engineers. To practice
engineering is to deal in contingency; to be an engineer, then, is essentially to be
rhetorical, deliberative, and choice-making. Epistemologically, when science cannot
provide an answer – as so often is the case - rhetoric is the necessary alternative that
allows us to develop possibilities, deliberate, and make choices.

In Chapter Two, I introduce the first of my two research questions: can a
phenomenological approach to engineering ethics pedagogy increase not only students’
ethical knowledge and sensitivity but also their emotional engagement and
understanding of their professional and ethical responsibilities? I propose that
phenomenology – the study of experience – can inform the design of an engineering
ethics pedagogy that will open the door for engineering students to discover, examine,
and understand the experience of engineering practice in its broadest ethical contexts.
By investigating the question, “what is it to be an ethical engineer?” students will improve
ethical reasoning and sensitivity skills and also develop a relationship with ethics that will
engage them in the study of ethics, commit them to the importance of ethical practice,
and help them better understand their professional and ethical responsibilities. I review
the underlying principles of phenomenology, examine and explain why phenomenology
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has the potential to improve and perhaps transform undergraduate engineering ethics
instruction, and present a phenomenology-informed curriculum design.

At its core, phenomenology seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the nature – the
essences – of our everyday experiences, through which we acquire meaning. In my
class, the focus is on real engineers, real-world ethical engineering practice, the
everyday impact and meaning of personal and professional values, and the
“everydayness” of engineering work and ethical practice. Coursework design uses
principles and methods of hermeneutic phenomenology research in particular. Students
focus on an investigation into the question of “what is it to be an ethical engineer?”
Through readings, interviews, and discussions, they arrive at their individual
interpretations and understandings of what that experience is and means.

Chapter Three presents the methods I use to test my research questions. My research
proposes to test (1) whether a phenomenological approach to engineering ethics
pedagogy will increase students’ ethical knowledge and sensitivity and their ethical
engagement with and understanding of their professional and ethical responsibilities,
and (2) whether a qualitative methodology can be used to assess if this understanding is
being achieved by students. The setting for my research is an engineering ethics course
I taught during fall semester 2014. I provide a brief background of cognitive moral
development theory examining primarily the theories of Piaget, Kohlberg, and Gilligan.
These are the theories that informed the Defining Issues Test-2, which is the test
designed to quantitatively measure ethical reasoning skills and the one I used in my
research. I include a critique of the weaknesses and benefits of the DIT-2 and a
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justification for its use in my research. Researchers and educators are increasingly
concluding that ethical sensitivity may be a more important indicator of ethical decisionmaking and behavior than ethical reasoning as measured by the DIT-2. So I also
consider work done by Narváez and others that was used to develop the Ethical
Sensitivity Scale Questionnaire (ESSQ), which I used in my research to quantitatively
measure ethical sensitivity skills of my students.

The third and key skill that I test is whether students gain an understanding of
professional and ethical responsibilities when they take this course. I argue that ABET
Engineering Criterion 3(f) is severely underestimated by most engineering programs.
The mandate has two requirements: an understanding of professional responsibility and
an understanding of ethical responsibility, a much broader obligation than is generally
undertaken by engineering programs. I argue that, not only are engineering graduates
not acquiring the requisite understanding of professional and ethical responsibility,
assessment methods fail to disclose that failed outcome. My challenge – and my second
research question - is to develop and test a qualitative method to assess students’
understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities. I propose that Gadamer’s
philosophical hermeneutics, which identifies the conditions in which understanding takes
place, can offer a framework for assessing whether students do come to an
understanding of their professional and ethical responsibilities. I suggest four markers of
understanding: (1) a foregrounded horizon wherein are found one’s biases and
prejudices, (2) an openness to engaging and placing those biases and prejudices at risk,
(3) a dialogical encounter or conversation with a “text”, and (4) interpretation and
emergence of a new understanding or a “fusion of horizons.” I propose that, if I can
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interpretively locate evidence of these markers within the narratives written by students, I
can reasonably conclude that students have achieved an understanding of their
professional and ethical responsibilities. I then set forth a two-pronged qualitative
research design for assessment: one grounded in hermeneutic phenomenology and the
second grounded in philosophical hermeneutics. I analyze the qualitative data (student
narratives) using both methods. Methods for ensuring trustworthiness are also
discussed.

Chapter Four presents the findings from both the quantitative and qualitative research.
Results from the pre and post-tests for the ESSQ that tests ethical sensitivity show no
statistically significant change in scores. I discuss possible reasons and how a change in
testing procedure, such as using paired comparisons, might yield different results.
Results of the DIT-2 pre and post-tests, however, do show a statistically significant
improvement in scores. I concluded that there is a correlation between the
phenomenological approach to ethics instruction and improved ethical reasoning skills
for undergraduate engineering students and, also, that there is a strong possibility that
the instructional approach used in the course may have had some positive causal effect
on this improvement in ethical reasoning skills. The most important outcome with the
greatest relevance for engineering ethics instruction is that my research strongly
suggests that a one-credit engineering ethics course can improve the ethical reasoning
skills of undergraduate engineering students by a statistically significant margin. I
discuss the limitations of the DIT-2 study and how these results compare with other
studies that aim to test the impact of ethics instruction on engineering students.

23

Based on the narrative data using qualitative philosophical hermeneutics, I arrived at five
findings: (1) Undergraduate engineering students enter their final year of studies illprepared for and with apprehensions about what it is to be an ethical engineer;
(2) Students recognize their “foregrounded horizons” and the traditions and values that
shape these horizons, they gain a new wisdom about themselves, and they are open to
putting their traditions and values at risk by encountering other points of view;
(3) Students understand that professional and ethical responsibilities are complex,
broader than they previously thought, and not confined to the workplace; (4) Students
begin to understand that engineers have special duties to the public, they begin to
problematize technology and recognize that engineers do not operate as ethically
neutral technicians; and (5) Students are developing a practice of reflection and
questioning. Based on these findings and the supportive qualitative data, I conclude that
my students on the whole have an understanding of their professional and ethical
responsibilities such that they are prepared to begin their careers as novice engineers.
Qualitative assessment revealed knowledge about my students that quantitative
assessment or rubrics would not have revealed, such as their concerns and fears about
ethical engineering practice. Finally, this philosophical hermeneutic approach allowed
me to discover and assess the strengths and the weaknesses of the course. The chapter
ends with a discussion of rigor and trustworthiness of this research and assessment
project.

Chapter Five presents my concluding thoughts about my research, in three parts. First, I
discuss the significance and implications of my work, including contributions of my work
to knowledge. I have shown that hermeneutic phenomenology can be adapted to
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undergraduate engineering ethics pedagogy by designing a course centered on student
research into the question of what it is to be an ethical engineer and that this approach
can result in quantitatively measured improvement in ethical sensitivity and ethical
reasoning skills and in qualitatively measured achievement by students of an
understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities. I have also demonstrated how
philosophical hermeneutics can be used to qualitatively assess student understanding of
professional and ethical responsibilities, and that this assessment approach can give us
much more information about our students than other quantitative standardized
assessment methods do. I argue for an interpretation of ABET’s Engineering Criterion
3(f) that is far more complex and more demanding of our students than current
traditional interpretations of that criterion by engineering programs.

Second, I make some recommendations based on the overall findings of my work, the
most important of which is that engineering programs should consider making a onecredit ethics course mandatory for all undergraduate engineering students.

Third, I explore possibilities for future work, which include, for example, expanding the
research to include control groups to test the impacts of varying approaches to ethics
instruction, using paired comparisons where pre and post-tests are matched to each
student, and using quantitative ethical reasoning tests designed specifically for
engineering students. Importantly, future work includes continuation of ongoing redesign of the ethics modules used in my class and those being introduced into first-year
Engineering Fundamentals courses and pursuing research testing with these students.
Finally, I will continue to teach and to publish and disseminate results of this work.
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Chapter One
Theoretical Background
Knowledge and the Engineering Ethics Curriculum
There is a nexus between how we understand and value knowledge and how we teach
engineering ethics. Although the literature on engineering ethics education is growing
exponentially, there is little written about this connection, and that is what I will address
in this chapter. My argument is that engineering programs as a whole remain firmly
entrenched in the position that scientific and technological knowledge is privileged,
particular to certain professions, and ethically neutral. Ethics is, according to this view,
largely outside the purview of engineering knowledge and practice except as it applies to
efficiency and safety in engineering design. With these narrow exceptions, engineering
students should not be expected to trade time spent studying and perfecting technical
knowledge and skills for this mostly irrelevant non-scientific knowledge. Though it is
veiled today in accreditation-motivated language that commits engineering programs to
somehow address ethics education, this standpoint nevertheless continues to permeate
mainstream engineering ethics pedagogy. It is manifested in the student learning
outcomes that are set for engineering ethics instruction, the implicit demands that are
placed on how engineering ethics is taught, and the ways in which student outcomes are
assessed. The result is continuing and widely acknowledged dissatisfaction with the
ethical competencies of engineering students. Yet, despite all the hand-wringing,
engineering ethics pedagogy does not change. How did this come to be?

26

Knowledge: Necessity versus Contingency
“All men by nature desire to know.”
Aristotle, from Metaphysics, Book I (A)
The debate about the nature of knowledge goes back at least 2500 years to the ancient
Greeks. The life work of Plato and then Aristotle, two of the best known ancient Greek
thinkers, was to understand and explicate what knowledge is, and they are among the
first to make metaphysics the concern of their thought. Considering that the earth was
then understood to be the center of the universe and that the gods were believed to be
in charge of human fate, it is remarkable that these ancient philosophers conceived and
wrote such complex, insightful, and enduring ideas. From their commitment to the
pursuit of knowledge – and in particular, truth – emerged the chief epistemological
debate of the day: whether knowledge is universal, transcendent, certain, unchanging,
and discoverable through reason – the kind of knowledge and thinking pursued and
taught by Plato and Aristotle – or whether knowledge is also constructed, contingent,
changeable, uncertain, shaped by ideology, subject to debate and persuasion, and
perhaps unknowable at all – the rhetoric practiced and taught by the Greek Sophists.
This debate not only divided the thinkers and educators of ancient Greece but it
characterizes a dualism in philosophical thought that has endured throughout the
millennia and into the 21st century. Although the debate persists, history has certainly
privileged the former, including in particular the knowledge of science and technology.

The legacy of this debate and its ensuing tensions have significance for engineering
ethics education. My purpose here is to briefly trace the history of that legacy so we can
better understand why engineering ethics instruction remains such a contentious issue.
Plato and Aristotle argued that there are categories or taxonomies of knowledge and that
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these various kinds of knowledge are accessible only to certain people and professions.
Engineering is generally considered a technē (a technical skill requiring specific training)
that uses episteme (scientific knowledge). The question of whether and to what extent
engineering is and ought to be concerned with ethics has traditionally been answered
that, as a technē employing episteme, engineering is ethically neutral. This remains the
dominant stance of engineering and engineering education today. I will suggest in this
chapter, however, that if we consider the knowledge and skills used in engineering, we
can quite reasonably conclude that engineering practice is more accurately
characterized by contingency, uncertainty, trial and error, values-balancing, probability,
trade-offs, and debate and persuasion – the hallmarks of rhetoric. These are two very
different views of engineering, and both have their roots in ancient Greek thought.

Plato and Aristotle: Technē, Epistēmē, and Phronesis
Plato and Aristotle understood knowledge as immutable, universal, and discoverable
through reason. Through the voice of Socrates, they each identified taxonomies of
knowledge. Plato calls the knowledge that informs human activity technē, art or craft,
which is rational action. In multiple writings, Plato’s conception of knowledge and technē
is expressed as complex and multi-layered, including both quantitative and qualitative
aspects, and encompassing a wide range of human activities from science to medicine
to ship navigation to cabinet building to statesmanship. And, although the scope of
technē is broad, there are, nevertheless, multiple classes of technē which serve different
functions and which have their own sort of hierarchy. In Plato’s Theory of Texnh: A
Phenomenological Interpretation, Wild examines four categories of technē:
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(1) knowledge for its own sake, that is, scientific knowledge, which is
acquisitive rather than productive and which seeks to discover the
nature of things through the philosophic process of dialectic inquiry;
for Plato, this is principally mathematical knowledge;
(2) knowledge that includes scientific knowledge but that is also an art “of
possession or conquest” such as hunting and power over other
people by, for example, physical conquest in war or economic power;
(3) knowledge that includes scientific knowledge but that also includes
making or producing such as craft; and
(4) knowledge that commands or directs, that is, statesmanship and
education (Wild 268-273).
For Plato, these various types of technē are important in part because of who needs or
can access them, and this is determined by one’s natural position in society. In The
Republic, Plato uses the allegory of the cave to demonstrate how pure knowledge – the
forms or Truth – is accessible only to a few and that the superior knowledge is science
(Plato, The Republic of Plato). He writes that people are naturally inclined to one of three
positions in the ideal state: philosopher-king (guardian) the auxiliaries (soldiers), and
producers (craftsmen) (357a-520a). Each of them uses knowledge but only the
philosopher-king achieves access to the essences of the forms, which is accomplished
through a process Plato calls the “dialectic” (533b). This process requires extensive
education and is appropriate only for a select few.

Aristotle, a student of Plato, creates his own taxonomy of knowledge – “virtues of
thought” – in Nichomachean Ethics VI. Each of Aristotle’s five intellectual virtues is
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concerned with reason and each “grasps the truth.” The highest, and accessible to the
fewest, is wisdom (sophia). Wisdom combines the “most exact [form] of scientific
knowledge with understanding to ‘grasp the truth about the origins’ ” (Aristotle,
“Nichomachean Ethics” 6.61). Understanding (nous), grasps first principles about
origins, the knowledge on which all other knowledge depends (6.51). Scientific
knowledge (epistēmē), which is theory, and craft-knowledge (technē), which is designing
and producing, are both teachable, both involve logos or rationality, and both are used
so interchangeably by Aristotle as to sometimes make them appear indistinguishable
(Dunne 253). The principal difference is that technē is concerned with production and
things that change – this includes a broad range of professions such as carpenters,
doctors, and engineers who use scientific knowledge to design and produce products or
deliver services – while scientific knowledge is concerned with “what is necessary” and
that which is “eternal” or unchanging (Aristotle, “Nichomachean Ethics” 6.21; Mitchum
120-121). Mitchum, in interpreting Book 1(A) of Metaphysics, describes the relationship
between technē and epistēmē this way: “As a type of awareness of the world, [technē]
lies between unconscious experience and knowledge of first principles; technē is part of
the continuum that moves from sense impressions and memories through experience to
systematic knowledge, epistēmē” (Mitcham 120).

Aristotle’s fifth virtue of thought is intelligence or phronesis, which is practical knowledge
concerned with action. Its focus is on human concerns; in the words of Socrates, “The
unconditionally good deliberator is the one whose aim expresses rational calculation in
pursuit of the best good for a human being that is achievable in action” (“Nichomachean
Ethics” 6.71) or what could be also be expressed as ethical deliberation and choice
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about human affairs. Only phronesis is concerned with action – determining what is good
or bad for people – and this distinguishes phronesis from all the other intellectual virtues
or kinds of knowledge. Importantly, Aristotle distinguishes phronēsis from both epistēmē
and technē. In other words, he distinguishes knowledge associated with deliberation
about human affairs (such as ethical knowledge) from both scientific and craft (such as
engineering) knowledge. He underscores the difference between technē and phronesis
by stating “And since production and action are different, craft (engineering) must be
concerned with production, not with action” (6.32, parenthetical added). He goes on to
write that practical intelligence (phronesis) is something humans share with some
animals and that “it would be absurd for someone to think that political science or
intelligence is the most excellent science, when the best thing in the universe is not a
human being [and the most excellent science must be of the best things]” (6.62).

In Metaphysics, Aristotle again sets up a taxonomy of knowledge with scientific and craft
knowledge being superior to experience or phronesis: “the man of experience is thought
to be wiser than the possessors of any sense-perception whatever, the artist wiser than
the men of experience, the master-worker than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds
of knowledge to be more of the nature of Wisdom than the productive” (Aristotle,
“Metaphysics Book I (A)” 1.25-30). Aristotle thereby seems to create a divide internal to
his own philosophy that distinguishes and opposes the knowledge of science and
technology against that of deliberation and choice about human affairs.

The Platonic/Aristotelian conception of differences in knowledge and who can access
them has important implications for technology and engineering. The ideal state
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described by Plato in The Republic and Aristotle’s detailing of the differences in the
intellectual virtues and their particular applications are prescriptions for occupational
specialization. Along with specialization comes an alignment of ethical responsibility.
Under this structure, deliberation and ethical choice in human affairs are granted to the
statesman or philosopher-king who is now responsible for deciding what is good for the
republic. Engineering’s claim that the responsibility for ethical decision-making about the
applied uses of engineering work resides with management and policy makers arguably
derives from this argument.

A relevant question at this point is whether Aristotle really did set up technē as an
ethically neutral kind of knowledge such that engineering and other professions can
claim with philosophical justification that ethical decision making should be left to others.
Or does Aristotle’s conception of phronesis somehow attach to technē and thereby
infuse technē with ethical accountability? Surprisingly, the concept of phronesis appears
infrequently in Aristotle’s work and is explained only briefly, in Nichomachean Ethics VI.
In contrast to technē, which is “very deeply embedded in the core of [Aristotle’s]
metaphysics,” phronesis “is what might almost be regarded as a ‘deviant’ concept’ “
(Dunne 245). Yet phronesis has been ascribed enormous importance as a standard for
ethical knowledge and action. Whether it applies to technē, Aristotle does not say,
leaving the answer to interpretation and conjecture. Dunne’s central argument in Back to
the Rough Ground is that Aristotle implicitly intends for phronesis to place some ethical
boundaries on the operation of technē. He relies on two statements from Nichomachean
Ethics in support of this proposition: first, “while there is such a thing as excellence in
techne, there is no such thing as excellence in phronesis; and in techne he who errs
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willingly is preferable, but in phronesis, as in the [ethical] excellences he is the reverse”
and second, “[phronesis] rules the productive intellect, as well, since every one who
makes for an end, and that which is made is not an end in the unqualified sense (but
only an end in a particular relation, and the end of a particular operation) – only that
which is done is that; for good action is an end, and desire aims at this” (Dunne, quoting
Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics” 6.44 and 6.2). With respect to these passages, Dunne
writes:
. . . Aristotle might be taken to mean that while the execution of a work,
strictly qua actualization of one’s techne, is morally neutral, it may also be
weighted with moral value (comparing, for example, a poorly constructed
table made for a poor person to excellent flute playing for the S.S. in
Auschwitz). . . . This sentence (6.2) very explicitly subordinates one’s
accomplishments as a technitēs to one’s wider concerns as a human
being; and one might then say that it is only within this subordination, and
not within the narrow realm of techne itself, that aretē accrues or does not
accrue to one’s techne (265, parentheticals added).
Whitburn, on the other hand, vigorously argues that Aristotle divided human activity into
the “practical sciences, theoretical sciences, and productive sciences” and that he
located deliberation and decisions about human affairs within the practical sciences. At
the same time, argues Whitburn, Aristotle wrongly but deliberately categorized rhetoric
as a technē or productive science by which he effectively “reduced the stature and
scope of rhetoric through definitional exclusion. He excluded the art of ethical choice, the
selection of subject matter, and the multiplicity of human goals beyond persuasion” (25–
26). By Aristotle’s own definition, then, technē precludes ethical choice, according to
Whitman.

MacIntyre also seems to say that phronesis does not attach to technē, at least not in a
systematic way. In discussing virtues of character – that which makes a good person –
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and the intellectual virtue of intelligence (practical judgment or phronesis), MacIntyre
writes that “According to Aristotle then excellence of character and intelligence cannot
be separated” (MacIntyre 154). Moreover, according to Aristotle – and a point that
MacIntyre considers a weakness in Aristotle’s otherwise well-favored virtue theory –
“one cannot possess any of the virtues of character in a developed form without
possessing all the others” (155). Applying this maxim to a person engaged in the
practice of technē, unless that person also possesses all the excellences of character
identified by Aristotle, it simply isn’t possible for that person to have practical intelligence
or phronesis. Moreover, any attempt to exercise what that person might think is practical
intelligence is false and “degenerates into or remains from the outset merely a certain
cunning capacity for linking means to any end rather than to those ends which are
genuine goods for man” (154). That is to say, those false efforts amount to no more than
dangerous rhetoric. So the answer to this question – does phronesis attach to technē? –
is ambiguous and scholars disagree on what Aristotle intended.

The Sophists and Rhetoric
The epistemological divide over the nature of knowledge is nowhere manifested more
cogently than in the differences over rhetoric, a central part of the philosophical battle
between Plato and Aristotle, on the one hand, and the group of Greek educators called
“sophists,” on the other hand. The trade pursued by the sophists and the educational
skills in rhetoric they offered their students were roundly condemned by both Plato and
Aristotle as something that scarcely deserved to be called knowledge. The principal case
against the sophists was a twofold claim: first, they trained in and practiced dissoi logoi –
in Greek, “different words” – the concept that there are two contrasting sides to every
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argument and that both sides, however seemingly contradictory, could be argued by the
same person even within the same argument (Dzialo 221,224; Kerferd 84). Second,
because sophists were willing to take up any cause, irrespective of merit or plausibility,
they were able to use their skills in persuasion to make a weaker argument appear to be
the stronger. These two practices are symbiotic. The end result, critics such as Plato and
Aristotle charged, was the privileging of relativism and probability over truth, the very
opposite of what humans should be striving to achieve.

In Gorgias, Plato writes of a conversation between Socrates, Polus, Chaerepho, and
Gorgias in which he mocks the sophistic practice of rhetoric:
There are then these four arts which always minister to what is best, one pair
for the body, the other for the soul. But flattery perceiving this – I do not say by
knowledge but by conjecture – has divided herself also into four branches, and
insinuating herself into the guise of each of these parts, pretends to be that
which she impersonates: and having no thought for what is best, she regularly
uses pleasure as a bait to catch folly and deceives it into believing that she is of
supreme worth. This it is that cookery has impersonated medicine and pretends
to know the best foods for the body, so that, if a cook and a doctor had to
contend in the presence of children or of men as senseless as children, which
of the two, doctor or cook, was an expert in wholesome and bad food, the
doctor would starve to death. This then I call a form of flattery, and I claim that
this kind of thing is bad – I am now addressing you, Polus – because it aims at
what is pleasant, ignoring the good: and I insist that it is not an art but a routine,
because it can produce no principle in virtue of which it offers what it does, nor
explain the nature thereof, and consequently is unable to point to the cause of
each thing it offers. And I refuse the name of art to anything irrational (Plato,
“Gorgias”464C-E, 465A).
In Phaedrus, written after Gorgias, Plato distinguishes between false rhetoric and
philosophical or scientific rhetoric (Kennedy 66–67). So, although he restores
philosophical rhetoric to a respectable art, he continues to severely criticize the rhetoric
of the sophists. “One essential duty of philosophy is to guard the enterprise against such
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speculative sophistry, and the further distortions it brings with it, and to recall men to
those basic dialectical truths which are within their reach” (Wild 281).

The sophists became and remained a metaphor for all things false and dangerous. The
rhetoric they practiced was alleged to be devoid of art and was relegated to mere
technique or knack (Mitcham 118). In fact, sophistry arguably did not even rise to the
level of respectable technique because it was imbued with deception and irrationality.
Moreover, the sophistic view of knowledge was grounded in human beings and
irreverently shifted our focus from the soul, otherworldliness, and the life of
contemplation to the mundane worldliness of human affairs (Whitburn 15). Nothing
brought this point home to Plato more than the statement attributed to Protagoras: “Man
is the measure of all things, of things that are as to how they are, and of things that are
not as to how they are not” (Theaetet. 161c). So important is this statement about the
sophists that Kerferd suggests this single writing “will take us directly to the heart of the
whole of the fifth-century sophistic movement” (Kerferd 85–86) and to the central point of
controversy between Plato/Aristotle and the sophists.

Many scholars argue that the reputation of the sophists is undeserved and offer several
explanations for the harsh historic and contemporary judgment of the sophists. First, little
written work of the sophists exists so we have few primary documents to study, and what
little has been written about their actual work is unreliable (Kerferd 1). Second, what we
know of the sophists and the sophistic movement is largely through the “profoundly
hostile treatment of them” by Plato (Kerferd 1) and by Aristotle (Kerferd 5; Poulakos,
“Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric” 35; Poulakos, “Rhetoric, the Sophists, and
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the Possible” 10). Third, Plato and Aristotle were in academic and economic competition
with the sophists and, therefore, had reasons to discredit them (Whitburn 25). ScenterZapico suggests a fourth reason that goes back to the impact of literacy itself. Today we
are a dominantly literate society – enhanced exponentially by technology – where the
written word has more value than the spoken. That, he argues, makes it even harder to
appreciate the oral skills of the sophists and the conditions in which they had to practice
their profession (Scenters-Zapico 364–365). Because of historic good fortune, the works
of Plato and Aristotle survived the millennia and are esteemed while the works of the
sophists carry pejorative implications. This, it has been observed, is something of an
irony given that someone like Socrates arguably “outsophists the sophists” (Dzialo 224).

Whitburn, who is a strong proponent of the sophist Isocrates and the rhetoric he used to
train leaders in ethics and statesmanship, argues that Plato’s strong preference for the
otherworldly pursuit of Truth over action in human affairs – and his corresponding
disdain for sophistry and rhetoric – set the course for the rest of history in terms of the
privileging of science over ethics:
Humans have this dualism within them – a body associated with this
world and something called a soul associated with the otherworldly. They
are encouraged to turn away from experience associated with body – for
instance, sensations resulting from hearing and sight or emotions such as
love and fear – and turn toward experiences associated with soul – for
instance, thinking, reasoning, and knowing. They are inclined to
disparage the use of judgment to make decisions about what is particular,
concrete, changing, and temporary and to praise the effort to acquire
certainty about what is universal, abstract, unchanging, and permanent.
They turn away from action in human affairs toward contemplation of
divinity and the forms, which results in truth, knowledge, and science.
They disparage politics and admire mathematics, geometry, and
astronomy (p. 23).
Methodologies associated with philosophy and science gained stature,
while methodologies associated with the art of choice in human affairs
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remained undeveloped and underappreciated. Little effort was devoted to
the development of an art of choice that could adequately support ethical
deliberation in any area of endeavor and insure that all relevant issues
could be brought to bear in the engagement of problems. Instead,
methodologies developed to determine truths about unchanging
phenomena gained such stature that they were inappropriately used to
address problems in changing human affairs (23).

Nor is Whitburn any more kindly disposed toward Aristotle who, in his view, removed the
art of ethical choice from rhetoric by “definitional exclusion” (25-26). Aristotle – motivated
perhaps by the practical realization that the sophists were gaining widespread
acceptance and that he needed to compete more effectively for students but in a way
that would still validate his rejection of sophistic rhetoric – articulated a philosophical
rhetoric that he presented as an art or technē (Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric). LawsonTancred, one of the translators of The Art of Rhetoric, says about this work: “[Aristotle] is
at pains to integrate the activity of rhetoric within his general hierarchy of intellectual
activity. It must be assigned its place alongside those sciences and arts to which the
Platonic tradition attached greater significance. This task is achieved by the recognition
of rhetoric as a technē” (Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric 15).

Mitchum makes a connection between Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric and the
philosophical reasoning of the pre-Enlightenment and Enlightenment thinkers that would
eventually render science and technology ethically neutral:
[Under the influence of 17th century thinkers such as Galileo, Descartes,
and Newton,] the material world began commonly to be regarded in much
the same way as Aristotle looked upon words. Instead of a potentiality
unknowable in itself yet ordered toward something higher, matter began
to be conceived of as separated from any cosmic process. This trend is
easily exemplified by the Cartesian theory of matter as pure, lifeless
extension, in itself ordered toward nothing, something to do with as one
pleases. More succinctly, matter ceased to be thought of as in any sense
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living – as having, as it were, any spiritual aspirations of its own. Consider
the case of alchemy as illustrative of the ancient worldview; for the
alchemist, matter is an aspect of God. It is not so much opposed or
indifferent to spirit as it is a necessary complement. In modern scientific
theory, however, matter does come to be conceived of as wholly inert,
totally devoid of spirit. Finally, it was through the modern hiatus that
human beings began to imagine the possibility of a logos of techne. Thus
it began to make sense to use a term originally applied to the study of the
manipulation of words, then to the organization of systems of words, to
name the study of the manipulation of nature (p.133).
Technē involves logos, but only in grasping form, not in directing the
actual process of production, the activity qua activity. There is no logos of
this activity. But is this not precisely what modern technology proposes to
furnish – a logos of the activity, a rationalization of the process of
production, independent of, if not actually divorced from, any particular
conception of eidos or form? Is this not precisely why it can so vigorously
claim to be neutral, to be dependent in use on whatever human beings
want to do with it, on purely extrinsic ends? (p. 128).
Schmidt and Marratto underscore the ethical vacuum that was left by Enlightenment
thinking in their book The End of Ethics in a Technological Society:
We are arguing that the Enlightenment project in moral theory has failed
precisely because it has been unable to offer any coherent ethical
framework that might enable us to deal with the crises that have emerged
as technological progressivism has reached greater and greater speeds.
In other words, the Enlightenment has transformed our view of ourselves
and our relation to nature in such a way as to facilitate our domination of
that nature, and that very transformation, which had the effect of casting
the moral self adrift from its moorings in the natural order, has, not
surprisingly, failed to offer any compelling restraints on our collective will
to domination (167).
Arendt describes the movement to an ethically-free science and technē, tracing it from
the ancient Greek mathematician Archimedes through Descartes and on to modernity
and the contemporary human condition:
The perplexity inherent in the discovery of the Archimedean point was
and still is that the point outside the earth was found by an earth-bound
creature, who found that he himself lived not only in a different but in a
topsy-turvy world the moment he tried to apply his universal world view to
his actual surroundings. The Cartesian solution of this perplexity was to
move the Archimedean point into man himself, to choose as ultimate
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point of reference and certainty within a framework of mathematical
formulas which are its own products. Here the famous reduction scientiae
ad mathematicam permits replacement of what is sensuously given by a
system of mathematical equations where all real relationships are
dissolved into logical relations between man-made symbols. It is this
replacement which permits modern science to fulfil its “task of producing”
the phenomena and objects it wishes to observe. And the assumption is
that neither God nor an evil spirit can change the fact that two and two
equal four (p. 284).

The consequence of all of this is that the sophistic conception of knowledge – that which
is given sensuously, concerned first with human affairs, premised on contingency and
uncertainty, geared toward action – took a back seat to the more powerfully alluring
knowledge of epistēmē and technē, today’s science and technology. And, whatever
“spirit” that may have dwelled within technē has long been disregarded or discarded
altogether. This is a key insight of Goldman and one which is a fundamental premise for
my argument about the current state of engineering ethics pedagogy – that
contemporary engineering ethics education is constructed to present engineering as a
largely ethically neutral endeavor. Goldman contests this notion of engineering as
ethically neutral and identifies two models of rationality – “contingency” versus
“necessity” – that correspond to sophistic versus Aristotelian epistemologies. He argues
that, although engineering claims its roots are in the necessity based model of rationality
– that is, science – engineering is not, contrary to what engineering educators tell
engineering students, “applied science.” Rather, engineering is rooted in the sophistic
contingency model of rationality:
There is a profound difference between engineering design and scientific
theorizing that further undermines the characterization of engineering as
applied science. While at any point in time there may be rival scientific
theories of some phenomenon, in principle there can be only one theory
that is ‘true’, namely the uniquely correct account of the way things are
‘out there’. Design, however, is an irreducibly pluralistic exercise of
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reason because of the role played in design by contingent value
judgements, which from the perspective of working engineers often
appear arbitrary. These contingent value judgements – embodied in
performance specifications and specification of size, weight, production
cost, reliability, materials, time to market, manufacturability, serviceability
– determine the parameters in terms of which both engineering problems
and what will be recognized by management as acceptable solutions to
them are defined. Furthermore, designs are open ended: they evolve over
time as problem and solution parameter weights vary ” (166–167).
Goldman argues that the contingency based model of rationality is the actual “intellectual
‘home’ of engineering” (171) but that the “growing power of the cult of science” (171)
clouds this fact. Engineering lost its soul, so to speak, so that today “engineers in the
Anglo-American world have overwhelmingly insisted that they are only technical problem
solvers, that accountability for actions based on their solutions and for consequences of
those actions lies with others” (172).

All of which now returns me to my argument about the impact of this epistemological
divide on engineering ethics pedagogy. My argument is that engineering programs
remain firmly entrenched in the position that scientific and technological knowledge is
privileged, particular to certain professions, and generally ethically neutral. Accordingly,
engineering ethics should teach knowledge and application of the professional rules of
ethics, which emphasize technical excellence and public safety as ethically paramount,
while omitting and disregarding the study of engineering itself and social policy about the
uses and consequences of technology (Winner). This attitude is manifested in the
student learning outcomes established by undergraduate engineering programs and the
parameters that are placed on how engineering ethics is taught.
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Student Learning Outcomes for Engineering Ethics Education
In the late 1990s, ABET (then called the Accreditation Board for Engineering and
Technology) rocked the engineering education world when it added an ethics outcome to
the ABET Engineering Criteria 2000 for baccalaureate level engineering programs: E.C.
3(f)7 states that engineering graduates must have “an understanding of professional and
ethical responsibility” (ABET, “Engineering Criteria 2000”). This Criterion is often
considered in connection with E.C. 3(h): “the broad education necessary to understand
the impact of engineering solutions in a global, economic, environmental, and societal
context.” If an institution wants its engineering programs to be accredited, then it must
adopt and satisfy all the ABET accreditation criteria. E.C. 3(f) was controversial when it
was adopted and questions immediately arose about the willingness of engineering
programs to take the new criterion seriously (Herkert, “ABET’s Engineering Criteria 2000
and Engineering Ethics”) and whether engineering faculty would be able to teach ethics
(Schimmel). Fifteen years later, those issues are still relevant.

Engineering programs are expected to develop “performance indicators” to help
programs know if they are meeting the ABET Engineering Criteria, including E.C. 3(f).
Performance indicators are “specific, measurable statements identifying the
performance(s) required to meet the outcome; confirmable through evidence” (Rogers
7). So, for E.C. 3(f), engineering programs must develop a set of performance indicators

7 ABET establishes a number of Criteria that must be satisfied for engineering programs to
receive ABET accreditation. One of the Criteria is Criterion 3 Student Outcomes a-k. “Student
outcomes” are defined as what undergraduate engineering students are expected to know and
able to do by the time of graduation. They relate to the knowledge, skills, and behaviors that
students acquire as they progress through the program (Rogers).
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that can be used to determine if undergraduate students have an understanding of
professional and ethical responsibilities. ABET offers training on how to develop
performance indicators but does not determine what they must be. As a result, these
indicators vary widely from one engineering program to another in terms definition and
measurement. The left column of Table 1.2 includes a sample of performance indicators
for E.C. 3(f) that have been established by five engineering programs. These programs
are representative in that they identify performance indicators for assessing students’

understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities that are common to almost
all engineering programs: (1) the ability to identify ethical issues, (2) knowledge of

professional codes of ethics, and (3) the ability to analyze and resolve ethical
problems by applying professional codes of ethics or other ethical principles to the
problems. These performance indicators are almost universally applied in the form of a
rubric that measures student performance on a quantitative scale.

The ABET criterion of “an understanding of professional and ethical responsibility” is
sufficiently vague that engineering programs can meet the criterion by establishing a
range of expectations of students in terms of their ethical development. Issue
spotting and ethical reasoning skills, which are what these engineering programs
tend to measure as evidence of student “understanding of professional and ethical
responsibilities,” are skills associated with lower levels of moral development (see
Chapter Three). These skills are also perhaps the easiest to measure. Engineering
programs generally do not try to measure affective engagement with ethics, an
attitude of caring or concern that is associated with more sophisticated levels of
moral development.
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Table 1.1 - Ethics Education Performance Indicators
A Comparison of Engineering Programs to Ethics Educators/Scholars
A Sample of Engineering Program Performance
Indicators to Assess ABET Engineering
(Ethics) Criterion 3(f)
University of Kentucky (draft July 2012
www.bae.uky.edu/academics/abet/Rubrics Draft July
2012.docx
x
Ethical issue recognition
x
Application of ethical perspectives/concepts
University of Puerto Rico, Mayaguez
http://ece.uprm.edu/programs/performanceCri.html
x
Student recognizes ethical issue
x
Student evaluates ethical problem through
harm, publicity, reversibility tests
Student anticipates possible ethical conflicts
x
and includes counter-measures to reduce
possible ethical dilemma
Oregon Institute of Technology
http://www.oit.edu/docs/default-source/provostdocuments/program-student-learningoutcomes/mechanical-engineering-technology/2011-12met-assessment-report.pdf?sfvrsn=2
x
Using code of ethics, describe ethical issue(s)
x
Describe parties involved and discuss their
points of view
x
Describe and analyze possible/alternative
approaches
Chooses an approach and explains the benefits
x
and risks
University of Delaware (Civil & Environmental)
http://www.ce.udel.edu/ABET
/Current%20Documentation/Outcome_8.html
x
Understanding and adherence to professional
code of ethics and UD students’ code of
conduce
Participation in class discussion and exercise of
x
ethics and professionalism
x
Demonstration of ethical behavior among peers
and faculty
x
Takes personal responsibility for his/her actions
x
Punctual, professional, collegial. Attends class
regularly
Evaluates and judges a situation in practice or
x
as case study using facts and professional code
of ethics
x
Uses personal value system to support actions
but understands role of professional ethical
standards for corporate decisions.
The Ohio State University (CSE)
http://web.cse.ohiostate.edu/~neelam/abet/DIRASSMNT/thirdGroup.html
x
Establishes a rubric to assess students’
understanding of ethical and professional
issues in context of “p/p/e:
product/practice/event
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Ethics Educators and Scholars’
Ethics Learning Objectives for
Engineering Undergraduates
Harris, et al. (Harris et al.)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Ethical imagination
Recognize ethical issues
Analyze key ethical concepts
Deal with ambiguity
Take ethics seriously
Sensitivity to ethical issues
Knowledge of relevant standards
Improve ethical judgment
Increase ethical will-power

Huff & Frey (Huff and Frey)
x
x
x
x
x

Master knowledge of basic facts and
understand and apply basic and
intermediate ethical concepts
Moral imagination
Moral sensitivity
Adopt professional standards into
the professional self-concept
Build ethical community

Callahan/Hastings Center (Callahan)
x
x
x
x
x

Ethical imagination
Recognize ethical issues
Analyze relevant ethical concepts
A sense of responsibility
Deal with ambiguity and
disagreement

Pfatteicher (Pfatteicher)
x

x
x

Understanding of the nature of
engineering ethics (explore, define,
and defend what it is to be an ethical
engineer)
Understanding of the value of
engineering ethics
Understanding of the resolution of
problems in engineering ethics

By contrast, the right column of Table 1.1 identifies ethics learning outcomes
recommended by various engineering ethics educators and scholars and offers an
instructive comparison. These learning outcomes depart significantly from
engineering program student outcomes and performance indicators in that they aim
for higher levels of moral or ethical development, including a stronger commitment to
ethics. For example, each of the four sets of outcomes calls for ethical or moral
imagination and the ability to deal with ambiguity (Callahan; Huff and Frey; Harris et
al.; Pfatteicher), which are more complex and sophisticated skills of moral
development than knowledge of codes of ethics and the ability to identify ethical
issues connected with engineering design issues. Harris wants students to take
ethics seriously and improve their ethical will-power (Harris et al.). Huff and Frey aim
for students to build ethical communities and to adopt professional standards into the
professional self-concept (Huff and Frey). Pfatteicher places strong emphasis on
teaching students, not what to think but how to think – what she calls “breeding
inquiry vs. breeding apathy” (140).

An important point to take from this comparison between the assessment-driven
performance indicators set by engineering programs and the learning outcomes
recommended by ethics educators is to recognize that engineering ethics education
remains largely under the control of engineering faculty. That, in turn, continues to
dictate how ABET’s E.C. 3(f) will be interpreted, what engineering ethics instruction
will look like, and what will pass as an “understanding of professional and ethical
responsibilities” for our engineering students.
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Critique of Engineering Ethics Instruction
In a 2012 article entitled “Grave New World” written for Prism, the flagship
publication of the American Society for Engineering Education’s (ASEE), Pine wrote:
Over the past decade, the burst of new technologies has been
breathtaking – and often revolutionary. . . . But with these
breakthroughs have come disturbing new ethical questions that
challenge traditional ways of training conscientious citizen-engineers.
No longer is it enough for students to be taught how to respond if a
boss ignores safety standards. The engineers of tomorrow must
grapple with technology that not only empowers humans with
spectacular new tools but also threatens to break free of human
control (n.p.).
Pine’s article implicitly raises three questions relevant to engineering ethics
education: (1) whether the emergence of ethical questions arising from modern
technology that are relevant to engineers and engineering is really just a 21st century
phenomenon, (2) whether engineering education should include the study of ethics,
and, if so, (3) why current engineering ethics pedagogy fails to adequately prepare
our engineers for their professional and citizen roles?

Ethics and Modern Technology: Not a 21st Century Phenomenon
To the extent that Pine expresses the perspective of the wider engineering education
community – that technology has presented ethical issues worthy of engineering
concern only in the past decade – he affirms and seems to justify engineering
education’s failure to recognize until now the post-Enlightenment impacts of
technology and technology’s ethical symbiosis with engineering. Philosophers have
long been thinking and writing about the dangers posed by modern technology. Karl
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Marx wrote in 1859, in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, about the
impact of the industrial revolution on humankind:
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations
that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of
production correspond to a definite stage of development of their
material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of
production constitutes the economic structure of society – the real
foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to
which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of
production of material life determines the social, political and
intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men
that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that
determines their consciousness (159–160; Preface).
Technology, argued Marx, allowed for an unlimited supply of labor (factories with
repetitive mass production rather than individual craftsmen) and thus the expansion of
capital; it altered the ownership of the means of production and diminished the working
conditions for and power of labor (Harvey 119–125).

Technology as the subject of epistemological and ontological inquiry was a prominent
focus of philosophy in the 20th century. In his 1949 lecture entitled The Question
Concerning Technology, Heidegger distinguishes modern technology from pre-modern
technology. He warns us of the “enframing” dangers of modern technology. Technology
becomes our very way of engaging with the world and deludes us into believing that we
are empowering ourselves when, in fact, it is this “enframing” essence of technology that
threatens to turn everything, humans included, into nothing more than “standing reserve”
or human inventory. Contrary to many interpretations that understand Heidegger’s work
as a condemnation of technology and despite all his warnings about the dangers of
technology, Heidegger does not demand that we abandon technology. In the end,
Heidegger says we must engage in “essential reflection upon technology and decisive
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confrontation with it”; Heidegger suggests that we must never stop questioning
technology and that art or poeisis offers a platform for questioning (Heidegger, Basic
Writings 339–341).

Ellul defines technology (technique) as the “totality of methods rationally arrived at and
having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human
activity (“On the Aims of a Philosophy of Technology” 182, emphasis in original). For
Ellul, technology is not ethically neutral (“The ‘Autonomy’ of the Technological
Phenomenon” 394–395). Its defining quality is that it is autonomous: “autonomy is the
very condition of technological development” in that “technology endures no judgment
from the outside nor any restraint. It presents itself as an intrinsic necessity. . . . The
technological system, embodied, of course, in the technicians, admits no other law, no
other rule, than the technological law and rule visualized in itself and in regard to itself”
(“The ‘Autonomy’ of the Technological Phenomenon” 386). This condition of autonomy,
he argues, makes technology the dominant force in the 20th century that controls
economic, social, and political structures – upending the Marxist philosophy of
materialism that says capital is the dominant force (“The ‘Autonomy’ of the Technological
Phenomenon” 393). Like Heidegger, Ellul also finds that humans are trapped by their
mistaken belief that they control technology. And, also like Heidegger, Ellul does not
think we can get rid of technology but must “transcend” it (“On the Aims of a Philosophy
of Technology” 186). One solution he proposes in a later writing is an ethics of nonpower
where human beings exercise technological restraint and “agree not to do everything
they are able to do” (“The Search for Ethics in a Technicist Society” 9). One of the most
difficult questions that Ellul addresses in many of his writings is whose responsibility it is
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to define and impose an ethics on technology. His answer is that it rests with all of us,
educators, designers (engineers), and users of technology.

A common theme in the philosophy of technology is the warning that technology has
become an end in itself and that it alone can deliver the tools for human salvation.
Mumford writes that what makes us human is not our tool-making ability but rather
“man’s capacity to combine a wide variety of animal propensities into an emergent
cultural entity: a human personality.” Mumford states “Until man had made something of
himself he could make little of the world around him” (Mumford 345, 347). Mumford
distinguishes between two kinds of technology: polytechnics, which resembles his
conception of technē in ancient Greece, a technics that was “broadly life-centered” and
bound up with nature, versus monotechnics, which is “work-centered or power-centered”
(347). He traces the origin of monotechnics, characterized by task specialization that is
alienated from all other aspects of human life, back more than 5000 years and locates
what he calls the “Megamachine.” The Megamachine is “the human model for all later
specialized machines” (348) and is today “regarded by many as the main purpose of
human existence” (350) even though it has given us technology with the capacity to
annihilate all of humanity. As with Heidegger and Ellul, Mumford also sees a way out.
His proposal is that technology become the means of liberation for work rather than from
work – that we engage in “more educative, mind-forming, self-rewarding work, on a
voluntary basis” as a “counterbalance to universal automation” (351).

Winner invokes a 2500 year old conversation from Prometheus Bound to show that the
problems posed by modern technology are not new. Winner also warns that technology
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has become autonomous, that it has evolved into a new “technological politics,” and that,
contrary to what we may want to believe, we are no longer in control of technology. He
critiques the work of others, such as Marcuse and Ellul, as “trivial” in terms of offering
real solutions, and he addresses multiple barriers to any new paths toward technological
reform. For his part, he proposes an “epistemological Luddism.” Unlike traditional
Luddism which would physically dismantle technology to be rid of it, Winner would
deconstruct technologies through a “method of inquiry” to reveal, in a way that derives its
significance from the ancient Greek concept of technē, the “forgotten essence of
technical activity.” And he suggests three criteria by which, at the individual or group
levels, we can reconsider both existing and proposed technologies: (1) the technology
must be understandable by non-experts, in particular, the people the technology will
affect, (2) the technology must be flexible, in other words, changeable by people so that
it doesn’t acquire autonomy, and (3) the technology should create as little human
dependency as possible (Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as
a Theme in Political Thought 325–35). Winner, as with the other philosophers discussed
here, acknowledges the permanency of modern technology and its autonomous nature
but asserts that it is not too late to deconstruct technology and use the knowledge we
gain to make informed decisions about existing and future technologies.

Bunge, who is both a theoretical physicist and a philosopher of science, distinguishes
pure science from technology in a way that is similar to the distinction made by Aristotle
between epistēmē and technē: “Whereas science elicits changes in order to know,
technology knows in order to elicit changes” (173). Science, he argues, does not need
much ethical control because it is self-governing (179) but technology, Bunge says, is
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different. He argues that technology itself is not ethically neutral. To the contrary, he
writes that “technology is involved with ethics and wavers between good and evil”.
Importantly for engineering ethics pedagogy, Bunge argues that we do a disservice to
both the profession and to society when we train engineers and other technologists to be
no more than “skillful barbarian[s] who must be kept in [their] modest place as the
provider[s] of material comfort” and who are expected only “to carry on their task without
being distracted by any ethical or aesthetic scruples” which are exclusively in the domain
of management (180).

Hannah Arendt begins The Human Condition by recounting a modern technological feat,
the successful launch in 1957 of the Russian satellite, Sputnik. For Arendt, who
published The Human Condition in 1958, this event was “second in importance to no
other” because of its political implications (1). She argues that technology has changed
the labor process and, consequently, our human condition such that our lives are now
consumed by making – production and consumption – rather than on action, that is, “to
think what we are doing” (5). Despite all the threats posed by the modern predicament,
Arendt, too, is optimistic that humanity, by virtue of its plurality, its capacity for
forgiveness and promising, and the fact of our natality – that there will always be a new
generation of us – can thrive.

These voices and others make it clear that ethical questions surrounding modern
technology and its connections to engineering are not recent and, moreover, that these
questions are not unique to the modern age or the 21st century. They affirm that neither
technology nor engineering is ethically neutral and that the responsibility for ethical
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decision-making about technology does not reside with philosophers or policy makers
alone. Yet, these voices have been and are excluded from traditional engineering ethics
education. Both technology and engineering as the objects of ethical inquiry remain offlimits for traditional engineering education. Why is this? The case of the Engineering
Publicity Program introduced by MIT in the 1920s is instructive. Russell examines this
program in the context of asking whether instructors of technical writing courses whose
students are mostly undergraduate engineering majors have a responsibility – or even
the prerogative – to teach ethics.

Should Engineering Students Study Ethics?
The story of MIT’s Engineering Publicity Program, briefly, is that in 1916 MIT decided to
place greater emphasis on literature and history in its required composition courses and
hired a literary scholar to chair the department. The goal was to educate more wellrounded engineering students. The new chair, Frank Aydelotte, taught composition as
“training in thought” which meant that he pursued a literary perspective emphasizing
critique as opposed to a science, business or engineering perspective. The engineering
students, as Russell describes them, “were not much interested in having their
characters and aims of life humanized in Aydelotte’s way, and they chafed at the literary
instruction” (178). Aydelotte left after three years and was replaced by Archer T.
Robinson who changed the curriculum again and replaced the literary courses with socalled “contact courses” because, in his view, most engineering students were not cut
out for a literary education and the duty of MIT was to prepare its engineering students
with the workplace skills needed to enter their chosen careers. He introduced three
courses, The Engineering Field, The Human Factor in Business, and Engineering
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Publicity. The courses were intended to bring students into contact with engineers, most
of whom were management level, to discuss problems encountered in the professional
working world and to absorb the “ethos” of the profession. But the “ethos” that the
engineering students encountered was engineering design, writing for engineering
publication, their duties to the employer, how to manage personnel and other workplace
problems, and how to get promoted. These skills, Robinson argued, were the “ethos”
that engineering students needed to enter their profession.

This vision of professional engineering “ethos” is little changed today. In 1985, Norman
Bowie, a professor at the Carlson School of Management at the University of Minnesota,
in arguing that there is no difference between business ethics and engineering ethics,
wrote, in a way that could just as well have been penned for MIT’s contact courses:
What is a good engineer? A good engineer is one who lives up to the
obligations of her employment contract, who conforms to the etiquette of
the job situation she finds herself in, and whose individual engineering
practice at least equals the performance standards of the profession (44).

Researchers from Purdue University recently studied the perceptions of ethics of
students who worked on multidisciplinary engineering design teams at four different
universities. These institutions were selected because their engineering project teams
are multidisciplinary and designed to give students a practical “real-world” type of
engineering experience. The researchers conducted extensive interviews with the
students and used discourse analysis to analyze student responses. Although each
university had a unique “discourse” that influenced student perceptions of ethics and
although there were individual differences among students at the same institutions, there
were nevertheless some common themes raised by students during the interviews.
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Students at all institutions expressed foremost concern for the technical excellence of
their products. Students were also strongly focused on meeting their clients’
expectations, following standards, avoiding adverse legal consequences (for example,
violation of patent rights or confidentiality agreements), and being part of a team (Kenny
Feister et al.). The point here is that, although each team had its own “discourse,” the
students viewed professional ethics within a rules-based framework. Students did not
generally raise concerns about their ethical obligations toward technology qua
technology, the ambiguities and uncertainties of engineering design practice, the political
implications of engineering, the social responsibilities of engineers, and the impacts of
globalization, for example. Today’s engineering students have a perception of the
“ethos” of the engineering profession that is almost indistinguishable from the one
Robinson was aiming to impart with his contact courses at MIT in the 1920s.

Conventional thinking says that students become engineers because they are already
disposed to this type of thinking but research suggests that majoring in engineering
reinforces and perhaps even generates these attitudes among students. Colby and
Sullivan discuss several research studies that evidence this is true:
[Engineering majors] are also more likely than any other major to
graduate believing that the chief benefit of college is to increase their
earnings potential, that individuals cannot change society, and that it is
not important to develop a meaningful philosophy of life. They are less
likely than other students to be committed to promoting racial
understanding and less likely to describe themselves as altruistic or
socially concerned. Majoring in engineering is also negatively associated
with writing, listening, and foreign language skills and with cultural
awareness (335).
Moreover, citing the work of Sax, they state that the differences in social commitment
between STEM (including engineering) and non-STEM undergraduate students can be
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attributed, at least in part, to the impact of being an engineering major. In other words,
the entrenched nature of the engineering curriculum and the views of engineering faculty
toward social responsibility can reinforce and even generate these student attitudes that
mirror the century-old MIT conception of the ethos of engineering (335).

Nearly 100 years later, the question of how much and what kind of ethics instruction we
should require of engineering students remains as contentious as ever. Latour calls this
a “two-culture debate” in which “[o]ne camp deems the sciences accurate only when
they have been purged of any contamination by subjectivity, politics, or passion; the
other camp, spread out much more widely, deems humanity, morality, subjectivity, or
rights worthwhile only when they have been protected from any contact with science,
technology, and objectivity” (134). Russell, a Professor of English, offers a compromise
he calls the “kairos of critique” that respects the career choices made by engineering
students and works to prepare them for that profession by selectively critiquing – at the
right time – the “structures and values of the community that an individual student is
struggling to enter” (182). Bizell also recognizes that it is painful for students to
“deconstruct ideologies [they] hold as foundational,” especially when we give them
nothing to use in their place. She argues that higher education should help make our
students better people and better citizens. She calls for a non-prescriptive dialog
between teachers and students to discover workable alternatives that can “collectively
generate trustworthy knowledge and beliefs conducive to the common good” (671).

The adoption by ABET of Engineering Criterion 3(f) made some form of ethics
preparation for undergraduate students essential if engineering programs were to
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maintain accreditation. But years later, the ambiguity about engineering ethics and the
continued resistance of engineering programs to embrace ethics instruction remains. It
was expressed by an engineering professor quoted in the Grave New World article:
“[M]any of the [ethical] questions they raise are issues for society as a whole to decide,
not just engineers. ‘Engineers have a lot to contribute, but it’s only a small part of the
whole’. . . Students already must master a jam packed engineering curriculum, with little
time for additional electives; teaching ethics classes holds little prestige for either
engineering professors or philosophy professors; and students resist ethics classes
because they’re an elective” (Pine).

So if the answer to the question about whether engineering programs should require
some sort of ethics instruction for engineering students is a reserved and begrudging
“yes” – and that is what it seems to be – the next step is to examine and critique how
that obligation is currently being met. ABET’s E.C. 3(f) sets the threshold – an
“understanding of professional and ethical responsibility” – for ethics instruction, so
engineering programs are now obligated to do something. But how much ethics should
be taught and what it should look like are not prescribed by ABET and remain the
prerogative of individual engineering programs. Pine talked with several engineering
educators about ethics instruction in light of the ABET requirement and found many who
were skeptical about the ability of engineering programs to satisfy the criterion. Among
them was Miller, who spoke about ABET’s failure to prescribe standards for Criterion
3(f), “I worry a bit that these look better on paper than as they have actually been
implemented” (n.p.).
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A critique of the current traditional approach confirms that most engineering ethics
instruction is designed to teach students about the professional rules of conduct and
how to use decision analysis tools to resolve ethical questions that involve engineering
design or workplace issues. The focus remains on imparting particular knowledge and
ethical reasoning with little or no concern for developing emotional engagement with
ethics and an understanding of what it is to be ethical engineers.

Ethics Education for Engineering Students: Critique of Traditional
Approach
The literature on engineering ethics education is abundant and growing. It includes
periodic general accounts of how undergraduate engineering ethics is taught in the
United States. Studies that attempt to summarize the state of engineering education at
varying points during the years since ABET adopted Criterion 3(f) in 2000 include, for
example, “Engineering Ethics Education in the USA: Content, Pedagogy and
Curriculum” (2000) (Herkert), “Is Engineering Ethics Optional?” (2001) (Stephan), “Ethics
Teaching in Undergraduate Engineering Education” (2008) (Colby and Sullivan), and
“Models of Teaching Professional and Research [Engineering] Ethics” (2013) (Burbules,
Lang, and Ramsey).

Ethics instruction is delivered through (1) stand-alone courses usually taught by
philosophy faculty, (2) embedding professional ethics knowledge in engineering
coursework, thereby making engineering faculty primarily responsible for this instruction,
(3) a set of ethics modules taught usually in a first year introduction to engineering
course or senior capstone design course, and (4) other methods such as service
learning and Science and Technology Studies (STS) coursework (Colby and Sullivan;
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Stephan; Herkert, “Engineering Ethics Education in the USA”; Davis and Feinerman).
Engineering ethics is rarely a required separate course for students. Stephan examined
242 domestic engineering programs and reported in 2001 that 78% of the programs had
no across-the-board engineering ethics requirement (8). Shuman, et al. found that, of
120 students surveyed, only 17 of them had taken an ethics course and that none of
them had taken a stand-alone ethics course. Colby and Sullivan studied a diverse
selection of U.S. engineering programs by interviewing faculty, administrators and
students and by observing classes. They reported in 2008 that a “broad, intentional,
planned approach to ethics and professional responsibility was rare. . . . Overall, a
picture emerged of rather spotty and unsystematic attention to students’ development of
professional responsibility” (332).

The traditional engineering ethics curriculum – whether a stand-alone course, embedded
in technical coursework, or a set of modules – centers on ethical theory. The three most
taught theories of engineering ethics are deontological or rules-based ethics,
consequentialist or utilitarian ethics, and Aristotelian virtue ethics.8 Rule-based ethics
forms the core of ethics education. Kant gave us the supreme paradigm of rules-based
ethics, the Categorical Imperative: to act only according to that maxim by which you can
at the same time will that it should become a universal law (Kant, “The foundations of the
metaphysics of morals”). His notion of the rules that govern “right” behavior is that they
are derived through reason, they are universal, they are inviolable, and they apply

8These

are the three dominant and most taught theories of ethics. There are numerous others.
Among those most often included in edited anthologies are “contractarianism” of John Rawls from
his seminal work The Theory of Justice (Rawls) and a feminist “ethics of care” articulated by
Carol Gilligan (Gilligan). This by no means – and is not intended to be – an exhaustive list or a
dismissal of other theories.
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without exception. The National Society of Professional Engineers has given us the rules
for engineers - the NSPE Code of Ethics. Nearly all of the rules in the Code are written in
prescriptive terms, telling engineers that they “shall” or “shall not” engage in certain
conduct. At the beginning of the semester, I often ask my students to write a brief essay
reflecting on what they think it takes to be an ethical engineer. Without exception, the
students (nearly all of whom are in their final year of undergraduate studies) tell me that
the most important thing for an ethical engineer is to adhere to Canon 1 of the NSPE
Code of Ethics: “Engineers, in the fulfillment of their professional duties, shall hold
paramount the health, safety, and welfare of the public” (NSPE). Canon 1 is the single
most memorable lesson in engineering ethics that students recall from their prior four or
five years of engineering education. In their view, almost every professional engineering
ethics decision (and ethical questions, of course, almost always arise in terms of
whether a design meets risk standards) can be decided by reference to this Canon. This,
I suggest – and my conclusion is supported by research – is the depth of professional
ethical awareness of most undergraduate engineering students (Colby and Sullivan
330).

Reliance on professional codes of ethics, although the most common point of reference
in engineering ethics instruction, is criticized by Bucciarelli as being too “narrowly read,
as the framework for defining what constitutes an ‘ethical problem’. “ He cites as an
example Canon 1 which “is read as a demand for product safety – as a means to avoid
liability – not as a call to social responsibility” (11, 10). Burbules, et al. find that the value
of codes of ethics as instructional material depends on how they are used. Merely
studying codes and applying them to particular cases may increase a student’s
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knowledge about ethics but it does little to improve ethical decision-making skills (18–
19). Codes of ethics can be effective, they write, when students recognize and
understand the community values that are behind them (20). Similarly, Davis argues that
codes of ethics can only be effective if they are used interpretively (150). Wike argues
that codes and rules are a too simplistic approach to engineering ethics and mistakenly
lead students to believe that laws and codes provide all the answers to ethical problems
(n.p.). Harris warns of engineering ethics education as a system of “preventive ethics”
that consists of negative rules and disaster case studies that inadequately prepares
students for most aspects of professional engineering practice (154). Frey, who doesn’t
reject the use of codes of ethics, nevertheless sees that codes of ethics are too often
presented in instruction as products rather than as processes and that, properly
redeployed, can have instructional value (622). Haws, on the other hand, considers that
instruction using codes of ethics for engineering students locks students into what he
calls “ethical primitives” and will leave them “functioning at the level of dogma” (207,
emphasis in original).

The second theory commonly taught in engineering ethics education is act utilitarian
ethics – today more commonly known as consequentialism. Act utilitarianism requires
that we act in ways that will result in the greatest good for the greatest number
(Bentham; Mill). On its face, consequentialism appears to be a pragmatic and realistic
theory for ethical decision-making – we weigh the consequences of our various options
and we try to pick the action that will do the most good or, in some cases, the least
harm. Consequentialism is, however, deceptively simple and is, in reality, a very
complex and demanding way to live (Singer; Timmons; Baron, Pettit, and Slote). In
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terms of engineering and engineering ethics, “utility” is an attractive approach to ethical
decision-making because it relies on a variety of formulae and decision-models such as
risk analysis, cost-benefit analysis, impact analysis, and so on, to help engineering
students assign numerical values to quantifiable factors in order to calculate the best
and “right” decision. Although multiple quantifiable factors may go into the calculation,
students don’t see this process as a particularly challenging one – it requires that a
formula be applied to a set of facts in order to yield the ethically correct answer. It is a
part of the design process for which students are trained beginning in year one with
Engineering Fundamentals, and it is the first tool that students turn to when confronted
with an ethical engineering problem.

Heuristics are decision models that give students a framework and rational process for
ethical decision-making. They are often used as a utilitarian calculation and critics
typically consider heuristics and risk/cost-benefit analyses together. Such models are
plentiful – one need only Google “ethical decision making model” to find thousands of
results. A typical model systematically helps define the ethical problem, identify available
alternatives, evaluate the alternatives (applicable rules, stakeholder consequences,
costs and benefits, etc.), make the decision, implement the decision, evaluate the impact
of the decision, and make adjustments if possible. This process bears a remarkable
resemblance to the engineering design process and is what Newberry has called the
“engineer-ization of ethics” which attempts to make ethical problems “simply another
class of problem that can be tackled by our rational-scientific procedures” (350). Haws
thinks that heuristics might help students resolve ethical dilemmas but, having said that,
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he also considers the heuristic to be “just a multi-step rule, which can itself become
dogma if relied on in an unexamined way” (208).

Deontology and utilitarianism are ubiquitous in engineering ethics instruction although
they are often masked as a code of ethics and cost/benefit analysis. Virtue-based ethics,
while not a standard component of ethics instruction, is receiving increased attention in
engineering ethics education literature. Aristotelian virtue ethics holds that the right
action is that which a virtuous person would do under the circumstances. For Aristotle, it
is not enough that a person does the right thing because there is a rule that prescribes
the behavior or because a reasoned calculation would bring us to that result. Rather, the
action must be done for its own sake and it must come from the core virtuous character
of the individual. The virtuous decision is a manifestation of the virtuous person.
Hursthouse writes that virtue as a character trait is “a well-entrenched or settled state of
a person – a certain sort of way they are, through and through, all the way down – which
involves a disposition of a very complex sort” (63). In engineering ethics instruction,
virtue ethics is typically implemented in the classroom by having students study cases of
“moral exemplars” – engineers who exhibited exceptional judgment in ethically
challenging situations – or by asking students to create a “professional virtue portrait” of
a good engineer (Pritchard, “Professional Responsibility”; Stovall; Harris Jr; Gorman).
Burbules, et al. think the study of moral exemplars can inspire students but they warn
that it, too, can be taught in a way that becomes “dogmatic and hinders moral
development” (23).
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Whether ethics is taught from a deontological, consequentialist, or virtues theory
approach, the method universally employed to teach students how to use ethical
knowledge is the case study. Case studies – real or fictitious – are the applied side of
engineering ethical knowledge and they are plentiful and well-known: the space shuttle
Challenger and Columbia disasters, the Ford Pinto gas tank explosions, the Hyatt
Regency skywalk collapse, the Bhopal chemical spill, and the made-for-the-classroom
depictions of multiple ethical dilemmas in films such as Henry’s Daughter, Gilbane Gold,
and Incident at Morales (“National Institute for Engineering Ethics”). The case study
method offers the greatest opening for variety in the classroom because there are nearly
unlimited options. Instructors can show movies or documentaries, use real ethical cases
from a growing number of online engineering ethics centers or from the NSPE, make up
their own cases, or ask students to use actual project design problems from their own
coursework. The case study method permits a wide range of applications in the
classroom including class or team discussions, role play, arguing for or against a
position, essay responses, and so on.

Notwithstanding its versatility, utility, and ubiquity, the case study instructional method
garners both support and harsh criticism. It has strong defenders (Stephan 11; Harris et
al. 94–95) and it has moderate defenders, those who warn against using only disaster
cases and advises a balanced mix of good and bad (Haws), those who create a
taxonomy of cases for students to study (Huff and Frey), and those who advise students
to focus on “good news cases” rather than negative disaster cases (Pritchard,
“Professional Responsibility”). Although the case study approach is rarely questioned in
actual engineering ethics instruction, the method is severely criticized in ethics pedagogy
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literature. Winner applauds the effort to teach ethics to engineers but argues that the use
of case studies allows students and instructors to avoid the harder ethical issues that
should be confronted by engineers:
This can seem to be nothing more than a useful attempt to transcend
mere abstractions and to provide contexts for issues by locating them in
the “real world” of practice. Unfortunately, what such moves often do is to
bracket the realities of daily work in favor of hypothetical situations that
are comforting because they are so remote. . . . So-called ethics case
studies usually point students toward specific troubling incidents within
what are assumed to be otherwise harmonious patterns in ongoing
institutions. The patterns themselves, however, are not identified as
anything problematic. Indeed, it is a property of the case study approach
to education in business, law, and engineering that the contexts that
underlie particular cases are never themselves called into question. By
failing to analyze and criticize these contexts, case studies tend to
legitimate and reinforce the status quo (“Engineering Ethics and Political
Imagination” 53–54, emphasis in original).

Colby and Sullivan express reservations about the heavy reliance on case studies in
engineering ethics instruction. They point out that this approach “does not require
students to struggle with the trade-offs involved in actual engineering decisions or with
the fact that the consequences of those decisions become clear only in retrospect”
(331). Lynch and Kline also criticize the standard use of “prepackaged ethical dilemmas”
because these cases don’t reflect the conditions in which engineers actually work on a
day to day basis and, thus, do not adequately prepare them for ethical decision-making:
[These] all-or-nothing dilemmas can be disabling for students: to take the
extreme case, if the only choices one is given are to challenge superiors,
potentially losing one’s job, or accept the status quo, potentially leading to
serious, negative outcomes, students may feel that ethics involves
nothing more than a pure trade-off between sacrificial heroism and
amoral self-interest. Such cases may not promote the initial recognition of
ethical problems in ill-structured, real-world situations, nor are they likely
to give students a sense of how different elements of their work setting
and culture can impede or facilitate remedial action (208–209).
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Conlon and Zandvoort, who are engineering and technology policy faculty at the Dublin
Institute of Technology and Delft University of Technology respectively, critique the
“individualist approach” to engineering ethics as giving too simplistic a view of the
practice of engineering: (1) case studies focus on the individual actor who, alone, must
make the ethical decision between “personal sacrifice” or doing nothing; (2) students use
a code of ethics to analyze the case; this gives the false impression that rules or codes
of ethics are clear and unambiguous; (3) if rules don’t solve the problem, students look
to “neighbor-ethics” or a narrow use of moral philosophy that fails to place the ethical
question in a much broader context; and (4) case studies typically assume that “win-win
solutions” are always possible and that they can be successfully adopted and
implemented (220-221).

With their criticism of the “individualist approach” in engineering ethics instruction,
Conlon and Zandvoort open a critique of traditional engineering ethics education. This
returns us to the epistemological roots of engineering, that is, the millennia-old divide
that opposes knowledge as universal, transcendent, discoverable by reason and
ethically neutral against knowledge as contingent, constructed, emerging from
competing and often conflicting values, and requiring ethical choice. If we accept that the
practice of engineering is the latter, that it is imbued with ethics and based on
contingency and uncertainty (see, for example, Bucciarelli, Herkert, Frey, Johnson,
Goldman, and Winner), then the proper question for engineering ethics pedagogy is:
What are the ethics of the technē of engineering? Traditional engineering ethics
instruction avoids this question altogether. With its reliance on an instrumentalist
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approach to ethical decision making, it never asks engineering students to consider the
ethics of engineering itself and the essences of being an ethical engineer.

Bucciarelli says that what is needed most in engineering ethics education is attention to
“the social responsibility of the profession as a whole” (11). He challenges the value
system of the current engineering curriculum and argues that the entire engineering
program – not just ethics instruction – must be reformed so that students understand
“the social as well as instrumental challenges of contemporary professional practice and
what this might entail as the profession’s ‘social responsibility’ (and ethical behavior of
the practicing engineer)” (14). Bucciarelli contrasts object-world work, which is the
current engineering approach toward ethical decision-making – an approach that is not
consonant with the reality of engineering practice – with that of social exchange and
action:
What engineers do, and are expected to do, includes much more than
rational problem solving and constructing efficient means to reach
desired, externally specified ends. My division of the work life of the
engineer into two modes – i.e., object world work characterized as
solitary, instrumental, mono-paradigmatic, materialistic, value-neutral,
hard, certain and calculative (yet challenging in a puzzle-solving way and
empowering) and all the rest characterized as social, i.e., collective,
negotiable, ambiguous, soft, qualitative, compromising, political – is no
lofty categorization of structure unfelt, but real and recognized by
engineers themselves. It is the case, however, that object-world work is
the kind of labor seen as primary by engineering faculty – and
consequently seen as such by our students. It is what they (we) explicitly
teach in our core curricula – the “hard” stuff – whereas the social is
generally not seen, neglected, or worse yet, made a laughing matter (4).

Herkert builds on earlier concepts of microethics and macroethics and considers them in
the context of engineering ethics. “ ‘[M]icroethics’ [which is] concerned with ethical
decision making by individual engineers and the engineering profession’s internal
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relationships, and ‘macroethics’ referring to the profession’s collective social
responsibility and to societal decisions about technology” (“Ways of Thinking about and
Teaching Ethical Problem Solving: Microethics and Macroethics in Engineering” 374).
Herkert observes that microethics is the approach used in most engineering ethics
instruction. It focuses on questions of individual agency, the solitary engineer making
ethical decisions about designing safe products, not fabricating or altering test results,
and so forth. Herkert does not suggest that microethics is unimportant for students but
says that it is only part of the ethical skills that engineers must develop. Macroethics, for
Herkert, works at the collective level of the engineering profession and is concerned with
social policy and policy making. He positions macroeconomics as squarely within
ABET’s Criterion 3 that engineering graduates “understand the impact of engineering
solutions in a global, economic, environmental and societal context.”

The microethics/individual agency – macroethics/social responsibility distinction is
usually described as a continuum and is correlated with stages of moral development as
well as the teaching methods that promote one stage or another. Haws says that
students should move from lower levels of moral development to higher ones, that is, “to
a deeper ethical conviction (and more consistent ethical actions) as well as an improved
efficacy in expressing their convictions to others” (210) and this requires more complex
skills than lower level ethical reasoning. Meta-ethics, which for Haws involves an
immersion in the study of original texts of ethical theory, is the way to achieve higher
levels of moral development (209). Burbules, et al. track the microethics/individual
agency – macroethics/socially situated nature of choice and social good continuum with
how people make moral decisions and with corresponding instructional methods geared
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toward lower or higher levels of moral development (13–16). Kline also critiques the
agent-centered focus of microethics (associated with case study method) because it
narrowly analyzes what an individual engineer should do in a particular case without
considering that engineering is a social experiment to be understood in a much broader
context (16–17).

Deborah Johnson attempts to answer the question about the social responsibilities of
engineers. Though she is addressing this question in the context of military research,
she wants to come up with a broad set of principles that could be useful for all engineers
when considering what work they should or should not do when it impacts the safety and
welfare of the public. She considers three different positions – (1) a “guns for hire” view
where the engineer is a morally neutral actor who is not entitled to impose a personal
point of view on the work, (2) a purely personal view where each engineer needs to
decide if a project conflicts with one’s own personal values, and (3) a social
responsibility view where engineers consider risk to the public and can proceed only if
there is public consent to the projects. Johnson generally favors the third view and wants
only to offer a frame of reference to open the discussion because she recognizes that
such decisions are complex and raise many more questions (107, 113-114).

For Goldman and Winner, engineering ethics is not satisfied by merely taking into
account or working toward the social good. For them, engineers cannot separate
themselves from the social, economic and political structure. Goldman writes:
Engineering practice in the modern world is embedded in a very particular
social context, one that has evolved out of mid twentieth century industrial
capitalism. . . .The common denominator is the process within which
engineers function. . . . one in which engineering serves managerial
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agendas. Engineers apply their expertise to the solution of problems that
derive from these (commercial or political or military) agendas, and their
solutions enable the realization of these agendas. Engineering is thus
ineluctably a sociopolitical, as much as a technical knowledge, practice.
As a matter of historical fact, engineers in the Anglo-American world have
overwhelmingly insisted that they are only technical problem solvers, that
accountability for actions based on their solutions and for consequences
of those actions lies with others. This insistence rings hollow, however,
with deeper insight into the nature of engineering. . . .If engineering
reasoning is by its very nature embedded in action contexts, then
engineers cannot escape sharing responsibility for that action (172).
Winner also situates engineering ethics in the political. Though supportive of the
movement toward increased engineering ethics instruction, he is critical for what it does
not do. First, by promoting the idea that technology is ethically neutral and by failing to
examine the phenomenon of power, traditional ethics instruction tacitly allows
engineering students to embrace without question “the power relationships the
profession contains” (“Engineering Ethics and Political Imagination” 56). Second,
engineering ethics courses fail to explore “the question of vocation, one’s calling in a
moral sense”:
It is reasonable to expect that as a person contemplates committing
several decades to a profession, some basic issues ought to be
addressed. What are the fundamental ends of a life invested in this line of
work? What is the purpose of developing my knowledge and skill in this
direction in the first place? Who ought to control the most basic definitions
of what my vocation entails? Our educational institutions now
shortchange students by avoiding such issues, neglecting focused study
of the moral and political groundwork of the professional life.
Courses on engineering ethics tend to focus upon issues of right and
wrong in personal conduct – extremely important matters indeed. But
beginning with Aristotle, philosophers have noticed that there is a logical
juncture where ethics finds its limits and politics begins. That turning point
comes when we move beyond questions of individual conduct to consider
the nature of human collectivities and our membership in them. This calls
upon us to ponder the nature of political society and what membership in
it means for us, not merely as individual actors but as participants in a
community neglecting focused study of the moral and political
groundwork of the profession life (57).
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To this end, Winner says that engineering students must learn to engage in political
reflection. This means asking, not only the “how” questions that are so natural to
engineers, but also the “why” questions, especially important in today’s world of rapidly
emerging technologies. He urges deliberations to discover “deeply grounded reasons to
guide our choices” (60). Finally, Winner argues that engineers should recognize the
public political and policy roles of engineers:
Engineers and technical professionals are the unacknowledged
legislators of our technological age. Choices that affirm the public good or
trample it often rest in their hands. If they overlook this critical role and
responsibility, they will also acquiesce in yielding power to agents whose
ends are increasingly distant from humanity’s best (59).
Ethical responsibility now involves more than leading a decent, honest,
truthful life, as important as such lives certainly remain. And it involves
something much more than making wise choices when such choices
suddenly, unexpectedly present themselves. Our moral obligations must
now include a willingness to engage others in the difficult work of defining
what the crucial choices are that confront technological society and how
intelligently to confront them.
The first requirement, therefore, might be called the responsibility of
dialogue; the second, the responsibility of citizenship. . . . Our task is that
of bringing these practices to life for the era of high technology (62-63).

Arendt effectively brings this critique together to make practical sense about the ethics of
the technē of engineering, the role of engineers in ethical debate and decision making,
and the skills they need to do this. Arendt argues that what is “sensuously given” for
people has been replaced by a “system of mathematical equations,” an argument that
assumes science is an adopted rather than a natural way to live and that the modern
dominance of science has changed the human condition by replacing concern for action
with a compulsion for production. In the following, Arendt appears to argue that scientists
(including engineers) and politicians are not the people that should be consulted about
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the very questions that Winner, Goldman, Bucciarelli, and others claim are integral to
their ethical responsibility as engineers. But a careful reading reveals that Arendt is
arguing that the language of science and technology simply cannot give us ethical
answers and that, instead, scientists and technologists must acquire the language skills
that enable them to speak meaningfully about these questions. It is not that they should
not be heard or have nothing to contribute; rather, scientists and engineers are not today
given the skills to speak about what they know or experience:
The question is only whether we wish to use our new scientific and
technical knowledge in this [destructive] direction, and this question
cannot be decided by scientific means; it is a political question of the first
order and therefore can hardly be left to the decision of professional
scientists or professional politicians (3).
For the sciences today have been forced to adopt a “language” of
mathematical symbols which, though it was originally meant only as an
abbreviation for spoken statements, now contains statements that in no
way can be translated back into speech. The reason why it may be wise
to distrust the political judgment of scientists qua scientists is not primarily
their lack of “character” – that they did not refuse to develop atomic
weapons – or their naïveté – that they did not understand that once these
weapons were developed they would be the last to be consulted about
their use – but precisely the fact that they move in a world where speech
has lost its power. And whatever men do or know or experience can
make sense only to the extent that it can be spoken about (4).
Arendt delivers a compelling argument that engineers should participate in the ethical
debates posed by modern technology but that, to do so, they must acquire the language
or rhetorical skills – and rhetoric is taken in the way that the sophists understood rhetoric
as the skill to work with knowledge that is contingent, uncertain, and permeated with
values and ethical choice – so they can responsibly fulfill their duties both as citizens
and as engineers.
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Assessment of Student Outcomes
It is necessary to include, along with a critique of traditional engineering ethics
pedagogy, data on the results it achieves. Is ethics instruction accomplishing, at a
minimum, what ABET Engineering Criterion 3(f) requires? Two problems arise with
respect to assessment of student learning outcomes for engineering ethics. First, there
is little data on which conclusions about student learning outcomes can be based. Ethics
is considered difficult to measure and less important to assess and report than technical
knowledge for engineers. Second, from the data that is available, the conclusions seem
to be that student learning outcomes for engineering ethics are not meeting
expectations.

In their 2008 report, Colby and Sullivan found that assessment for ethics learning of
undergraduate engineering students was weak; ethics coursework was often ungraded;
and faculty saw ethics as “subjective and personal” and not assessable (333). They
reviewed 100 ABET self-studies that tracked ethical learning and concluded that the
reports from these programs were “vague and sometimes even seemed to be
inaccurate” – in other words, the very assessment data that are supposed to prove
engineering program success in meeting ABET’s ethical learning outcome criterion are
flawed and unreliable (336). Davis and Feinerman attempted to conduct an NSF-funded
study to assess ethical learning outcomes of graduate engineering students and
encountered several impediments to effective assessment, including the time it takes for
assessment testing which detracts from time spent on other aspects of the course, the
objections of faculty to the seeming irrelevance of such assessment, and challenges of
finding testing methods that offer comparability of results (5-7). Harding, et al. undertook
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a broad nationwide assessment of the state of undergraduate engineering students’
ethical knowledge, reasoning, and behavior. They reported in 2013 that ethics
assessment is usually done on a class by class basis with no generalizable results
(n.p.). So the challenges of sound assessment of ethical learning outcomes for
engineering students continue to be used as a justification for inadequate assessment
and as an argument against the requirement of ethics instruction in the first place.

Colby and Sullivan undertook a comprehensive review and analysis of several
quantitative studies on student learning outcomes for engineering ethics. Their overall
conclusion is that these studies confirm that engineering ethics instruction does not
adequately prepare students for the ethical work they will face in actual engineering
practice. They site studies of practicing engineers who report that their undergraduate
education left them unprepared for addressing ethical issues and who now express
stronger support for an ethics curriculum (334, citing McGinn) and that the ethical
reasoning skills of engineering students do not significantly improve between their
freshmen and senior years (334, citing Shuman et al.). This confirms my own experience
that the ethical reasoning skills of engineering students entering their fourth and fifth
years of undergraduate education are not significantly different from the ethical
reasoning skills for first year engineering students, as measured against the national
norms established for undergraduate students by the DIT-2 (Troesch n.p.; Bebeau and
Thoma 35). There are other studies that seek to quantitatively measure the student
learning outcomes and impacts of ethics instruction on engineering students and to
develop and test new assessment tools; and these will be discussed further in Chapter
Three, the research methods portion of this dissertation.
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Rhetoric Revisited: Its Ontological and Epistemological Importance
Previously in this chapter, I examined sophistic rhetoric as the epistemological
opposition to the certainty and truth of both idealism and science. The context was a
historiographic study of the “necessity-contingency” dualism that originated in recorded
Western history with the ancient Greeks and that continues today and is manifested in
the tensions between science/engineering and the humanities. So powerful is the
positivist position that it continues to try to set the standards for what counts as
knowledge outside of science, to the exclusion of rhetoric. For example, Perelman refers
to failed efforts to develop a “logic of value judgments” in that scientists have not been
able to successfully reduce the exercise of judgment based on values to a logical
science (512). The power of science is present and strong in education as well, requiring
teachers to institute rational “behavioral objectives” models so that learning can be
assessed by quantitative, standardized measures (Dunne 1–8), defining what counts as
an acceptable course of undergraduate study ((Miller, “A Humanistic Rationale for
Technical Writing”), and, especially for my purposes in this dissertation, whether and
what engineering students should and will study about engineering ethics (Russell).

Rhetoric is not per se the topic of this dissertation and may not be out front in the
ensuing discussions, but it is also not hidden away in the deep shadows and blocked
from our consideration altogether. Rather, rhetoric is always already there within the
penumbra of all that is written here. It has both ontological and epistemological
significance for engineering practice and for philosophy and ethics education. My
purpose here is to give a due accounting of these significances.
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We have been and continue to be mistakenly led to accept that the “self-evident” –
demonstrably certain scientific truth – is the sole mark of reason. We are asked to
believe that knowledge based on “necessity and self-evidence” (Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca) is not only the paramount but also the most useful and productive kind
of knowledge. If we think about it, however, we will find that there is very little “certain”
knowledge at all (Booth 61). To the contrary, our lives are lived mostly in uncertainty and
as rhetorical beings who dwell in the “domain of argumentation” which is that “of the
credible, the plausible, the probable, to the degree that the latter eludes the certainty of
calculations” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1). We must live as deliberating and
deciding beings precisely because most things are not self-evident. Moreover, most of
our decisions have ethical implications to one degree or another.

Rhetoric then is part and parcel of our being. Gross, who argues that rhetoric was
central to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, writes, “We are human insofar as we can
generate shared contexts, articulate our fears and desires, deliberate and judge in the
appropriate terms of our day, and act meaningfully in a world of common concern” (4).
As Goldman points out, this holds as much for the practice of engineering as it does for
our living and being in general. To practice engineering is to deal in contingency; to be
an engineer, then, is essentially to be rhetorical, deliberative, and choice-making.

Scholars debate the epistemological foundations of rhetoric. Plato depicts rhetoric as
among the lowest forms of technē, that is, mere flattery or “cookery” (Gorgias, 464C-E,
465A). George Kennedy argues that, although Aristotle was inconsistent and referred to
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rhetoric at varying times as theoretical, productive, and practical, it was Aristotle’s intent
that rhetoric was not a productive kind of knowledge but rather an epistēmē (Kennedy
77-79). A growing consensus among postmodernists is that rhetoric is praxis, the action
side of phronesis or practical knowledge (Zhao; Miller, “What’s Practical about Technical
Writing?”). Rhetoric as praxis makes the most sense, certainly from a sophistic point of
view, when we consider what rhetoric is and does. I’ll offer four interconnected
epistemological significances of rhetoric and, in particular, how they relate to science
and engineering practice.

First, rhetoric is what keeps us from operating in utter chaos:
The assertion that whatever is not objectively and indisputably valid
belongs to the realm of the arbitrary and subjective creates an
unbridgeable gulf between theoretical knowledge, which alone is rational,
and action, for which motivations would be wholly irrational. Practice
ceases to be reasonable in such a perspective, for critical argumentation
becomes entirely incomprehensible, and it is no longer even possible to
take seriously philosophical reflection itself. For it is only those fields from
which all controversy has been eliminated that can thenceforth lay claim
to a certain rationality. As soon as a controversy arises, and the
agreement of minds cannot be reestablished by “logico-experimental”
methods, one would be in the sphere of the irrational – which would be
the sphere of deliberation, discussion, and argumentation (Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca 512).

Second, when science cannot provide an answer, rhetoric is the necessary alternative. I
have said that, if we think about it, we will find that there is very little “certain” knowledge
and that, to the contrary, we live our lives mostly in uncertainty. Rhetoric is what helps us
deliberate through the mass and tangle of information about problems and find
possibilities where science ceases to be useful. Walzer and Gross provide an illustrative
example of the limited utility of science in their discussion of the decision to launch the
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space shuttle Challenger. They point out that it was the uncertainty of science and the
subsequent failure to engage in rhetorical deliberation that ultimately led to the decision
to launch the space shuttle. The engineers from Thiokol, the manufacturer of the booster
rockets used on the shuttle, could not say with certainty how the O-rings would perform
under the low temperatures that were expected at time of launch. This was not a failure
of science but rather an example of the uncertainty of science knowledge and,
accordingly, where its usefulness ends. Science could not give an answer when it was
needed. Walzer and Gross go on to uniquely argue that rhetorical deliberation – “an art
that helps find the best reasons for assent or dissent and the best reasons for decision
and action, especially in the absence of consensus among experts” – could have yielded
a no-launch decision had those in charge not reversed NASA’s safety priorities by
shifting the burden of persuasion from those who advocated for a launch to those who
advised against a launch (Walzer and Gross 427). There was no known scientific
answer, so rhetorical deliberation was the only means left to decide the fate of the
shuttle. This deliberation required an ethical decision. And that kind of deliberation did
not take place. When Goldman describes the contingency model of knowledge within the
realm of engineering practice, this is what he means. Rhetoric allows us to deliberate
and, from ambiguity and uncertainty, create new knowledge and possibilities. Its
capacity for revealing possibilities is perhaps rhetoric’s greatest value. Poulakos
compares the “possible” of sophistic rhetoric to the “ideal or actual” – a dualism that
aligns with “contingency” and “necessity” and gives an assessment of the greater
potentials offered by a sophistic rhetoric:
Unlike the possible, which is the outcome of man’s subjective experience
and imagination, the ideal is an instance of “divine madness” entirely
separate from the structure of the lived world. Further, the ideal is beyond
actualization. . . .By contrast, the possible can be actualized; and its
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actualization constitutes not the end but an origin or source of yet another
set of possibilities. . . . In distinction to the actual, which is bound to the
requirements of presence and necessity, the possible is absent and not
necessary. The actual stands for what the world is and can be discerned
by the cooperation of the senses under the purview of reason. While the
actual is tied to the reality of facts and their proof, the possible has no
special regard for facts and cannot be proved; at best it is concerned with
their extra-factual dimension we know as interpretation (Poulakos,
“Rhetoric, the Sophists, and the Possible” 221–222).
This is to say, rhetoric frees us from the rigid constraints of science and objectivity to
create and deliberate possible ideas and solutions that take into account more than
science, including ethical perspectives and the views of others. In the case of the
Challenger, for example, the astronauts on board had no idea of their fate and were not
consulted about risks and options. Aside from the ethical implications of failing to consult
or inform them, we will never know if other possibilities might have been actualized.

Third, science itself is rhetorical. Miller explains that science – what we think is absolute
and true knowledge – in fact changes, making “human knowledge thoroughly relative
and science fundamentally rhetorical” such that “[s]cientific observation relies on tacit
conceptual theories, which may be said to ‘argue for’ a way of seeing the world.
Scientific verification requires the persuasion of an audience that what has been
‘observed’ is replicable and relevant” (Miller, “A Humanistic Rationale for Technical
Writing” 615-616). Similarly, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that “judgments of
reality (science)” can have no need of rhetoric only if “the terms they contain must be
free of all ambiguity, either because it is possible to know their true meaning, or because
a unanimously accepted convention does away with all controversy on this subject.
These two possibilities, which are respectively the approaches of realism and
nominalism in the linguistic field, are both untenable” (513). Booth, in making his case
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for what he calls “listening rhetoric,” in The Rhetoric of Rhetoric, devotes a full chapter to
the intrinsic necessity of rhetoric to science. He writes:
[E]very corner of life invites not just the use of but thought about how the
language in that corner both changes realities and depends on
indemonstrable beliefs about what is real. The pursuit of knowledge
cannot be divorced from rhetorical issues. That is why in most fields most
genuine thinkers address the rhetorical questions openly, though usually
in non-rhetorical terms. They probe questions about the reliability of the
assumptions and methods on which all of them depend – often with no
“scientific” proof (Booth 59, emphasis in original).
How were they to face the unquestionable fact that most of our efforts at
communication, most of our debates, are about judgments that entail
values? How were they to demonstrate that feelings (pathos), and
reliance of character (ethos), and non-empirical forms of demonstration
(logos) are not totally separable from rational persuasion? (61, emphasis
in original).

Fourth, and perhaps most significant for philosophy in general and engineering ethics in
particular, rhetoric makes choice and action possible. If we can deliberate, we can also
choose. “Only the existence of an argumentation that is neither compelling nor arbitrary
can give meaning to human freedom, a state in which a reasonable choice can be
exercised. If freedom was no more than necessary adherence to a previously given
natural order, it would exclude all possibility of choice; and if the exercise of freedom
were not based on reasons, every choice would be irrational and would be reduced to an
arbitrary decision operating in an intellectual void” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 514).

Our capacity for choice and action is a central tenet of Arendt’s The Human Condition. It
was the substitution of making for action and our human turning from the vita activa to
that of homo faber as an attempt to avoid the uncertainty and irreversibility of action that
most worried Arendt. While she holds open the possibility for a return to action made
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possible by our human capacities for forgiveness and promise-making, she ends The
Human Condition with a critique of the role of scientists in policy making:
It certainly is not without irony that those whom public opinion has
persistently held to be the least practical and the least political members
of society should have turned out to be the only ones left who still know
how to act and how to act in concert. . . . But the action of the scientists,
since it acts into nature from the standpoint of the universe and not into
the web of human relationships, lacks the revelatory character of action
as well as the ability to produce stories and become historical, which
together form the very source from which meaningfulness springs into
and illuminates human experience” (Arendt 324).
I would argue that the “ability to produce stories and become historical” are skills that
scientists can learn and use, given the opportunity, and that rhetoric is the means and
the opportunity. Goldman would say that engineers cannot escape this responsibility:
“Engineers apply their expertise to the solution of problems that derive from these
(commercial or political or military) agendas, and their solutions enable the realization of
these agendas. Engineering is thus ineluctably a sociopolitical, as much as a technical
knowledge, practice” (172). Thus, when engineers try to claim that they are “only
technical problem solvers” with no accountability for outcomes, Goldman, responds:
“This insistence rings hollow, however, with deeper insight into the nature of engineering
and the cumulation of negative consequences of technological action. If engineering
reasoning is by its very nature embedded in action contexts, then engineers cannot
escape sharing responsibility for that action” (172).

Rhetoric, then, with its ontological and epistemological significances, is indispensable to
both engineering practice and philosophy. We are rhetorical beings, a capacity that is
not severed from our being when a person becomes or works as an engineer,
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irrespective of what engineers and engineering students might be told or might believe to
the contrary.

It may be that Arendt has unwittingly revealed the work of engineering ethics education:
to give undergraduate engineering students a setting and opportunity to explore stories
of themselves and others; to examine their traditions, histories, and values; and to
investigate and illuminate human experience as it relates to being ethical engineers and
to their professional and ethical responsibilities. This is a rhetorical endeavor.
Phenomenology, the study of experience, can inform such a pedagogy. That is what I
take up in Chapter Two.
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Chapter Two
A Phenomenology-Informed Engineering Ethics Curriculum
If there is a principal conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing, it is that the
engineering ethics instruction available to most undergraduate engineering students
isn’t producing the outcomes we want for those students. Students do not
demonstrate adequate ethical reasoning skills, (Colby and Sullivan), they express
little interest in engineering ethics and consider it trivial and unimportant (Newberry),
and they are unprepared for the ethical challenges posed by modern technology
(Pine). In short, there is widespread acknowledgement that engineering students
who graduate from ABET accredited engineering programs are ill-prepared for the
real ethical work they will face as practicing citizen engineers (McGinn; Pine). Yet,
knowing this, the teaching of engineering ethics does not change.

I propose that phenomenology – the study of human meaning from the standpoint of
experience – can inform the design of an engineering ethics pedagogy. My instinct is
that there is a connection between studying the meaning within the human experience of
being ethical and understanding ethics itself. Reynolds concludes that “any decent moral
theory must include a sophisticated phenomenology of moral experience” that “ought to
take seriously core phenomenological methodological strictures” (Reynolds 113). I
proposed that by studying the experience of being an ethical engineer – by investigating
the question, “what is it to be an ethical engineer?” – students would not only improve
their ethical reasoning and sensitivity skills but also develop an affective engagement
with ethics and an understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities that can
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prepare them for ethical practice. In this chapter, I review the underlying principles of
phenomenology, explain why phenomenology has the potential to improve and perhaps
transform undergraduate engineering ethics instruction, and present a phenomenologyinformed curriculum design.

Phenomenology
Phenomenology is “the study of essences” (Merleau-Ponty, p. vii). It seeks to discover
and describe human meaning from the standpoint of experience. For Husserl, who was
the first to bring phenomenology to the forefront of philosophical thinking,
phenomenology centered on the study of human consciousness, the understanding that
being human is to have consciousness of something and that our actions are those of
intentionality. Heidegger makes this focus on human experience explicit in the opening
line of Being and Time: “We are ourselves the entities to be analysed” (Heidegger, p. 67)
and defines this essence of our Being – of Dasein – as:
The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those
characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not ‘properties’
present-at-hand of some entity which ‘looks’ so and so and is itself
present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no
more than that. All the Being-as-it-is which this entity possesses is
primarily Being. So when we designate this entity with the term ‘Dasein’,
we are expressing not its “what” (as if it were a table, house or tree) but
its Being (67, emphasis in original).
Van Manen describes “essence” in the context of phenomenological research:
[T]he word “essence” should not be mystified. By essence we do not
mean some kind of mysterious entity or discovery, nor some ultimate core
or residue of meaning. Rather, the term “essence” may be understood as
a linguistic construction, a description of a phenomenon. A good
description that constitutes the essence of something is construed so that
the structure of a lived experience is revealed to us in such a fashion that
we are now able to grasp the nature and significance of this experience in
a hitherto unseen way (van Manen, Researching Lived Experience:
Human Science for an Action Sensitive Pegagogy 39).
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Phenomenology is grounded in the real, lived world of everyday human experience, an a
priori condition Heidegger calls “being-in-the-world.” Being-in-the-world is an
existentiale, a state of our Being, as opposed to a mere corporeal presence (Heidegger,
79). Ilsley and Krasemann state that “the task of phenomenology is to reflectively
disclose the criteria already implicit in those intentional acts that individuals perform in
everyday life through which we come to know this world” (5). Phenomenology “is to look
on lived experience as a spectacle in order to get the overall sense of it and to
understand it for its own sake” (Burch, “On Phenomenology and Its Practices” 202).
Phenomenology “approaches a phenomenon – that is, whatever manifests itself to
consciousness – in its lived aspect, with the intention first and foremost of understanding
not its causes, but the meaning the phenomenon takes on in human experience”
(Guimond-Plourde 4).

The focus of phenomenology is on the everyday lived experiences of people, what
Husserl called the “natural attitude.” It is “that province of reality which the wide-awake
and normal adult simply takes for granted in the attitude of common sense. By this
taken-for-grantedness, we designate everything which we experience as
unquestionable; every state of affairs is for us unproblematic until further notice” (Schultz
and Luckmann 3–4). “[W]hat we have primarily in mind in the expression everydayness
is a definite how of existence by which Dasein is dominated through and through ‘for life’
[zeitlebens] (Heidegger, Being and Time 422). “Everydayness refers to the absorption of
the individual into the world, it is the rhythm of life or surface existence. ‘Everydayness’
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stands for that way of existing in which the human being maintains itself everyday. It is
the practical, pre-critical way of being in the world” (Ilsley and Krasemann 11).

Importantly, “being-in-the-world” cannot be the subject of scientific, theoretical, or causal
explanations of phenomena. Rather, phenomenology describes a phenomenon and
interprets it in order to express an understanding about the essence of that phenomenon
– what is that phenomenon about, what does it mean? Unlike science and positivism
which hold that scientifically certain knowledge about causation or explanation is the
highest and perhaps only true form of knowledge, phenomenology admits the existence
and value of scientific knowledge but holds that the world encompasses more than
science, is already there, and precedes knowledge (Merleau-Ponty viii). In fact, Husserl,
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty all “placed phenomenological theorizing squarely in the
tradition of ‘first philosophy,’ and thereby affirmed its radical, ontological significance”
(Burch, “On Phenomenology and Its Practices” 191). Merleau-Ponty says that
phenomenology “rests on itself, or rather provides its own foundation” (xx-xxi). As to the
relationship between science and phenomenology, he writes:
Scientific points of view, according to which my existence is a moment of
the world’s, are always both naïve and at the same time dishonest,
because they take for granted, without explicitly mentioning it, the other
point of view, namely that of consciousness, through which from the
outset a world forms itself round me and begins to exist for me. To return
to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge,
of which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every
scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is
geography in relation to the country-side in which we have learnt
beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is (ix, emphasis in original).
Heidegger also points out the inadequacy of science to account for the ontological
facticity of our being:
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In suggesting that anthropology, psychology, and biology all fail to give an
unequivocal and ontologically adequate answer to the question about the
kind of Being which belongs to those entities which we ourselves are, we
are not passing judgment on the positive work of these disciplines. We
must always bear in mind, however, that these ontological foundations
can never be disclosed by subsequent hypotheses derived from empirical
material, but that they are always ‘there’ already, even when that
empirical material simply gets collected. If positive research fails to see
these foundations and holds them to be self-evident, this by no means
proves that they are not basic or that they are not problematic in a more
radical sense than any thesis of positive science can ever be (Heidegger
75, emphasis in original).
Phenomenology broke sharply from dualism and positivism precisely because it did not
promise certainty and universality. Descartes, in his aim for certainty, had to separate
the mind from the body in order to locate reality and certainty (Heidegger 122-134).
Kant, Hegel, and even Husserl held on to distinctions between two separate realities
(Kafle 183–184). Western thought was not unique in understanding “truth” in terms of
dualisms; Kafle describes similar distinctions present in Hinduism, Buddhism, and other
eastern thought (184-185). Phenomenology, however, renounced these dualisms and
brought the mind and body into unity. “The world is not what I think, but what I live
through” (Merleau-Ponty xvi). Phenomenology recognizes that the mind as a separate
entity from the body with separate functions (mental processes versus bodily processes)
is an impossibility because “it is precisely the relationship of the mind and the body that
is definitive of our experience and that needs to be explained“ (Russon 23–24) “The
subject and the object are not indifferent beings that might or might not come into
relation: they are already involved, each having a grip on the other” (Russon 20).

Phenomenology seeks to disclose the essences of human experiences so that we can
get a better understanding of what these experiences are like, to capture how it is to do
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or experience something and what that experience means. It is an understanding that
science cannot provide. In our everyday lives, we have experiences with both things and
with other people. While they are both part of our lifeworld, we experience things and
other people differently (Heidegger 157). Heidegger describes our “ready-to-hand”
experiences with things such as a hammer (101). Once we know how to use a hammer,
we do not have to “think” the process of hammering a nail. Similarly, a practiced chef no
longer must “think” cooking and a musician does not “think” playing the guitar (Ruspoli).
Merleau-Ponty describes the body in relation to experience and objective thought:
I move external objects with the aid of my body, which takes hold of them
in one place and shifts them to another. But my body itself I move directly,
I do not find it at one point of objective space and transfer it to another, I
have no need to look for it, it is already with me – I do not need to lead it
towards the movement’s completion, it is in contact with it from the start
and propels itself towards that end. The relationships between my
decision and my body are, in movement, magic ones (94).

The unity of the mind and body is like the unity of a work of art: “The body is to be
compared, not to a physical object, but rather to a work of art. In a picture or a piece of
music the idea is incommunicable by means other than the display of colours and
sounds. . . . [Our body] is a nexus of living meanings, not the law for a number of
covariant terms (Merleau-Ponty 150–151).

Human experience is also that of being with others:
“Being with Others belongs to the Being of Dasein, which is an issue for
Dasein in its very being. Thus as Being-with, Dasein ‘is’ essentially for the
sake of Others. . . . [B]ecause Dasein’s Being is Being-with, its
understanding of Being already implies the understanding of Others. This
understanding, like any understanding, is not an acquaintance derived
from knowledge about them, but a primordially existential kind of Being,
which, more than anything else, makes such knowledge and
acquaintance possible” (Heidegger, Being and Time 160–161).
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Heidegger tells us that Dasein’s Being-with Others is primarily a “phenomenon of care”
and that this is an essential part of Dasein’s Being (157, emphasis in original). So, even
though humans can behave in inhumane and unethical ways toward others, even though
humans can live in states of inauthenticity for perhaps their entire lifetimes, and even if
some humans can exist without being around other people, our core essential Being is
one of “care” and “solicitude” toward Others. Importantly, this attitude of care, I think, is
an intuitive opening for a phenomenological inquiry into understanding ethical behavior
and what it is to be an ethical professional.9

No quality is more central to phenomenology than interpretation. Ontologically, to live is
to interpret. It is how we are and it is what makes experience meaningful for us. We are
always taking something as something, interpreting, and it is the “primordial givenness of
our world orientation” (Schwandt, “A.(2000), Three Epistemological Stances for
Qualitative Enquiry” 194). Gadamer, considered the founder of philosophical
hermeneutics, wrote extensively about language, understanding, interpretation, and the
conditions in which meaning takes place: “[L]anguage is the universal medium in which
understanding occurs. Understanding occurs in interpreting” (390, emphasis in original);
“Understanding and interpretation are indissolubly bound together” (Gadamer, Truth and
Method 399–400; Schwandt, “A.(2000), Three Epistemological Stances for Qualitative

While Being and Time treats human experiences with things and with people as separate and
dissimilar experiences – and so Heidegger doesn’t speak about the possibility that these
experiences may overlap and intersect in some ways such that humans could and perhaps
should have an attitude of “caring” toward things as well as other people – this does become a
central theme in his later lecture, The Question Concerning Technology. Heidegger not only
warns that humans can become enframed by technology such that they are essentially and see
Others as the “things” of “standing reserve,” he also implies that we have duties of care toward
things like the environment.

9
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Enquiry” 194–196). Interpretation and understanding take place within what Gadamer
calls a “fusion of horizons” (390) whereby we bring to bear all our prior experiences,
prejudices, traditions, and so forth into our interpretation or understanding of a text (even
when the “text” is not linguistic in nature and would include, for example, actions). This is
what makes understanding our own (Burch, “On Phenomenology and Its Practices”
208). Russon describes the significance of a “fusion of horizons” in practical terms:
Probably the single most important aspect of the critique of this familiar
view [the Cartesian separation of subject and object] is found in the
recognition that our experience is always interpretive: whatever
perception we have of the world is shaped by our efforts to organize and
integrate all of the dimensions of our experience into a coherent whole.
How we go about this will be dictated by the level of our education, by our
expectations, and by our desires, and so the vision we have will always
be as much a reflection of ourselves and our prejudices as it is a
discovery of “how things really are.” In other words, the very way that we
see things reveals secrets about us: what we see reveals what we are
looking for, what we are interested in. This is as true of our vision of
things that we take to be outside us as it is of our vision of ourselves (10).

This sense of how interpretation of the “texts” of our lives occurs is integral to the
uncertain nature of understanding and what we call knowledge. Our “horizon” is not fixed
and unchanging but fluid and dialectic. “By relating with the world’s objects, beings and
things, a person is a being who perceives the world from different standpoints depending
on the situation in time and space, who perceives particular perspectives that vary
accordingly to the perceptual field – which is a horizon, that is, the place of perceptual
experiences” (Sadala and Adorno 287). Merleau-Ponty describes this as a “transitionsynthesis” (30) where immediate experience is ephemeral but not without some
transformational imprint. This forever changing horizon helps account for the uncertain
nature of knowledge because “we never understand exhaustively or with absolute
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certainty” (Burch, “On Phenomenology and Its Practices” 211). Moreover, the horizons of
no two persons are the same so there will always be different interpretations.

The impermanence and variability of our horizons does not, however, make
interpretation or understanding relative, arbitrary, or inaccurate. For one thing, our
changing horizons allow for subsequent reflection on experience against new backdrops;
although an experience occurs and we perceive it immediately, we also reflect on the
experience and allow its meaning to take on a new perspective (Russon 15; Burch,
“Phenomenology, Lived Experience: Taking a Measure of the Topic” 134). In other
words, we can change our minds about things. For another, interpretation itself, given
that it takes place within our horizons or hermeneutic situations, implies a freedom to
reflect and to choose. “Our engagement in that world (i.e., in the “disclosure of beings as
such”) is the freedom that we are. In this sense, then, for human being ‘to be’ is ‘to
interpret.’ Its essential freedom is the original projection of possibilities of meaning, a
fundamental process of interpretive understanding that takes place on the basis of a
world always already in play” (Burch, “On Phenomenology and Its Practices” 208,
emphasis in original).

Introduction to Phenomenological Research
I have been describing the ontological essentiality of phenomenology and interpretation,
that to live is to interpret. But we also use phenomenological interpretation as a research
method in order to study phenomena and gain an understanding of what they are about.
In phenomenological research, the aim is still that of discovering human meaning from
the standpoint of experience. “[L]ived experience is itself essentially an interpretive
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process that calls for a correspondingly interpretive appropriation” (Burch, “On
Phenomenology and Its Practices” 207). But the degree of interpretation appropriate for
phenomenology research is debatable, depending on the particular approach that is
adopted. Though there are several distinctions made among approaches to
phenomenology research (Butler-Kisber; Creswell; Denzin and Lincoln, The Sage
Handbook of Qualitative Research; Kafle; Finlay, “Debating Phenomenological Research
Methods”; Prasad; “The Interpretive Perspective: An Alternative to Functionalism”;
Schwandt, “A.(2000), Three Epistemological Stances for Qualitative Enquiry”; “The
Interpretive Perspective: An Alternative to Functionalism”), the two that are often
contrasted are transcendental (descriptive) phenomenology associated with Husserl and
hermeneutic (interpretive) phenomenology associated with Heidegger and Gadamer .
The most practical – and contentious – distinctions between the two are how much
“distance” there needs to be between the researcher and the experience and people
being researched and what degree of interpretation is permissible or acceptable in
describing a phenomenon.

Husserl’s idea was that the phenomenological “reduction” would allow us to gain enough
distance from a phenomenon in order to understand it without the distraction and
distortion of our own prejudices. He thought that we needed to transcend experience in
order to better grasp its true meaning and that we could do this by “bracketing out” our
“natural attitude,” something that encompasses not only personal prejudices and ways of
thinking about things but also the scientific attitude or positivism. In so doing, it would be
possible to arrive at a single essential description of the phenomenon. This view came to
be described as an impossible “God’s view” or what Nagel termed the “View from
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Nowhere” because, even though transcendental phenomenology differentiated itself
from the positivism of science, it still relied on the possibility of securing an objective
description of human experience (Matthews 14). Merleau-Ponty didn’t deny the need for
some sort of reduction , though he did recognize that the “most important lesson which
the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction” (xiii-xiv). Burch
quotes a rather cynical Adorno on the impossibility of detachment: “ ‘The detached
observer remains as much entangled as the active participant; the only advantage of the
former is insight into his entanglement, and the tiny freedom that lies in knowledge as
such’ “ ("On Phenomenology and its Practices" 203, citing Adorno 26).
The reduction – understood as the adoption of a “phenomenological attitude” that
“refrains from importing external frameworks and sets aside judgements about the
realness of the phenomenon” – has certainly not been abandoned as an element in
phenomenology research (Finlay, “Debating Phenomenological Research Methods” 19).
Transcendental phenomenology, understood as pure description, is more often
encountered today in the human or social sciences and business schools, where an
objective description is the established standard, than in humanities, where there is a
strong preference for hermeneutic phenomenology (Putnam; Schwandt). There are
exceptions to this generalization. Van Manen, for example, is widely regarded as an
authoritative voice on hermeneutic phenomenology for the human sciences.

To say that one engages in hermeneutic phenomenology does not position oneself
squarely anywhere, however. Hermeneutic phenomenology covers a broad spectrum of
interpretivism, and there is no consensus on where to draw the line on the interpretation
continuum. Burch describes this stepping back as one that requires “distance and
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withdrawal” but not so much as to “resuscitate in a hackneyed form the old metaphysical
dualism – that philosophers withdrew to a ‘higher’ region to grasp a truth always invisible
and inaccessible to ordinary folk” (“On Phenomenology and Its Practices” 202). A
relationship of inter-subjectivity develops between the researcher and research
participants such that “phenomenological research is a lived experience for researchers
as they attune themselves towards the ontological nature of phenomenon” and the
researcher becomes the “signpost pointing towards essential understanding of the
research approach as well as essential understandings of the particular phenomenon of
interest” (Kafle 188-189). Hermeneutic phenomenology “move[s] beyond description to
interpretation where the researcher actively takes a role in explaining participant
meanings” (Butler-Kisber 51). Guimond-Plourde explains hermeneutic phenomenology
as an “orientation in which the descriptive (phenomenological) and interpretive
(hermeneutic) aspects of every reflection are distinct but inseparable elements in a
process of clarification” (Guimond-Plourde 4).

Garrick questions whether interpretation is possible at all and uses postmodern theories
such as power/knowledge formations and deconstruction to argue that the authenticity
and individual agency of research participants should be subjected to greater scrutiny
and doubt. He examines experience as it is relayed by those who actually experience a
phenomenon and questions the reliability of the participants themselves who are the
source of phenomenological research (151–153). In the end, Garrick makes it clear that
he doesn’t want to set up a binary – either interpretation is possible or it is not – but he
does argue for becoming reflexive to enhance validity and reliability of interpretive
research work (154).
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Schwandt distinguishes between interpretive understanding – which (1) views human
action as meaningful, (2) has fidelity to the life world, and (3) thinks it is possible to
understand subjective meaning in an objective manner – and philosophical
hermeneutics as exemplified by the works of Gadamer. Schwandt argues that, according
to Gadamer, it is not only impossible but indeed undesirable to try to eliminate or
transcend our prejudices and traditions. Rather, to understand, we must engage these
prejudices and traditions by putting them “at risk” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 390) in
the “dialogical encounter with what is not understood” in order to challenge and test
these preconceptions. From this, understanding emerges and this is as much for the
benefit of the interpreter as it is for representing the experience under study:
[U]nderstanding is something that is produced in that dialogue, not
something reproduced by an interpreter through an analysis of that which
he or she seeks to understand. The meaning one seeks in “making
sense” of a social action or text is temporal and processive and always
coming into being in the specific occasion of understanding (195).
In this sense, philosophical hermeneutics opposes a naïve realism or
objectivism with respect to meaning and can be said to endorse the
conclusion that there is never a finally correct interpretation. This is a view
held by some constructivists as well, yet philosophical hermeneutics sees
meaning not necessarily as constructed (i.e., created, assembled) but as
negotiated (i.e., a matter of coming to terms (195).
A focus on understanding as a kind of moral-political knowledge that is at
once embodied, engaged (and hence “interested”), and concerned with
practical choice is a central element in the hermeneutic philosophies that
draw, at least in part, on Gadamer and Heidegger. . . (196).

Putnam argues for a critical approach to interpretation. Far from being objective, the
work of interpretivism is to actively use interpretation to understand and make apparent
the forces of power and oppression in society and to realize a more humane and just
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world. Putnam contrasts two interpretive approaches to the study of organizations:
naturalistic research which aims “to describe and to understand organizational reality as
it is without questioning what it could or should become” and critical research which
“strives for emancipation through a critique of social order” and that by exposing
“inconsistencies in the deep structures of organizational life, free[ing] people from a
sense of alienation and oppression” (53) Freire, a Brazilian educator and philosopher,
maintained that the goal of education should be the revealing of oppression and the
politicizing of the learner and that this is achieved, in large part, by the kind of approach
used in the interpretation of texts (57–58).

Most hermeneutic phenomenology research practice seeks a balance between the
extremes of objective description and critical interpretation. Denzin (who is himself a
postmodern social constructivist) and Lincoln contend that all qualitative research falls
within an interpretive paradigm and recognize the influence of poststructuralism and
postmodernism on qualitative research. But, rather than arguing for a single standard for
what constitutes knowledge and the role of interpretation, they acknowledge that
researcher and research participant are always socially situated and that a range of
interpretive methods is needed to study and understand experience (Denzin and Lincoln,
The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research 11–12; Denzin 152–153). Orbe and van
Manen represent this balanced approach toward hermeneutic phenomenological
research. Both locate their work within hermeneutic phenomenology. Although their
approaches are not identical, they both stress the need for what Orbe calls “radical
reflection,” an iterative process of “simultaneously thematizing, bracketing, interepreting
and then beginning the process again” (616). Van Manen takes a lead from Merleau-
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Ponty and makes “wonder” the pivotal element in his phenomenological methodology;
he says that “phenomenology not only finds its starting point in wonder, it must also
induce wonder” (van Manen, Researching Lived Experience: Human Science for an
Action Sensitive Pegagogy 44–45). Merleau-Ponty describes “wonder” as part of
phenomenological reduction:
Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of
consciousness as the world’s basis; it steps back to watch the forms of
transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slackens the intentional
threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice; it
alone is consciousness of the world because it reveals that world as
strange and paradoxical. Husserl’s transcendental is not Kant’s and
Husserl accuses Kant’s philosophy of being ‘wordly’, because it makes
use of our relation to the world, which is the motive force of the
transcendental deduction, and makes the world immanent in the subject,
instead of being filled with wonder at it and conceiving the subject as a
process of transcendence towards the world (xiv, emphasis in original).

Reflexivity is not only central to the process of interpretation, it is also essential to the
scholarly rigor of phenomenology as a research method. The positivist/science research
community has been and continues to be highly skeptical of qualitative research
precisely because of its reliance on interpretation rather than objectively determined and
scientifically proven fact (van Manen, “Phenomenology of Practice” 19–20; Denzin).
Notwithstanding current lip service given to equal consideration of “mixed methods” and
qualitative research, those who use qualitative research remain on the defensive,
continually justifying the method. For that reason, considerable attention is given to the
conduct of qualitative research so that it meets rigorous standards of validity and
reliability (Orbe; Daly; Finlay, Introducing Phenomenological Research; Garrick;
Seidman; Mischler; Guillemin and Gillam). Guillemin and Gillam describe the process
and role of reflexivity as ensuring rigor in one’s research:
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Reflexivity involves critical reflection of how the researcher constructs
knowledge from the research process – what sorts of factors influence the
researcher’s construction of knowledge and how these influences are
revealed in the planning, conduct, and writing up of the research. A
reflexive researcher is one who is aware of all these potential influences
and is able to step back and take a critical look at his or her own role in
the research process. The goal of being reflexive in this sense has to do
with improving the quality and validity of the research and recognizing the
limitations of the knowledge that is produced, thus leading to more
rigorous research (Guillemin and Gillam 275).
Phenomenology is both a theory and a research methodology. With its fundamental
ontological purpose being the investigation and understanding of lived experience, it
goes to the very core of what it is to be. As a research method, its objective is also to
investigate and understand lived experiences. My purpose here has not been to write an
exhaustive description of phenomenology but rather to explain enough of its
characteristics so that its usefulness for pedagogical practice may become apparent.

Phenomenology and Pedagogy
My argument and proposal is that phenomenology – the revealing and understanding of
lived experience – can inform a pedagogical method that helps students discover,
interpret, and understand what it is to be an ethical engineer. By investigating
experience, students can become more emotionally engaged with ethics and acquire an
understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities. Phenomenology is particularly
useful to study professional experience because it investigates the phenomenon
“starting from the origin of all knowledge – experience of the world” (Sadala and Adorno
288). Sadala and Adorno, who used phenomenology to help nursing students
understand the world of nursing on an isolation ward, found that this method is the most
effective way for students to investigate the lived professional world because they will
acquire “experience in a situation where they relate to an already given world, which is
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out there, into which they are launched and which they will have necessarily to face”
(287-288, emphasis added). In the context of engineering ethics education,
phenomenology can be a powerful way for undergraduate engineering students to
understand the experience of what it is to be ethical engineers and to help prepare them
for a professional world into which they will soon “be launched” and “will have
necessarily to face.”

Phenomenology can do this because of the intersubjective relationship that necessarily
develops between the researcher (student) and the experience and experiencers being
studied. The orientation of the students (as those who study ethical experience) is their
involvement “in the world of the research participants and their stories” (Kafle 188, 196).
This contrasts sharply from traditional ethics education which follows a positivist linear
paradigm in which students learn rules and principles of ethics along with problemsolving heuristics and then apply them to ethical problems presented in case studies.
With the traditional approach, engineering students are taught to position themselves as
objective, external observers as they confront and solve ethical problems just as they
would do in solving technical design problems. They are encouraged – indeed trained –
to be detached from the subject matter and the process. As a result, they are affectively
disengaged from ethics.

When students study ethical engineering experience from a phenomenological
perspective, however, they must necessarily become engaged with the experience itself
and the people who are experiencing it. Phenomenology allows students to examine the
phenomenon of being an ethical engineer from the inside – subjectively and
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empathetically and not as an outside unbiased observer. Students move from “knowing”
to “understanding” ethics. Solloway and Brooks, who use hermeneutic phenomenology
for classroom assessment, describe this process of hermeneutic phenomenology
elegantly:
While the act of knowing reduces learning to the mastering of facts,
understanding implies something more. . . .From this perspective student
learning is not couched in terms of domination of a body of knowledge,
but in terms of an engagement with that body as an Other to be
understood. The learning process is not seen as one of mastery of new
facts and/or skills, but as one of dialogue characterized by a kind of play,
a back and forth or to and fro movement. Through this to and fro, selfsustaining momentum of questioning and answering, the possibility of
transformation – rather than domination – occurs in the transcendence of
previous understandings and the apprehension of new insights. The
possibility of evolving wisdom and compassion is widened (45).

Phenomenology is a “powerful way for ‘understanding subjective experience, gaining
insights into people’s motivations and actions, and cutting through the clutter of takenfor-granted assumptions and conventional wisdom’ “ (Butler-Kisber 51 citing Lester 1).
“[Phenomenology’s] chief practical benefit lies instead in the reform of understanding, in
what its serious pursuit ‘does with us.’. . . The understanding that theorizing initiates and
carries forward enables one to situate what she does in a more encompassing context of
meaning and thus opens her to the possibility of acting more thoughtfully, that is, with a
view to her whole person and the wise conduct of her life” (Burch, “On Phenomenology
and Its Practices” 204). “Phenomenological research tries to describe an experience
from the point of view of the experiencer, and in the process it hopes to achieve
awareness of different ways of thinking and acting in its search for new possibilities”
(Hultgren 16). Gadamer explained the changes that come with understanding:
Understanding, like action, always remains a risk and never leaves room
for the simple application of a general knowledge of rules to the
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statements or texts to be understood. Furthermore where it is successful,
understanding means a growth in inner awareness, which as a new
experience enters into the texture of our own mental experiences.
Understanding is an adventure and, like any other adventure is
dangerous. . . But. . . [i]t is capable of contributing in a special way to the
broadening of our human experiences, our self-knowledge, and our
horizon, for everything understanding mediates is mediated along with
ourselves (Schwandt 196 quoting Gadamer, Reason in the Age of
Science 109–110).

When students move from knowing to understanding, important changes take place for
them. “From an educational point of view, phenomenology should be seen as a way to
educate our perspective on reality, to reflect on our relationship with the world, to change
and refine our point of view, to build and define our mental posture, and to broaden the
way we look at the world” (Gallagher and Francesconi 3). Similarly, engineering students
who use phenomenological methods to investigate the experience of what it is to be an
ethical engineer should be able to move from knowing to understanding professional and
ethical responsibility; this experience should change them and prepare them to be
ethical engineers and perhaps to see the world differently than they might otherwise
have done.

The core of undergraduate engineering education is teaching and developing technical
skills of engineering students. Ethics is a taken-for-granted backdrop, something that is
assumed to be understood by students to the extent it is considered relevant at all to
engineering work. “What is taken for granted is the familiar. People immersed in their
day-to-day concerns and activities normally do not give them much conscious attention”
(Hultgren 14). Heidegger recognized the importance of illuminating features of our
everydayness: “And because this average everydayness makes up what is ontically
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proximal for this entity, it has again and again been passed over in explicating Dasein.
That which is ontically closest and well known, is ontologically the farthest and not
known at all; and its ontological signification is constantly overlooked” (Heidegger 69,
emphasis in original). This is exactly what a phenomenological approach to engineering
ethics pedagogy changes. It shifts the focus from ethics as part of the unimportant
taken-for-granted background of the everydayness of engineering practice and brings
this very aspect of engineering practice to the forefront where students can investigate
and discover what is significant about ethics and about being an ethical engineer.

The principal concern of my research is to develop an ethics pedagogy that improves,
not only the ethical reasoning skills and ethical sensitivities of undergraduate
engineering students, but more importantly their emotional engagement with ethics –
that they will care about ethics and being ethical – and their understanding of
professional and ethical responsibilities. The practice of hermeneutic phenomenology
can help achieve this. Van Manen writes about phenomenology as practice, which he
describes as “an ethical corrective of the technological and calculative modalities of
contemporary life.” He speaks of the benefits that inure to such a practice, one of the
most important being that we come to “grasp the world pathically” (van Manen,
“Phenomenology of Practice” 20). Pathic understanding “is not primarily gnostic,
cognitive, intellectual, technical – but rather that it is, indeed, pathic: relational,
situational, corporeal, temporal, actional” (20). “[A] phenomenology of practice aims to
open up possibilities for creating formative relations between being and acting, between
who we are and how we act, between thoughtfulness and tact” (13). “[A] pathically tuned
body recognizes itself in its responsiveness to the things of its world and to the others
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who share our world or break into our world. The pathic sense perceives the world in a
feeling or emotive modality of knowing and being” (21). “[W]e may say that a
phenomenology of practice operates in the space of the formative relations between who
we are and who we may become, between how we think or feel and how we act” (26).
Van Manen does acknowledge the difficulty and challenges of teaching toward pathic
understanding, especially in educational settings that lean toward the technological and
calculative (20–21). Nevertheless, the potential outcome for engineering students –
moving from knowledge to pathic understanding of professional and ethical
responsibilities, ABET’s expressly stated student learning outcome – seems to be so
intrinsically rewarding that it’s somewhat surprising that hermeneutic phenomenological
inquiry is not a more commonly used as a pedagogical method.

Hermeneutic phenomenology is not entirely new to education and pedagogy. It is an
important method for education research and as a way for teachers to improve their own
teaching in the classroom (see, for example, Hermeneutic Phenomenology in Education:
Method and Practice; van Manen, Researching Lived Experience). Phenomenology as a
research method is being introduced to engineering education research (Borrego,
Douglas, and Amelink; Koro-Ljungberg and Douglas; Gallagher and Francesconi) and is
being tried in some engineering classrooms (see, for example, Borges, Silva Goncalves,
and Cunha, who use phenomenological and hermeneutic concepts to teach calculus).

Phenomenology as a pedagogical method for engineering ethics education is also not
untried or unreported. Porra, a professor at the Helsinki University of Technology in
Finland, described a phenomenological approach to ethics in design engineering at the
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2004 International Conference on Engineering Education and Research. He introduced
phenomenological methods in an existing course to help reveal to students the “values,
forces, interests, and mechanisms in society” that pose ethical questions for design
engineers (Porra n.p.). Broome described an impromptu activity he tried in an ethics
workshop to prepare students for the FEE professional engineering licensing exam. He
asked students to take the exam before he delivered his lecture. Then, also before the
students received any instruction, Broome asked them to take the exam again but, this
time, to imagine themselves as an “aged, highly mature person: a family member or
some legendary character; someone who exhibited great wisdom and caring for others.”
The results were stunning: students either failed or performed marginally on the first
exam but “maximized the examination” when they imagined themselves to be wise and
caring (Broome Jr n.p.).
Wike, who adopts a values-based approach to teaching engineering ethics, describes
values in decidedly phenomenological terms: “If, as I am claiming, the best way to talk
about ethics is in terms of values, then ethics is everywhere. Ethics isn’t ‘outside’ a
technical practice; it is already there. We just have to make it explicit” (Wike n.p.,
emphasis added). Lynch and Kline describe what amounts to a phenomenological
approach to engineering ethics when they suggest that students focus on the everyday
mundane ordinariness – the essences – of engineering ethical decision-making (Lynch
and Kline). These are all attempts to get students to understand – to experience,
describe, empathize with, and internalize – the real world phenomenon of being an
ethical engineer.
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Using hermeneutic phenomenology as a pedagogical approach to teaching engineering
ethics seems, then, to have the potential to help undergraduate engineering students
acquire and improve their “understanding of professional and ethical responsibility.” The

next question is what such an ethics curriculum would include and how it would be
delivered.

Engineering Ethics Pedagogy Grounded in Hermeneutic Phenomenology
The pedagogy I propose is drawn from my experience of teaching engineering ethics for
three semesters using an approach informed by hermeneutic phenomenology. The
curriculum was not static during each of those semesters but, rather, evolved each term
based on prior student outcomes and suggestions, my experiences in the classroom,
and what I learned from my own “phenomenology of practice.” As I write this, I already
know that the next time I teach ethics, the curriculum will have changed again. I will
describe here the principles that should govern a hermeneutic phenomenology-informed
pedagogy, the curriculum I used in my classroom and research, and comments about a
model curriculum. The curriculum I propose is one that is accessible to and useable by
both engineering and non-engineering faculty. This is important because the teaching of
engineering ethics remains primarily in the domain of engineering faculty.

The course I teach is Ethics in Engineering Design, ENT3958, a one-credit elective
course offered through the Enterprise Program at Michigan Technological University.
The Enterprise Program is an alternative to engineering senior capstone design.
Students work in multidisciplinary teams to solve real-world problems supplied by
industry. Students can earn a minor or a Certificate in Enterprise from Michigan Tech by
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completing requisite coursework. ENT3958 is an elective offered by the Enterprise
Program to fulfill the minor or certificate requirements, but it is open to all students at
Michigan Tech.

Phenomenology – the revealing of essences or the meaning of phenomena – can inform
a pedagogical method that helps students discover and understand the experience of
what it is to be an ethical engineer. In my ethics class, I give students a platform where
they use hermeneutic phenomenology research methods to investigate the question that
is the singular focus of inquiry for the course: what is it to be an ethical engineer? By
using this approach, students can come to understand professional and ethical
responsibility in a different way than traditional ethics coursework allows. They can also
achieve greater ethical reasoning skills, ethical sensitivity, and engagement with ethics.

Some time ago, I was discussing my ethics class with a colleague who is an engineering
educator. She asked me, “how can students be expected to understand what it is to be
an ethical engineer when they haven’t ever been engineers?” This is a reasonable
question, and the answer is that this is exactly what phenomenological research intends
– to make it possible for a researcher to gain an understanding of the meaning of being
an ethical engineer through studying lived experiences of others without personally
having the actual experience. It is what makes phenomenology such a powerful way for
students to study professional experience because “it tries to place a researcher in the
perspective of the research participants in order to understand their experience and
feelings, thus unveiling what it means, from their point of view, to be in the situation
within the experience” (Sadala and Adorno 288, emphasis in original).
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The course curriculum is designed to provide students with requisite background
knowledge of ethics (theory) and basic phenomenology research methods so they can
undertake and complete their coursework. When I say that students use hermeneutic
phenomenology methods to investigate the question of what it is to be an ethical
engineer, I mean that students step into the role of researcher. Assignments include
readings, reflections, writing, discussions, and interviews, all of which are part of the
research the students conduct. At the end of the semester, students write a paper that
uses their research data to express their understandings of what it is to be an ethical
engineer.

The course is about ethics, not phenomenology, and the purpose of the course is not to
train students to be phenomenologists or phenomenology researchers. But because the
phenomenological approach grounds the course curriculum and is critical to achieving
intended student learning outcomes, the students need to be able to use some
fundamental principles and methods of hermeneutic phenomenology research in order
to do their work.

I previously addressed the principal differences between transcendental and
hermeneutic phenomenological research:10 the degree of description versus
interpretation allowed the researcher and the role of the reduction or distance between

These are not the only two phenomenological research methodologies. Finlay explains the
differences among multiple – more than a dozen – approaches and contrasts how the actual
practice of phenomenological research is influenced by the methodology that is chosen (Finlay,
Introducing Phenomenological Research).
10
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the researcher and the research participants. Irrespective of these differences, there are
some key assumptions and principles of phenomenological research that all methods
share. Finlay writes that the “central concern [of phenomenological researchers] is to
return to embodied, experiential meanings” (Finlay, Introducing Phenomenological
Research 17). Creswell observes that all phenomenological methodologies rely on three
common foundations: “the study of the lived experiences of persons, the view that these
experiences are conscious ones . . . and the development of descriptions of the
essences of these experiences, not explanations or analyses” (58). Orbe identifies six
key assumptions that make phenomenology a practical option for research into lived
experience:
x

Phenomenology seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the nature and
meaning of our everyday experiences.

x

Phenomenology rejects the notion of an ‘objective researcher’ and the claims of
positivist epistemology.

x

Phenomenological method differs from traditional research in that traditional
research specifies beforehand what it hopes to discover from its research. . . .
Phenomenological questions are ‘meaning questions’ – questions that ask for the
possible meaning and significance of a certain phenomenon.

x

Phenomenology seeks to study phenomena in an open, unconstricting way.
Ambiguity is viewed as productive, necessary, and valuable.

x

Phenomenology is interested in the study of ‘persons,’ as opposed to
‘individuals.’

x

Phenomenology focuses on researching conscious experience (capta) rather
than hypothetical situations (data) (Orbe 606–608).
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These various assumptions inform the design of my ethics curriculum. At its core,
phenomenology seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the nature and meaning – the
essences – of our everyday experiences. In my class, the focus is on real engineers,
real-world ethical engineering practice, the everyday impact and meaning of personal
and professional values, and the “everydayness” of engineering work and ethical
practice. Most of my students are perplexed when I tell them they will be researching
experience, specifically the experience of being an ethical engineer. So helping them
understand what “lived experience” means is one of the first challenges in preparing
them to do their coursework research. There are two aspects to this challenge. The first
is simply getting the students to understand that everyone – engineering students
included – has “lived experience” and that this is our normal way of being in the world.
Engineering students are so inculcated into the scientific explanation for how things –
including their own selves – work technically and biologically that they rarely if ever are
given the opportunity to simply think about what it is for them to be and how “lived
experience” can be something that we actually want to and can study.

The second aspect of this challenge is helping the students understand what counts as
“lived experience” for research and how it is studied. Phenomenology rejects the notion
of an ‘objective researcher’ and the claims of positivist epistemology. The “natural
attitude” of engineering students – one that is so well cultivated by their engineering
education – is that there has to be a problem to solve and that it must be solved using an
objective, instrumental, problem-solving approach. The students want to approach their
research in this class as subjects studying objects, whether those objects are written
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texts or other people, and then they want to write a report from an objective, detached
“view from nowhere” position about what they’ve read or learned. The phenomenological
investigation of “lived experience” doesn’t fit into this paradigm. There is no problem
statement, no hypothesis, nothing to be solved. The engineers that students interview
are not objects or “individuals” whose statements are recorded and reported as data.
Each one is a person who experiences the phenomenon of “being an ethical engineer.”
For most of my students, the activity of “interpreting” written or human “texts” to express
their own understanding or meaning of lived experience is counterintuitive. It is not the
case, however, that students are incapable of doing any of this. It’s more a matter of
giving them permission to do something that, to this point in their engineering studies,
they’ve not been asked to do.

The question: “what is it to be an ethical engineer?” does not have a pre-known answer
and no theory is put forth for students to test. Instead, inquiry is a subjective rather than
objective experience in which each student explores this phenomenon and, through
interpretation, discovers his or her own answer to the question. Because there are no
fixed answers, ambiguity is expected and necessary. Becoming comfortable with
ambiguity in a profession that rejects that notion is important for many reasons. “Being
able to deal with ambiguity” is not only part of the phenomenological process and an
often-cited student learning outcome in general and for ethics, it is also a condition of our
being. Merleau-Ponty proposes a “dialectics without synthesis” that is essentially the
nature of ambiguity. Nothing ever stops for us and is complete. We constantly take in
new input, new information, new perceptions, and we somehow fit them in with
everything else that is already there. Sadala and Adorno describe this in terms of the
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phenomenological research process: “The question and the investigation remain open,
always in transformation. As in the research reported in this paper, whenever a new
horizon of knowledge was reached, when our questions could be answered, we could
see ahead new horizons of new questions and we set out a new search for more
answers. People, from this standpoint, are eternally coming-into-being, always in the
move, and, therefore, in a dialectic without synthesis” (286).
Interviewing is the chief method used by phenomenology researchers to study
experience – they interview the experiencers. So one of the course requirements and
part of the research process is that students must interview a practicing engineer. The
central topic of the interview is the everyday experience of being an ethical engineer.
Their inquiry is not about being an engineer but, pointedly, about being an ethical
engineer. Interviewing is also not a subject-object experience but an intersubjective one
where the “emphasis is on the person who experiences a phenomenon, and not on just
the phenomenon as an object in itself” (Guimond-Plourde 4). Gallagher and Francesconi
write about teaching phenomenology to researchers. They emphasize the necessity that
students understand what does and does not constitutes “lived experience” in order to
write interview questions that will help them access the lived experiences they are
investigating:
Students will often devise questions that ask the subjects about how they
think of specific things in their life. These students equate the subjects’
opinions or thoughts about their life with their lived experience. . . . What
a subject thinks about something is not the same as his or her experience
of that phenomenon. In the phenomenological court, so to speak, only
certain things count as evidence, and theory, opinion, or hearsay are not
accepted” (2).
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These interviews with practicing engineers have proven to be an extremely edifying
activity for the students, one that comes as a surprise to the students themselves who
initially resist this assignment. The interview facilitates the movement from knowledge to
understanding that is part of the phenomenological research process and, while students
are investigating the details of the everyday lived experience of being an ethical
engineer, they are at the same time thinking about and developing an idea of their own
professional ethical identity. Research confirms that undergraduate engineers develop a
sense of their own ethical professional identity far more from contact with other
engineers than from formal study of engineering ethics (Loui, “Ethics and the
Development of Professional Identities of Engineering Students” 385). Students
consistently report that the interview was the most significant aspect of their research.

There are many approaches to the procedural practice of phenomenological research.
Orbe, drawing on his own and others’ work, describes a three part process: (1) collection
of descriptions of lived experiences, (b) reduction of capta into essential themes, and (c)
hermeneutic interpretation of themes (Orbe 610–618). Van Manen defines four activities
for hermeneutic phenomenological research: (1) pick a human phenomenon to
investigate that engages the researcher, (2) study the phenomenon as a lived
experience and not a conceptualized or theoretical one, (3) identify the “essences” or
themes that depict the experience in an effort to discover the meaning of the experience
and to answer “what is it that constitutes the nature of this lived experience?” and (4) the
researcher’s interpretation must account for the whole of the experience on the basis of
its parts and the role or impact of each of the parts on the whole (Researching Lived
Experience: Human Science for an Action Sensitive Pegagogy).
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Reflexivity and interpretation are necessary and integrally related practices in this
research process. Reflexivity and self-reflection about the researcher’s own biases and
pre-conceptions – the “reduction” or “bracketing” that to some extent requires the
researcher to step back from the research – is essential to the rigor of phenomenological
research. That is a given. The issue among phenomenologists is what a researcher
does with this reduction, and this becomes a practical question for phenomenological
research. Everyone recognizes today that a complete reduction is impossible – we are
simply not capable of extracting and ignoring our prejudices, biases, and pre-conceived
assumptions from any investigation or interpretation that we undertake. Philosophical
hermeneutics not only recognizes the impracticality of trying to do otherwise but also
holds that these prejudices, biases, and preconceptions constitute part of who any
researcher is and must be embraced as part of the interpretive process, as part of the
act of finding meaning (Schwandt, “A.(2000), Three Epistemological Stances for
Qualitative Enquiry” 194–195). The essence of hermeneutic phenomenological research
is to “formulate an intersubjective reflection through interpretation” (Guimond-Plourde 4).
This does not mean, however, that such biases and preconceptions must not be
accounted for in the research, and there is no disagreement about this.

Reflexivity is in itself a complex process which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter
Three, Research Methods. For purposes of student-conducted research in my class, it is
important for students to think about and acknowledge their biases and preconceptions
as they go through the research process. Gallagher and Francesconi call this an
“awareness of one’s own mind” and go on to say that “It is of fundamental importance
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that teachers and students become aware of, and take responsibility for, their
perspectives on the world” (3–4, emphasis added). My experience has been that
students are able to account for their biases and preconceptions, at least at a level that
is meaningful for their work in the class.

In addition to these commonly-held assumptions about phenomenology, I have three
other tenets that guide the class curriculum. First, I do not assume that my students
have any knowledge of ethics as an academic course of study. And that is usually a
valid assumption. Other than an ethics module that is part of first year Engineering
Fundamentals coursework, ethics is not a required course for undergraduate
engineering students at Michigan Technological University. Almost all of the students in
my course are in the final semester or two of undergraduate studies, which distances
them by several years from that limited first year ethics instruction. That students at
Michigan Tech receive almost no formal ethics instruction and remember very little of it
was confirmed by the SEED study which, based on student and faculty focus groups,
reported that “Students agree that ethics is sparse throughout the curriculum. Several
students feel as though they do not receive much training on ethics within the
curriculum. . . . Students also state that ethics is often taught in relationship to academic
integrity. . . .” (Carpenter, Harding, and Finelli 11). So I do think it is essential to give the
students some instruction in ethical theory at the beginning of the semester. It provides
them with a theoretical grounding and it also gives them a point of departure when they
undertake the research assignments.
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Second, I am mindful of Arendt’s critique in The Human Condition of the language of
science, which is mathematical symbols that “in no way can be translated back into
speech.” As a consequence, scientists “move in a world where speech has lost its
power” (5). She writes that “whatever men do or know or experience can make sense
only to the extent that it can be spoken about” (Id.). “Language is not just one of man’s
possessions in the world; rather, on it depends the fact that man has a world at all. . . .
Thus, that language is originarily human means at the same time that man’s being-inthe-world is primordially linguistic” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 440). The point of my
class is not singularly for engineering students to engage in a research activity that
investigates the lived experience of being an ethical engineer. In doing this, it is just as
important that my students be able to write and speak a language not exclusively of
science but one that expresses meaning derived from experience. This is what will
enable them to contribute to – to make sense of – the ethical debates they will face as
citizens and engineers. Gadamer also wrote:
Language and thinking about things are so bound together that it is an
abstraction to conceive of the system of truths as a pregiven system of
possibilities of being for which the signifying subject selects
corresponding signs. A word is not a sign that one selects, nor is it a sign
that one makes or gives to another; it is not an existent thing that one
picks up and gives an ideality of meaning in order to make another being
visible through it. . . . Rather the ideality of the meaning lies in the word
itself. It is meaningful already. But this does not imply, on the other hand,
that the word precedes all experience and simply advenes to an
experience in an external way, by subjecting itself to it. Experience is not
wordless to begin with, subsequently becoming an object of reflection by
being named, by being subsumed under the universality of the word.
Rather, experience of itself seeks and finds words that express it. We
seek the right word – i.e., the word that really belongs to the thing – so
that in it the thing comes into language (Truth and Method 416–417).
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We live in language and, probably for that reason, it is taken for granted and not always
given its due. This is all the more so in a world that privileges positivism and reason over
emotion, experience, and Truth.

Third, and this is a corollary of my own “phenomenology of practice” and reflexivity, my
role in this ethics classroom is teacher, advisor, and mentor. One of the often-expressed
concerns of engineering faculty about humanities faculty and the subject matter we
teach is that we intend to perform mind melds on our engineering students that will
somehow change them into beings no longer suited for science. Indeed knowing where
to draw the line between “teaching” and “preaching” in humanities classes is a longdebated, and unresolved problem. I refer back, for example, to the debate about
technical writing education and the outcry at MIT when a humanities-based approach
was introduced to its Engineering Publicity Program, discussed supra in Chapter One.
Russell, on the one hand, doesn’t think it is his place to ask engineering students to
question at a fundamental ethical level the profession they’ve chosen to enter; rather, it
is his job to give them the tools so that they are well-prepared and empowered to enter
their chosen professions (Russell 183–184). Winner, on the other hand, argues that
questioning both one’s profession and its policies is one of the core functions of
engineering ethics education (Winner Engineering Ethics and Political Imagination).

My thinking is that I am obliged to create a climate where my students can recognize
and consider such questions on their own initiative. Using a phenomenological approach
and structuring the class as inquiry into being an ethical engineer can help create a
climate for exploration, discovery, questioning, and reflection. Students need guidance
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and advising in this process, of course. Ethics as academic study is not familiar subject
matter to most or all of the students, a new research method is being introduced, and
there is much ground to cover in this one-credit course, all of which requires direction.
I’ve found that, with a broad range of readings, their face-to-face interviews with
engineers, and the opportunity for reflection, class discussion, and personal meetings
between me and my students, they are for the most part quite capable of raising and
addressing issues that they hadn’t previously thought much about, including the question
of whether or not being an engineer is the right thing for them.

The Place of Values in Engineering Ethics Education
Pfatteicher addresses “teaching versus preaching” in engineering ethics education and
probably echoes the prevailing attitude toward how instructors should approach the job
of teaching engineering ethics. She acknowledges that it’s impossible to extract ideology
from the classroom but she certainly argues that it should be minimized as much as
possible, at least on the part of the instructor. She argues that, if teaching inculcates any
beliefs at all, it should be that instructors “inculcate belief about the value of critical
thinking” (Pfatteicher 139). I think that Pfatteicher is preaching to the masses of college
instructors, none of whom is likely to disagree with her statement. I agree with much of
what she writes. For example, she proposes that one objective for undergraduate
engineering ethics instruction ought to be that students have an “understanding of the
nature of engineering ethics” and she includes in this inquiry not only engineering ethics
design dilemmas but whether professional ethics should or does extend to the social and
economic consequences of technology and to an engineer’s personal life (137-138). She
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argues that students need to learn to question the world around them and that they must
learn to be comfortable with ambiguity (140).

But I disagree with Pfatteicher’s argument that another objective for engineering ethics
instruction is that students should understand “the value of engineering ethics, as
opposed to the values of an ethical engineer” (138). We should give them reasons for
why they should be ethical but we should not get into the values that engineers have.
There are at least two problems with this. First, in terms of students understanding why
they should act ethically, Pfatteicher tells us that that students should be told the risks of
unethical behavior and the rewards of ethical behavior. This, on its own, is an
instrumental approach to engineering ethics and is nothing more than a variant of costbenefit analysis – a calculation of how much I stand to gain or lose in making any ethical
decision.

What Pfatteicher says about the values of engineers is more concerning to me.
Pfatteicher clearly considers the study of the values of engineers to be off-limits for
engineering ethics education. I speculate that her reasoning is that a discussion of
values too closely approaches that line of “preaching.” I disagree. I am not arguing that
we as ethics instructors should or must prescribe a set of values to our students. In fact,
we should not, but that doesn’t mean we should not ask students to think about values
and their impact on ethical decision-making. To take the examination of and reflection on
values completely off the table is, not only unjustified in the sense that values are central
to ethics and ethical experience, but counterproductive if we want our students to
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understand – in the pathic sense of caring about – engineering ethics and being ethical
engineers.

Traditional ethics instruction assumes that deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue are
complete in themselves – that we can derive what we need to know about ethics from
these theories and then use them in ethical decision-making. What this assumption
ignores is the role of values that operate in the background of all ethical theory. Values
cross all theoretical boundaries. Both deontological and consequentialist ethics are
premised on complex sets of values, even though the values are not always obvious or
explicit. The virtuous engineer is virtuous because he or she holds fundamental values
that inform and define virtuous behavior. Blackburn tells us that, in the end, ethical
progress is “given from the values we deploy” (Blackburn 134). To rely on rules, costbenefit analyses, or just being a good person as the basis for ethical decision-making
without examining underlying values is the equivalent of an ethical house built on sand.

If our purpose in engineering ethics instruction is to prepare engineering students to enter
the world of engineering practice, then we cannot possibly accomplish that outcome if we
exclude examination of values from the ethics curriculum. “As engineering exemplifies a
practice that successfully couples values and knowledge to ‘the world’, pursuing a
philosophy of rational action by studying engineering practice seems a particularly
promising vehicle for exploring experience as itself a source of values” (Goldman 175,
emphasis added). Bucciarelli divides the work life of an engineer into an object world
where engineers perform their technical and instrumental problem-solving work – and
this, he says, constitutes only a part of the actual work world of engineering – and the
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social. The former, he says, is the one we associate with engineering and it is the one
that gets the most attention, to the neglect of the latter, in engineering education. “Once
one acknowledges that the challenges participants face are not wholly amendable to
instrumental resolution and that social exchange and action is part and parcel of an
engineer’s work, engineering practice appears as a much richer experience, one in which
values and value judgments, often not made explicit – about the user, about robustness,
about innovation, quality, about responsibilities, safety, social benefit, risks and cost – are
made” (Bucciarelli 4). Wike, who uses a values-based approach in engineering ethics
instruction, reminds us that “(1) values are fundamental; (2) values are familiar; and (3)
values are inclusive and pluralistic. . . . If, as I am claiming, the best way to talk about
ethics is in terms of values, then ethics is everywhere. Ethics isn’t ‘outside’ a technical
practice; it is already there. We just have to make it explicit” (Wike n.p.). Stephan
addresses the question of whether engineering ethics is optional and, quoting John
Staudenmaier, offers the most practical reason of all for students to think about values
(their own and those of engineers), how values are prioritized, and how values influence
ethical decision-making: “. . . professionals need to think through their own ethical
standards before situations arise in which they will have to apply those standards by
making choices. The moment of choice is no time to begin figuring out what you stand
for. . . “ (Stephan 12 quoting Staudenmaier 94).

Values are not to be considered the same thing as virtue ethics. These terms are often
used interchangeably, although I intend and understand a clear distinction between
them. This will also help explain why virtue ethics is not, by itself, a “good enough”
theory to ground a course in engineering ethics. As I’ve stated, a values-centered

119

approach to engineering ethics does not supplant virtue ethics or any other theory of
ethics for that matter. But reflection on values, as a place to start in studying what it is to
be an ethical engineer, offers something that other ethical theories, including virtue
ethics, cannot give us, and that is a deeper awareness of ourselves, what is important to
us, how we prioritize things in life, and how we make ethical decisions. I consider values
as an accessible way to think about ethics for those of us who are mere ordinary people
who cannot expect or hope to live the perfectly ethical life of Aristotle’s virtuous person.

Virtue ethics arises from the Aristotelian notion of the virtuous person and the multiple
virtues of character and intelligence such a person would possess as laid out by Aristotle
in his writings, principally in Nichomachean Ethics. Aristotle is unwavering in his
conviction that the virtuous person is virtuous through and through (Hursthouse 63). This
is not someone who merely does the right thing; the virtuous person acts virtuously
because that is who the person is. To be a virtuous person requires “a capability to judge
and to do the right thing in the right place at the right time in the right way” (MacIntyre
150). The virtuous person must possess, in addition to practical intelligence, all the
virtues of character fully developed – a so-called “unity of virtues” (MacIntyre 155), all of
which makes the virtuous person exceedingly rare. Ethics scholars and educators who
advocate for a virtues-based approach to engineering ethics usually begin with Aristotle
and then offer prescriptive, though rarely identical, lists of the virtues that a virtuous
engineer would possess (see, for example, Harris Jr; Stovall; Pritchard).

One problem with virtue ethics as given to us by Aristotle is that a virtuous person is
infallible because to be a virtuous person by definition means that the person always
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does the right thing. Moreover, Aristotle contends that any given ethical problem has a
single answer only (Nussbaum 635). MacIntyre cites another problem with virtue ethics
which arises from Aristotle’s pursuit of idealization and his conviction that conflict must
be “avoided or managed.” In our actual life experiences, “it is through conflict and
sometimes only through conflict that we learn what our ends and purposes are”
(MacIntyre 164), suggesting again that experience can be as good a teacher about
ethics as formal education in the virtues.

Proponents of a values-based approach to engineering ethics emphasize human values,
things that are important to and that motivate people (Wike; Cummings). In this respect,
values-based ethics resembles virtue ethics. But values cross all theoretical boundaries in
ethics. As the in-class activities on values demonstrates, both deontological and
consequentialist ethics are premised on complex sets of values, although the theories
themselves seek to give universal guidance on right behavior without the need to
explicitly acknowledge or identify the values underlying them. As with virtue ethics
theorists, values-based ethics proponents can fall into the same trap of prescribing the
fixed values that are needed to make ethical decisions (Cummings, for example,
prescribes twelve human values that must be considered in engineering design and she
uses these to analyze and ultimately justify as ethical the decision to design the Tactical
Tomahawk cruise missile. Wike, on the other hand, identifies only six values to which
professional engineers should be committed. Who is right?). In the end, both virtues and
values-based approaches, as well as deontological and consequentialist approaches,
have the potential to end up as prescriptive “formulas” by which to make ethical
decisions, and that is what I seek to avoid. As part of a phenomenological inquiry into
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what it is to be an ethical engineer, students discover and reflect on the values they think
are important, rather than have these values delivered to them as pre-packaged, alreadyknown content.

Proposed Engineering Ethics Curriculum
How do these assumptions and principles inform an engineering ethics curriculum? I
now provide an overview of the course I teach and some of the core assignments I use.
They are not prescriptive or rigid. The phenomenological inquiry approach allows an
instructor to try a variety of assignments and to use student performance and feedback
to gauge outcomes and make revisions. It is also intended to be used by engineering
faculty who may not be versed in engineering ethics. The curriculum content has
evolved over the three semesters though the phenomenological interpretive approach
has been the same throughout. The students undertake a variety of assignments that
are informed by hermeneutic phenomenology and designed to help them discover,
interpret, and describe the real, every day, lived experiences of an ethical engineer.
Assignments include selected readings about engineering practice, personal interviews
of engineers, activities in which students explore and reflect on personal and
professional values in a variety of contexts, and a final research essay in which students
express their understanding of what it is to be an ethical engineer. The best way to
introduce and describe my course is to walk through the syllabus. This is the syllabus I
used in ENT3958 during the fall semester of 2014. Excerpts are incorporated into this
narrative and the full syllabus is included in Appendix A.
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Course Objectives: I begin the course by introducing the three course objectives: (1) to
develop a working knowledge of the principles of ethical theory and how these theories
connect to actual personal and professional ethical decision making, (2) to explore and
articulate their own understanding of what it is to be an ethical engineer, a question that
will be their central inquiry during the semester, and (3) to demonstrate proficient
communication skills. These objectives also help students meet three of Michigan
Technological University’s Student Learning Goals: Critical and Creative Thinking,
Communication, and Social Responsibility and Ethical Reasoning.

Course Overview: The “Course Overview” explains what the class is all about and my
expectations of the students. Some pertinent excerpts follow:
Your work in this class will be a research project, but not the kind of
research you are accustomed to doing as engineering students. The
research you will do is qualitative rather than quantitative. It is also
interpretive and will find no “right” or “wrong” answers. Everyone’s work
will be personal and unique. Your research will address the question:
What is it to be an ethical engineer? You will use multiple resources to
help you discover some answers and insights into this question. At the
end of the semester, you will submit a research paper that reports what
you have discovered and understand about being an ethical engineer.
This class is premised on multiple assumptions. First, most engineering
students don’t care about learning ethics philosophy – that’s a general
observation made by most instructors who teach engineering ethics.
Second, most engineering students don’t actually engage with the study
of ethics even though this is one of the learning outcomes that we expect.
Third, engineering students prefer to investigate a question rather than
study about it in books – you want hands on projects. Fourth, engineering
ethics will be more meaningful if you study it in the context of everyday
real engineering work. This is especially true because most of you in the
class are preparing to graduate very soon and enter the engineering
profession. This course takes all of these things into consideration.
The goal is for you to investigate this question about what it is to be an
ethical engineer – the lived everyday experience, not just when big issues
arise. Ethics isn’t something engineers choose to do; ethics and ethical
decision-making are part of being an engineer. What you are seeking to
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understand is: what is the experience of being an ethical engineer in the
routine day to day work I will do? You will explore this question by
examining your own values, by talking with other engineers, by reading
about being an ethical engineer, and by observing and listening. Your
final essay will draw on your research as you begin to answer this
question.

Review of Ethics Theory: I emphasize again that the approach of this class is intended
to supplement and not supplant ethical theory. I do not assume that my students have
any theoretical ethics knowledge so I allow two class periods for lectures and activities to
give them some grounding in ethical theory. This is adequate time to cover the principles
of deontology, consequentialism/utilitarianism, and virtue theory. I provide an overview of
these three dominant ethical theories and how they relate to engineering ethics. I then
pose two ethics problems to the students. These problems are well-known to ethicists
but not necessarily to engineering students: the case of the inquiring murderer (a
problem of deontology) and “Ivan’s Challenge” taken from The Karamazov Brothers
and/or the trolley problem. For each of these problems, I ask the students to take time to
think about and write down their thoughts. I have learned from classroom experience
that, when students have something in writing to refer to, it’s much easier for them to
volunteer and be part of a class discussion.

Kant gave us the paradigm of rules-based ethics, the Categorical Imperative: to act only
according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law [5]. The rules that govern “right” behavior are derived through reason, they
are universal, they are inviolable, and they apply without exception. Benjamin Constant
posed the case of the “inquiring murderer” to Immanuel Kant to challenge Kant’s
Categorical Imperative. Constant’s challenge to Kant is this: should a person lie to a
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murderer who asks the location of his intended victim, even though that would violate the
maxim against lying? We discuss possible ways to answer the question. Most students
believe that breaking the rule against lying is justified by the circumstances, and they are
surprised to learn that Kant’s stunning reply to Constant was that lying about the wouldbe victim’s location would violate the maxim of truth-telling and would be wrong (Kant,
“On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives” 346–349). The larger lesson, of
course, is that there will almost always be circumstances in which an exception to a rule
seems to be justified, so that rules cannot be relied on to make ethical decisions in all
cases.

Most students are familiar with the trolley problem: there is a runaway trolley and you
can operate the switch that will avoid the trolley killing five people on the track but, by
switching tracks, the trolley will kill one person on the other track. “Ivan’s Challenge,”
however, is not as familiar and poses a more dramatic and emotional case:
Tell me honestly, I challenge you – answer me: imagine that you are
charged with building the edifice of human destiny, the ultimate aim of
which is to bring people happiness, to give them peace and contentment
at last, but that in order to achieve this it is essential and unavoidable fo
torture just one little speck of creation, that same little child beating her
chest with her fists, and imagine that this edifice, has to be erected from
her unexpiated tears. Would you agree to be the architect under those
conditions? Tell me honestly! (Dostoevsky i, part 2, bk. 5, ch. 4).
These problems illustrate one of the problems of consequentialism – weighing the costs
and values when human life is at stake. They are excellent problems for class
discussion.

Student Assignments: Everyone has values though they are usually not explicitly
considered in our everyday lives. Students come into my class versed (to varying
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degrees) in the NSPE Code of Ethics and ethical decision making based on cost-benefit
analyses. Many students recognize that they rely on their “values” to make ethical
decisions, but they have not usually considered just how those values actually operate in
engineering ethics and all ethical decision-making. Two assignments are designed to
bring to the foreground and make students mindful of the tangible, identifiable impact of
values on decision-making. The first assignment is an in-class activity that we do on the
first day of class. This activity follows a basic introduction to ethics theory (rules,
consequentialism, and virtue).
Identifying and thinking about values (in-class): I ask students to think about how ethical
decisions are actually made. If codes and rules and utilitarian calculations of
consequences have limited practical usefulness in ethical decision-making, then how do
engineers make ethical decisions? A set of three activities helps them think about
values. Again, for each of these activities, I ask the students to take time to think about
and write down their thoughts before we have the class discussion.
First, I ask the students to think about what they ate (or didn’t eat) for
breakfast and then to think about why they made those choices. What
students discover is that even the simple choices they make about
breakfast are based on their personal values and often carry ethical
implications. The second activity asks student to work in small teams to
consider the Canons of the NSPE Code of Ethics and to identify the
values that are behind these rules. If they cannot rely on the NSPE Code
of Ethics to definitively answer professional ethical questions, then why
does it exist? If the NSPE Code of Ethics was not created out of whim,
then where did these rules come from and what values inspire the rules?
The third activity is also a team activity. Each student is asked to reflect
on the values that made him or her choose engineering as a profession
and the particular field of engineering. These three activities are inclusive
ways to have students begin to talk about values, to realize how
influential a role values have in all decision-making, and to understand
how ethical consequences follow from values. Finally, I ask the
students to consider a real-world case such as the Space Shuttle
Challenger disaster. Students now understand the issues in the case from
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a values perspective rather than from a rules or consequentialist
perspective, resulting in new questions, alternative possibilities, and
perhaps otherwise unconsidered ethical options and obligations.
These seem like simple activities but they are convincingly effective in making the point
to students about the ubiquity and power of values. Values are familiar and this is a good
activity to introduce values and have the students begin to think reflectively about them.

Autobiographical Reflection on Values (Essay): The second assignment is a written
autobiographical reflection on values. The students now have a good idea of what
“values” are about and how they might identify and think about them. This is a written
assignment and is due early in the semester:
This is an introspective assignment. It is part of the process of answering
the question that is the focus of this course: what does it mean to be an
ethical engineer? This assignment requires you to reflect on your life
experiences (including any internship or co-op work), to examine your
own values, and to explain how you see yourself as an emerging
engineer. In this paper, please address the following (your paper should
be about 500-800 words in length):
x
x
x
x

Why do you want to be an engineer? What motivates you to choose
this over other careers?
What field of engineering did you choose? Why? What does this
choice say about you and your values (talk about explicit values that
contributed to your decision)?
I will assume you want to be an ethical engineer. What values do you
think you will need to be an ethical engineer? Identify some of these
values and describe what you mean by them.
Think about relevant experiences (without betraying confidences!) that
helped you learn more about yourself as an ethical engineer such as
co-op, internship, or other work experiences. Think about how values
were involved in the everyday work you were involved in or that you
observed. Give a couple of examples. Think about what values
motivated actions you took or that others took and how these values
impacted ethical judgment.

It’s important to include the opportunity for students to reflect about prior co-op or
internship experiences. There are limited means for engineering students to get
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to this “everydayness” of being an ethical engineer. The intent of the co-op or
internship experience is almost always to provide both the student and the
employer with a way to check out one another for possible post-graduation
employment. In fact, these experiences reinforce the foregrounding of
engineering technical work and the “taken-for-grantedness” of ethics and ethical
practice. Students are seldom, if ever, asked to reflect about their perceptions of
how engineers experience being ethical during or after a co-op or internship, and
this is an opportunity to think about those experiences in new, reflective ways.

Introduction to Phenomenology: Phenomenology is concerned with what Heidegger
called “being-in-the-world” – a way of understanding what it means to live our everyday
lives – how we work with things and how we encounter other humans. Phenomenology
is not concerned with scientific explanation or causation, though it certainly does not
deny the importance of scientific and technical knowledge. There are two fundamental
aspects of phenomenology that I want my students to understand. The first concerns
“knowing” in a phenomenological sense. I give a brief introduction to and explanation of
what the students should look for in the film, “Being-in-the-World” (Ruspoli). This film
requires an introduction and advance positioning so that the students view it in some
context relevant to the course. Engineering students are so immersed in the assumption
that scientific knowledge can explain everything. This film makes explicit that we all have
a kind of “knowing” that is pre-reflective such that we can do things expertly without
thinking about it. Our minds are not “thinking” our bodies to act; rather these craftspeople
and artists are being and doing what they are, with no separation between mind and
body. Examples include craftsmanship carpentry, Flamenco guitar playing, and culinary
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arts. I ask the students to think about where this kind of knowledge is situated with
respect to scientific knowledge. I also ask them to think about this kind of knowledge in
terms of engineering practice and, more importantly, how it might relate to ethical
decision-making.

The second aspect of phenomenology is concerned with research methodology. The
learned inclination of my students is to treat their research in this class either as a
problem they must test and prove or as a report that summarizes what they have read
and learned. I use the term “hermeneutic phenomenological research” when I explain
the rudimentary but essential approaches they must take toward their research work in
the class. I am not a purist on methods, however, because I don’t think every step of
academic phenomenology research is required to serve the purposes for this class. I
explain about “bracketing” and acknowledging their biases and pre-conceptions that they
bring to the research. I encourage them to be open about these biases and preconceptions because they will be able to recognize and understand them as they do the
coursework readings and activities. I suggest how they can approach the reading
selections – not as texts they have to learn in order to pass a test but as ways of looking
at and understanding ethical problems and the role of engineers. I expect them to take
notes about the parts of the texts that speak to them and have meaning about what it is
to be an ethical engineer. I introduce the engineer interview assignment. Lastly, I discuss
the final paper in which they will take all the activities that they have experienced during
the semester and draw from them themes which help them understand what it is to be
an ethical engineer. As I mention below, I meet with each student individually twice
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during the semester. Those meetings, I’ve found, are necessary to help clarify and affirm
this process for students.

Readings: I selected and assigned 14 readings for the fall semester 2014 class. I’ve
used several of these readings before and some were new in 2014. I try to select
readings that are accessible (written so they can understand it without having to refer to
something else for interpretation) to the students. I also aim for readings that will
provoke thought and reflection. I try to avoid strident articles that “preach” unless I have
something that will provide a counter point of view. I do make it clear to my students that,
while I have a point of view, I don’t expect them to echo it. I ask them to ask what the
meaning of a reading is and how it applies to their inquiry into what it is to be an ethical
engineer. I encourage the students to take notes about the readings and I found that
each student, in fact, did this. The required readings for 2014 were:
x

Mario Bunge. Philosophical Inputs and Outputs of Technology. 2003 (Bunge).

x

Michael Davis. Does “public” mean an engineer’s nation? 2014 (Michael Davis,
“Does ‘Public’ Mean an Engineer’s Nation?”).

x

Gary Lee Downey, Juan C. Lucena, and Carl Mitcham. Engineering Ethics and
Identity: Emerging Initiatives in Comparative Perspective. 2007 (Downey,
Lucena, and Mitcham 463–487).

x

Lav R. Varshney. Engineering for Problems of Excess. 2014 (Varshney).

x

Pete Hylton. Ethics and Competitive Advantage in a Fast-Paced Industry. 2014
(Hylton).

x

Gerard van Oortmerssen. Ethics and ICT: Beyond Design. 2014 (van
Oortmerssen).
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x

Wade L. Robison. Ethics in Engineering. 2014 (Robison).

x

Saif alZahir and Laura Kombo. Towards a Global Code of Ethics for Engineers.
2014 (alZahir and Kombo).

x

Human Head Transplants Now Possible, Italian Neuroscientist Says. 2013
(“Human Head Transplants Now Possible, Italian Neuroscientist Says”).

x

John Markoff. Making Robots More Like Us. 2013. (Markoff).

x

Carl MItchum. Martin Heidegger: The Question concerning Technology. 1994
(Mitcham 49–55).

x

Kristin Shrader-Frechette. Technology and Ethics. 1992. (Shrader-Frechette).

x

Jason Millar. Technology as Moral Proxy: Autonomy and Paternalism by Design.
(Millar).

x

Jianping Zeng. A Brief Introduction to Chinese Ethics (transcript of video). 2013
(Zeng).

Individual Student Meetings: I schedule two individual meetings with each of my
students. Fall semester 2014 was the first time I did this. Because I gave my students
less structure and more autonomy to pursue the research activities (readings, interview)
in this class, I was concerned that I needed to periodically meet with them to monitor
their course progress. This concern turned out to be justified for some of the students
and forced them to stay on track because they needed to account to me for their
progress. As I met with students, I recognized two additional and equally important
reasons for these meetings. It was a chance for students to ask questions about the
readings, to get clarification on phenomenology research and interpretation (versus
reporting), to bounce their ideas, to discuss activities they could do that would help their
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research, and to help them think through what some of the meanings were that they
encountered. Students must bring an outline of their research findings and
interpretations – there are no specific requirements on what it must look like but they
have to be able to discuss it – to the second individual meeting. Perhaps the most
important outcome of these meetings is their contribution to development of emotional
engagement of the students with ethics. This didn’t become apparent until I read the
course evaluations written by the students at the end of the semester. Several students
wrote that these meetings were appreciated and helpful, particularly for clarifying
expectations and discussing their ideas and getting feedback. It gave students a sense
of individual importance.

Interview with Practicing Engineer: I’m reluctant to declare that any assignment is more
impactful than others (I’d prefer to think that they all have equal importance), but it’s hard
to ignore the evidence. Year after year, this interview is the assignment that students
report they dread the most (the time commitment, the effort to find someone to interview,
and the fear of talking with someone from what they see as a subordinate student
position) but that, after they have done it, they report gaining the most. The assignment
requires them to interview an engineer who has experience working in industry:
This is a required part of the research for this class. You can interview an
engineer currently in academia as long as the engineer has significant
(more than 5 years) experience working in industry. The focus of your
interview is to help you answer the question: what is it to be an ethical
engineer? Note that the interview is not about learning what it is to work
as an engineer, but the focus is on the everyday practice of being an
ethical engineer – discovering what that means. I will post a list of
possible questions used by earlier classes for the interview but you can
add any of your own. Keep notes about the interview that (1) summarize
answers to the interview questions and (2) reflect on your interview
experience and what it contributed to your own knowledge of what it is to
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be an ethical engineer: what was helpful, surprising, new, not helpful,
etc.?
This assignment often ends up being easier for the students than it is for the engineers
they interview. These engineers in most cases have never been asked to talk about their
experience of being an ethical engineer.11 In that respect, the students must prepare the
engineers by explaining – and affirming – the reason for the interview. Engineers often
comment that they’ve not been asked to talk about this and they express interest and
appreciation for the opportunity. I’ve yet to have a student report that the engineer he or
she interviewed responded negatively to the question or the interview.

In-class Discussion: One class discussion is devoted to what students have discovered
about what it is to be an ethical engineer. I ask each students to write down at least
three points they want to share with the class. I make it clear to the class that these are
not “presentations” but discussions. I go through the class to make certain each student
has the opportunity to speak and, after each student makes his or her point, I allow
some time for additional discussion. As long as they stay on the topic of ethical
engineering, I don’t interfere. Prior to 2014, I asked students to study a technology of
choice and give a brief presentation on the ethical issues posed by that technology with
a time for questions at the end of each presentation. The class discussion format I used
for the 2014 class was a superior experience for me and for the students. I discovered

Anecdotally, I am working with instructors in Engineering Fundamentals to revise the ethics
module used in ENG1101. Interviews with engineers are an important assignment but it isn’t
practical to have 1000+ first year engineering students find engineers to interview. The alternative
we came up with is to have a special symposium and to invite a panel of engineers to talk about
and to answer student questions about what it is to be an ethical engineer. I attended the
symposium held during fall semester 2014. Every engineer on the panel wanted to talk about
being an engineer and had to be reminded by the instructor facilitators that the topic was “what is
it to be an ethical engineer?” This is not a topic engineers routinely think about.
11
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that, because nearly all of them will soon graduate, the everydayness of being an ethical
engineer took on new importance for them. In their course evaluations, several students
suggested that they would like at least one additional class for discussion, and I agree
with that.

Final Research Essay: The capstone assignment is a final research paper. All of the
students generally need to have the “interpretive” nature of this paper reinforced during
the semester, and that is addressed during my individual meetings with students:
This research paper draws on all the research work you have done this
semester to answer the following question: What is it to be an ethical
engineer? Your paper should be 1800-2000 words long (again, I’m not
counting words but quality will be the paramount consideration). This is
an interpretive form of research. In other words, I do not expect you to
merely report or repeat what you have read, watched, discussed, or
observed. What I expect you to do is take all of this input and use it to
describe how you interpret and understand the essences of what it is to
be an ethical engineer. You should refer to readings, interviews, etc. to
support your ideas.
In prior years, the class met bi-weekly for two hours over the 14-week semester. I
decided that, for the fall semester 2014 class, I wanted to create more of a research
environment and give the students increased time for their research and more autonomy
to do it. Table 2.1 includes the course schedule with some comments about its structure.

The significant changes to the class structure were (1) fewer class meetings; three
classes of 90 minutes each were held at the beginning of the semester and used to
deliver the knowledge students would need to proceed with their research (ethics theory
and phenomenology); we met as a class only once more, at the end of the semester, for
class discussion; (2) no assigned order for readings, and (3) addition of my individual
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meetings with students with specified “deliverables” for each meeting. This was a risky
approach, but it is one that paid off. There are modifications that can be made but,
overall, the students appreciated the autonomy, were able to maintain progress over the
semester to complete their work on time, and demonstrated significantly improved
ethical reasoning, ethical sensitivity, and emotional engagement, as will be reported in
later chapters.

Table 2.1 - Course Schedule ENT3958 Fall Semester 2014
Date
Topic
Assignment Due
September 4
Class meets
90 minutes

Introduction and Course
Overview: What is it to be
an ethical engineer?
Review of principal ethical
theories

Complete the DIT-2 (Defining Issues Test)
and the TESSE (Test of Ethical
Sensitivity in Science and
Engineering). Links to these tests are
below (page 4). They must be
completed by September 11 to count
toward class participation grade.

September 11
Class meets
90 minutes

A phenomenological
approach to understanding
what it is to be an ethical
engineer

Film: “Being in the World”
Reading: Bunge: Philosophical Inputs and
Outputs of Technology (Canvas –
Pages: Course Readings)
Completion of DIT-2 and TESSE.

September 18
90 minutes

Ethical Theories, continued

Writing Assignment due:
Autobiographical Reflection on Values.
See below (page 4).

October 7 and 9
(Tuesday and
Thursday evenings
6:00-8:30)

Individual meetings with
students – sign up on
Canvas.

Bring a list of the readings you have
completed and your interview plan. Also
any additional sources you want to include
as part of your research.

November 4 and 6
(Tuesday and
Thursday evenings
6:00-8:30)

Second set of individual
meetings with students –
sign up on Canvas

Bring a draft or detailed outline of your
research paper and interview notes. Be
prepared to discuss some of your findings,
observations, discoveries, etc.

November 20
Class meets

Presentations and
discussion of research
papers

Students will give brief presentations on
highlights of their research. Class
discussion as time permits.

December 4

Final Research Papers are due. See page
4.

December 11

Complete the DIT-2 and TESSE as postassessments. They must be completed
between December 4 and December 11
to count toward class participation grade.
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For three years, the impacts of a phenomenological approach to engineering ethics have
been a matter of supposition on my part supported by minimal testing using the DIT-2 to
measure ethical reasoning skills. Chapter Three explains the research methods I
undertook to at last quantitatively and qualitatively test and assess the outcomes of a
phenomenology-informed engineering ethics pedagogy.
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Chapter Three
Research Design: Quantitative and Qualitative Methods to Measure Ethical
Sensitivity, Ethical Reasoning, Emotional Engagement, and Understanding
of Professional and Ethical Responsibilities
My dissertation research examines whether a phenomenological approach to
engineering ethics pedagogy can improve not only students’ ethical reasoning and
sensitivity but also their emotional engagement with and understanding of professional
and ethical responsibilities. I contend that ABET’s Engineering Criterion 3(f), which
requires that graduates of engineering programs have “an understanding of their
professional and ethical responsibility,” is a far more demanding standard than most
engineering programs recognize and that ethical reasoning, ethical sensitivity, and
emotional engagement are all required in order for students to fulfill this criterion.

The meaning we give to “understanding” is really the crux of the problem for establishing
what we want students to get out of engineering ethics, how we design and deliver
engineering ethics instruction, and how we assess student learning outcomes. As I have
argued, on the whole, current engineering ethics instruction follows a traditional model
that emphasizes rational problem-solving, delivers an ethics curriculum with materials
designed to teach rational problem-solving, and assesses student outcomes according
to their ability to rationally solve ethical dilemmas. This is to be expected, given that
deontological, utilitarian, and virtue ethics all hold that moral decision-making is a
rational, cognitive process. It follows, unsurprisingly, that most research into the
effectiveness of engineering ethics instruction adheres to this same premise and uses
tests of cognitive skills – ethical reasoning – as the measure of student learning.
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My research challenges this paradigm and proposes, instead, that the ABET Ethics
Criterion does and should intend “understanding” in the way that Gadamer elucidates
understanding as a set of conditions under which we open our existing or foregrounded
horizons – including all our biases, prejudices, and values – and place them at risk in a
dialog with a foreign “text” and, through interpretation and hermeneutic experience, we
emerge with a “fusion of horizons” and a new understanding – different from where we
were and unique to each person, a never-ending process that constitutes how we live.
With understanding, there is a shift – momentous in that it happens – and our new
horizons are forever changed, only to be put at risk and changed again. Gadamer’s
explanation of understanding certainly includes a cognitive element, but there are also
practical and linguistic elements that precede or exceed cognition (Grondin). So,
although I don’t reject the utility of measuring cognitive skills – those skills are important
and the measures offer a way to compare outcomes of my research to the work of
others – I proceed from the premise that these measures are inadequate for the task of
assessing whether our engineering students have attained an “understanding of their
professional and ethical responsibilities.” This will be explicit as I describe the
quantitative and qualitative measures used in my project to assess ethical reasoning
skills, ethical sensitivity, and emotional engagement.

Research Setting and Participants
My research was conducted in ENT3958, Ethics in Engineering Design, a one-credit,
3000-level elective course offered by the Enterprise Program at Michigan Technological
University. The Enterprise Program was initially funded as an NSF Action Agenda pilot
program in 2000 as an alternative to engineering senior capstone design. Enterprise
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offers teams of students from varied disciplines the opportunity to work for several years
in a business-like setting to solve real-world problems supplied by industry. It is an
extensive multi-year, multidisciplinary design experience. All Enterprise participants
complete an Enterprise curriculum which includes a minimum of 20 credits for an
Enterprise Minor and 12 credits for an Enterprise Concentration. Some of the courses
are mandated and others are elective. Most Enterprise electives, like ENT3958, are
offered for one-credit. Although Ethics in Engineering Design is an elective offered by
the Enterprise Program, it is open to all students at Michigan Tech, irrespective of
discipline or major. Course enrollment is restricted to juniors or seniors (lower grade
levels with the permission of the instructor) who have completed first-year Engineering
Fundamentals 1101 Engineering Analysis and Problem Solving (or equivalent) as a
prerequisite. ENT3958 is offered each Fall Semester and has an enrollment cap of 25
students, though this cap is seldom reached.

The thirteen students enrolled in the Fall 2014 semester participated in this study. This
was a quasi-experimental study because all students enrolled in the course were
required to participate in the study as part of their assigned work, and no random
selection occurred. The students were representative of all engineering majors at
Michigan Tech, they were all white, and English was their first language. Of the 13
students, there was only one female, though this is not unusual at Michigan Tech where
women continue to be underrepresented in engineering.

Students were required to complete all assessment components of the project: pre and
post Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2) surveys, pre and post Ethical Sensitivity Scale
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Questionnaire (ESSQ), and a final research essay. The DIT-2 and ESSQ tests were
required and students received course points for taking them, although results were
anonymous and actual responses were not graded. Students evidenced their
participation in the DIT-2 by submitting a screen shot of the “thank you” page generated
at the end of the survey, and they submitted the ESSQ during class so I could account
for the fact that each of the 13 students completed the questionnaire. Students
completed the DIT-2 and the ESSQ as a pre-test during the first week of the semester
and as a post-test following submission of their final research essays at the end of the
14-week semester. Final research essays were graded. However, for the qualitative
coding and explication of the essays, each essay was numbered with student names
removed. During the semester, I met individually twice with each student, and these
meetings were also required for point-value purposes but not graded. These interviews
were not recorded because they were intended for the benefit of the students (to discuss
readings, ask questions, and get feedback); however, I did make some field notes
following these meetings, though no student names are included. No students withdrew
from the course during the semester, and all 13 students completed each component of
the project with the exception of the post-test DIT-2, which was completed by 12
students.

A Human Subject Use Request for Exemption Review to administer these tests and to
conduct individual meetings with the students was submitted to Michigan Technological
University’s Institutional Review Board, and the project was granted exempt status on
July 25, 2014. The IRB exemption letter is included in Appendix B.
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Research Methods
I am using both qualitative and quantitative methods to test and assess the impact of a
phenomenological approach to engineering ethics instruction on the moral development,
emotional engagement, and understanding of ethics of undergraduate engineering
students. This statement brings to the fore a preliminary question of whether my work
here is properly considered assessment or research. I’ve used the terms
interchangeably and I want to acknowledge that there may be some objection to that.
Assessment and research are distinguished (Upcraft and Schuh) but they are also not
incompatible in the manner that I am using them in my work. Educational research
frequently consists of testing an educational approach to determine if it is effective in
producing a desired outcome. Qualitative or quantitative methods are appropriate
depending the research question. Assessment is generally understood as a process for
determining if an educational outcome has been achieved either in the classroom or
institution-wide and, as with research, both qualitative and quantitative approaches can
be used depending on what works best to measure the intended outcome.

My work entails both research and assessment. First, I want to know if a
phenomenological approach to engineering ethics pedagogy is effective to improve
ethical reasoning, ethical sensitivity, emotional engagement, and understanding of
professional and ethical responsibility for undergraduate engineering students. If it is, I
also propose that outcomes may be generalizable and that this pedagogical method may
be transferable to engineering ethics classrooms beyond Michigan Tech. To this extent,
my work tests an educational approach and is research. But I am also proposing a
qualitative method to measure “engagement” and “understanding,” that is, to assess
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whether undergraduate student outcomes for ethics, such as ABET’s Engineering
Criterion 3(f), have been attained. To that extent, my work converges with assessment.
Arguably I am testing an assessment method with the expectation that it could be
generalizable and transferable, so this would be considered research as well.
Although there may be objections to my failure to consistently distinguish between the
two approaches (see, for example, Upcraft and Schuh), I also note that the terms
“research” and “assessment” are used interchangeably by others who write about
engineering education. Leydens et al., for example, entitle their comparison of qualitative
and quantitative methods in engineering education research, “Qualitative Methods Used
in the Assessment of Engineering Education” (Leydens, Moskal, and Pavelich, emphasis
added) even though the entire article is devoted to a discussion of educational research
and data collection methods without distinguishing between assessment and research
terminology or processes. Similarly, Borrego et al., refer interchangeably to research and
to assessment in their comparisons of “Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Research
Methods in Engineering Education” (Borrego, Douglas, and Amelink, emphasis added).
So, having acknowledged this issue and explained its implications for my work, I will
continue to use both these terms somewhat interchangeably and don’t intend to
problematize them further. To the extent that methodologies differ, I will apply the
appropriate standards for research or assessment.

Qualitative Research in Engineering Education:
The question arises: why is it necessary to use qualitative methods to assess student
outcomes in the first place? Aren’t quantitative methods more reliable and more
scientific? Denzin calls quantitative evidence the “elephant in the room” because the
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standards for quantitative research have been transferred to qualitative research on the
assumption that evidence and data from qualitative research are not acceptable
otherwise. This has critical and far-reaching consequences for qualitative researchers. It
affects, for example, where and whether one’s work can be accepted for publication and
eligibility for research funding (Denzin).

Strauss and Corbin define qualitative research as “any kind of research that produces
findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of
quantification” (Strauss and Corbin). Although there are multiple paradigms or theories,
along with associated methodologies, of qualitative research (see, for example, the
works of Lindlof and Taylor; Prasad and Prasad; Denzin and Lincoln), all qualitative
research classifications share a fundamental common assumption. They are critical of
the position that all research should or can be conducted by an objective researcher who
collects and then describes data about some fixed reality. Interpretive qualitative
research assumes that human action is meaningful and seeks to understand how people
make meaning in their lives, how they understand experience, and how they perceive
the constantly changing world in which they live. It accepts that knowledge is not always
fixed and unchanging but is “constructed” and permeated with values. Denzin and
Lincoln describe qualitative research as follows:
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the
world. Qualitative research consists of a set of interpretive, material
practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the
world. They turn the world into a series of representations. . . . At this
level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to
the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their
natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in
terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin and Lincoln,
“Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research” 3).
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These definitions of qualitative research are hard to digest if one is looking for ways to
compare it to quantitative research. The manifest and persistent bias against qualitative
research in engineering education research continues notwithstanding the stated
policies of research funding agencies such as the National Science Foundation (NSF),
which routinely solicits proposals that use qualitative or mixed methods research and
seeks to learn more about how qualitative methods can be used in engineering
education research and assessment. Borrego, et al., received funding from NSF to study
the use of quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods research in engineering
education. Their results, reported in 2009, conclude that there is a gap between the
expressed desire for more qualitative research and the actual fact of funded qualitative
research. Although researchers say they are disappointed with the low representation of
qualitative research in engineering education, these same researchers nevertheless
admit to far greater comfort with quantitative methods. Their responses demonstrate that
they are unfamiliar with qualitative methodologies and that they judge qualitative
methods by the same standards that apply to scientific or positivist research in terms of
purpose, method, and validity. Specifically, researchers who were queried about
qualitative methods stated that they are concerned about the absence of control groups
as critical to experimental design, the inability to assess statistical significance of results,
and the insistence on triangulation that correlates research results with student
performance (grades) (61–62). Persons who conduct qualitative research expressed
their perception of a bias against qualitative research by those who review their work,
and that they feel pressured to include methods that will produce quantitative results that
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can be statistically analyzed in order to have their work funded or accepted for
publication (62).

Leydens, et al. compared quantitative and qualitative methods that are used to assess
engineering education outcomes. The authors suggest that criticisms of qualitative
research may be due to the fact that engineering educators misunderstand that the
purposes of qualitative research differ from quantitative research. Quantitative
researchers seek results that are generalizable and transferable across populations, and
that is not an objective or outcome of most qualitative research (65) which tends to focus
on the particular and the local. Leydens, et al. also acknowledge the misinformed
perception among quantitative researchers that qualitative methods are “unsystematic or
lacking in rigor” (65).

Koro-Ljungberg and Douglas conducted a meta-analysis of articles published in the
Journal of Engineering Education, one of the premier places for publishing research on
engineering education in the United States. They looked at articles that were published
in the JEE over a two year period in which the articles’ authors claimed to use qualitative
research methods. They analyzed these articles on one aspect of research rigor, the
consistency between the authors’ theoretical perspectives and the actual research
design. They found that, of the 26 articles that claimed to use qualitative methods, only
four of them met their established criteria for rigorous qualitative research (168). They
concluded that rigorous qualitative research is difficult to do properly and cautioned
qualitative researchers to adhere to established standards for qualitative research (172).
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All of these writers offer good reasons for qualitative research and why it serves a
difference purpose and provides different information than does quantitative research.
Leydens, et al. explain that “the broad purpose of qualitative research is to understand
more about human perspectives and provide a detailed description of a given event or
phenomenon” and that qualitative research is “not meant to provide fodder for crosscase generalization” (65). Borrego, et al. write that qualitative research is designed to
use textual data in order to answer questions that require “rich, contextual descriptions
of the data, what is often called ‘thick’ description” (Borrego, Douglas, and Amelink 56).
Koro-Ljungberg and Douglas observe that qualitative research designs are increasingly
being used in engineering education research because they “offer alternative ways of
knowing and viewing the empirical world” and because they “have the capability to
capture the complexity of human behaviors in ways that are not possible when studies
are based on prediction and randomized controls” (163).

Educational assessment often claims to use qualitative methods. But, in fact, most
qualitative assessment work that uses interpretive methods is ultimately converted to
quantitative data so that it can be statistically analyzed and reported. The most evident
form of “quantitizing” qualitative data is the scoring rubric (Leydens, Moskal, and
Pavelich; Borrego, Douglas, and Amelink). Evaluators are asked to read student textual
work or observe behavioral projects and then score it using a rubric that rates the work
according to one or more measures on some numerical scale. Whether this can properly
be called “qualitative” assessment is questioned (Borrego, Douglas, and Amelink 59).
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Despite these problems with and resistance to qualitative methods, assessment of
engineering education using authentic qualitative methods is being done. Loui used
student essays written at the beginning of the semester and reflection papers written at
the end of the semester to assess the impact of a course on engineering ethics on the
development of undergraduate students’ perceptions of their professional identities as
well as to identify the potential for “deep learning” in the course. He used a coding
scheme to sort responses into categories and themes and was able to identify important
differences between the earlier and later essays. For example, students came into the
class seemingly “hard-wired” for following a code of ethics whereas their final essays
reflected recognition of the need for moral courage, understanding that ethical
responsibilities extend beyond the workplace, and that there may be an obligation to
consider the effects of technologies on the public (Loui, “Ethics and the Development of
Professional Identities of Engineering Students” 388). Hashemian and Loui continued
this qualitative approach in a study of whether engineering ethics instruction can affect
students’ feelings about professional responsibility. In this study, they interviewed three
groups of undergraduate engineering students: six students who had completed an
ethics course, six who had registered for the course but had not yet taken it, and six who
had no formal ethics instruction. In the interviews, students were asked uniform sets of
questions about their experiences and expectations of a career in engineering and two
case studies that were variations of case studies used in the ethics course. Because of
the small numbers of students in the pilot study and because of the possibility that
students who had taken the ethics course were already familiar with similar case studies,
the researchers were unable to draw conclusions about the effects of an ethics course
on students’ feelings of responsibility about ethical decisions (Hashemian and Loui). But
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the study does show the availability of qualitative methods to inform assessment of
engineering ethics instruction outcomes. In both of these studies, the researchers were
using qualitative methods to investigate the influences of engineering ethics instruction
in ways that quantitative methods could not address or capture.
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued for ethics instruction that emotionally
engages students in the study of professional and ethical responsibilities, and I have
argued that we can use qualitative methods to determine if this outcome is being
achieved. Perhaps the most significant shift in my research occurred when I examined
this outcome – emotional engagement – more thoroughly. What I found – and this jumps
ahead a bit – is that I moved from an emphasis on emotional engagement as a learning
outcome to the very thing that we as ethics instructors are charged with achieving: an
understanding by students of their professional and ethical responsibilities, as mandated
by ABET’s Engineering Criterion 3(f). One of the implications of this change is that
qualitative methods for assessment of “understanding” not only made more sense but,
indeed, seemed indispensable.

Ethical Reasoning and its Measurement:
Moral development has historically been theorized and studied from a cognitive
perspective. Aristotle, Kant, Bentham, and Mill all approached their ethical theories as
matters of rational, cognitive thought. Piaget and Kohlberg followed in this tradition and,
though critique of and alternatives to their thinking on moral development are offered,
they are still influential in contemporary theory. Piaget engaged children in game playing
and observed how they developed their moral understanding of rules. He ultimately
determined that there are two principle stages of moral development: “moral
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heteronomy” where children understand rules to be absolute and “moral autonomy”
when children begin to mature and understand that rules are not fixed and absolute but
that they are changeable and can be adapted to varying situations as the need may
arise (Fleming 7–4).

Kohlberg applied Piaget’s theory of cognitive development to moral understanding.
Unlike Piaget, he was less concerned with how children developed and applied rules
about right and wrong than the reasoning they used to explain their moral decisions. He
also studied children by giving them various situations presenting moral dilemmas and
discussing with them how they came to their decisions about what was right or wrong.
One of the most well-known dilemmas that he posed to the children is “Heinz Steals the
Drug” where a man is unable to raise enough money to pay for an expensive drug
needed to treat his wife’s cancer. When the druggist refuses to sell it to him for a
cheaper price, he later breaks into the store and steals the drug. Children are asked to
decide if the man’s action in stealing the drug was right or wrong and to explain the
reasons for their decision. Based on his findings, Kohlberg expanded Piaget’s two
stages of moral understanding to six stages that consist of three main stages with two
sub-stages within each major stage, as follows:
I.

Level I: Decisions about behavior are made on the basis of consequences –
rewards and punishments.
a. Stage 1: “Punishment and Obedience” – obey and order to avoid being
punished. Child’s perspective is completely self-centered.
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b. Stage 2: “Instrumentalism” – the child makes decisions based on the
child’s own self-interest – there is a sense of “tit-for-tat” in that the child
can understand behavior can be for mutual benefit.\
II.

Level II: Conventional Morality: child begins to grasp the notion of social rules
a. Stage 3: “Interpersonal relationships” – the child understands about social
approval and this becomes the child’s major motivation
b. Stage 4: “Maintaining social conventions” – the child places high priority
on following rules and doing one’s duty. Law and order are important.

III.

Level III: Postconventional Morality: At this stage of development, there is
increasing recognition and development of one’s own idealized principles and
less reliance on society’s standards of moral behavior
a. Stage 5: An understanding of the “social contract” – that rules exist for the
mutual benefit of everyone in society
b. Stage 6: “Universal ethical principles” – the individual reflects on what is
just and understands that right and wrong behavior cannot be prescribed
only by rules. Personal ethical values are developed.

There have been many criticisms of Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s theories that other theorists
have tried to address. One of the most important objections was the fact that Piaget and
Kohlberg worked almost entirely with boys. Piaget, who did conduct limited separate
studies of girls, observed that the rules girls developed for their games were less
complex than the rules developed by boys and, from this, concluded that the moral
development of girls might be less advanced than that of boys (Fleming 7–6).
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Psychologist Carol Gilligan challenged Piaget’s conclusions about girls as sexist and
criticized his method of studying boys and then trying to generalize their behavior to both
sexes. In her book In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s
Development, Gilligan confronts the methods and theories of both Piaget and Kohlberg
(as well as Freud). She begins with this:
At a time when efforts are being made to eradicate discrimination
between the sexes in the search for social equality and justice, the
differences between the sexes are being rediscovered in the social
sciences. This discovery occurs when theories formerly considered to be
sexually neutral in the scientific objectivity are found instead to reflect a
consistent observational and evaluative bias. Then the presumed
neutrality of science, like that of language itself, gives way to the
recognition that the categories of knowledge are human constructions.
The fascination with point of view that has informed the fiction of the
twentieth century and the corresponding recognition of the relativity of
judgment infuse our scientific understanding as well when we begin to
notice how accustomed we have become to seeing life through men’s
eyes (6).
She observes, in response to those who find the level of moral development of women
to be inferior to that of men:
Yet herein lies a paradox, for the very traits that traditionally have defined
the ‘goodness’ of women, their care for and sensitivity to the needs of
others, are those that mark them as deficient in moral development (12).
Gilligan posits that women are more likely to approach moral questions from an ethics of
care perspective whereas men tend to decide these questions from an objectively
principled and rational perspective: “Thus while Kohlberg’s subject worries about people
interfering with each other’s rights, this woman worries about ‘the possibility of omission,
of your not helping others when you could help them.’ “(21). Drawing on the work of
Jane Loevinger, Gilligan argues:
The autonomous stage in Loevinger’s account witnesses a relinquishing
of moral dichotomies and their replacement with a ‘feeling for the
complexity and multifaceted character of real people and real situations.’
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Whereas the rights conception of morality that informs Kohlberg’s
principled level (stages five and six) is geared to arriving at an objectively
fair or just resolution to moral dilemmas upon which all rational persons
could agree, the responsibility conception focuses instead on the
limitations of any particular resolution and describes the conflicts that
remain.
Women’s moral judgments thus elucidate the pattern observed in the
description of the developmental differences between the sexes, but they
also provide an alternative conception of maturity by which these
differences can be assessed and their implications traced. The
psychology of women that has consistently been described as distinctive
in its greater orientation toward relationships and interdependence implies
a more contextual mode of judgment and a different moral understanding.
Give the differences in women’s conceptions of self and morality, women
bring to the life cycle a different point of view and order human
experience in terms of different priorities (21-22).
Gilligan is recognized as an important and influential voice to counter the theories of
Piaget, Kohlberg, and others. In addition to psychology theory and research, Gilligan’s
ethics of care has come to resonate as well in the field of ethics theory. Gilligan is
routinely included in discussions of ethics, in particular virtue ethics and the virtue of
care (see, for example, Timmons; Ethical Theory: An Anthology; Ethics). Gilligan’s work
eventually influenced changes in the way moral development was theorized and
measured by people like Kohlberg and his successors. Consider, for example, the
evolution of the Defining Issues Test, discussed infra, this Chapter.

Other criticisms of Kohlberg are that his theory focuses on cognitive development and
ignores the influence of emotions in moral judgment. This, of course, was the central
contribution of Hume to moral theory, who argued that passion was as much a motivator
in ethical decision-making as was the rationality of Kant’s theory (Fleming; Dunbar;
Greene et al.; Haidt). Kohlberg’s theory also fails to account for the fact that moral
understanding does not always lead to moral action; ethical decision making is
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situational and other factors, including emotions, can and do impact actions. Similarly,
Kohlberg assumed that his stages of moral development were universal among all
populations even though critics point out that, for example, his Level III Postconventional
Morality reflects Western Enlightenment values that are not necessarily globally held or
given the same priority among all cultures (Fleming).

Rest, who adheres to most of the foundational principles of Piaget and Kohlberg,
nevertheless acknowledged these weaknesses in their theories (Rest et al. 644–645)
and tried to account for them in his Four Component Model of moral behavior (Rest,
Moral Development: Advances in Research and Theory). This model posits that ethical
behavior and decision-making is comprised of four distinct and independent elements:
(1) ethical sensitivity – how the person interprets the situation to recognize that there is
an ethical problem, (2) ethical judgment or reasoning – how the person figures out what
the morally ideal course of action is, (3) ethical motivation and commitment – how does
the person decide what to do, and (4) ethical character or moral courage – whether the
person actually does what he or she intends to do (Rest and Barnett; Rest, “A
Psychologist Looks at the Teaching of Ethics”). Rest recognized that what people think
they should do is not always the same as what they decide to do (or what they actually
do) and that differing values and priorities of values play an important role and, at the
same time, contribute to the problem of designing decision-making models (Rest, “A
Psychologist Looks at the Teaching of Ethics” 33). Rest adopts what he describes as a
“Neo-Kohlbergian” approach toward both the theory of moral development and,
importantly for my purposes in this dissertation, the measurement of moral judgment or
ethical reasoning (Rest et al. 644–645; Thoma). He was a principal in the development
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of the Defining Issues Test and the successor Defining Issues Test-2, tests designed to
measure ethical judgment.

Huff and Frey are critical of Kohlbergian and Neo-Kohlbergian theories. They give NeoKohlbergians – and this refers primarily to Rest – credit for recognizing the complexity of
moving from perception of a moral issue to moral action but they also critique the NeoKohlbergian approach for its shortage of data on any aspect of the Four Component
Model other than ethical judgment or reasoning (390). Huff and Frey consider that we
are now in a “Post-Kohlberg” era where new theories of moral development are being
proposed based on new data. They cite Haidt who proposes a “two-process” theory that
involves both conscious (rational) and non-conscious (emotional or intuitive) processing
in ethical decision-making (393, citing Haidt). Haidt’s work is significant because it brings
emotion back into prominence in ethical decision-making theory. As Huff and Frey point
out, this has important implications for how we teach professional ethics. Reason-based
approaches (deontology, utilitarianism, virtue) appeal to and influence the conscious or
rational part of decision-making. But if we want to target the intuitive process and aim for
persuasion, the more effective instructional approaches would be methods that employ
analogy, metaphor, and narrative (393) - rhetoric. It’s important to add that, although
Huff and Frey critique Kohlbergian and Neo-Kohlbergian theories as somewhat
outdated, they do not reject them outright. For example, they cite approvingly a study
that uses the DIT (developed in part by Rest) to show that an ethics course can improve
moral reasoning, thereby arguing that moral pedagogy is worth the effort (394).
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As Huff and Frey note, there is little data on measuring aspects of moral development
other than the second component of Rest’s Four Component Model of moral behavior,
that is, moral judgment or ethical reasoning. This data centers on the development and
use of the Defining Issues Test (DIT) and the newer Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2),
which were designed for the purpose of quantitatively measuring ethical reasoning skills.
The DIT was first published in 1974 by researchers at the Center for the Study of Ethical
Development, then located at the University of Minnesota. The DIT was used for 25
years before it was revised and replaced by the Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2). The DIT2 was developed in response to several issues identified by the developers themselves.
They cite three reasons for revising the DIT: (1) outdated dilemmas and language
(referencing, for example, the Vietnam War and referring to Asian Americans as
“Orientals”), (2) discovery of a more accurate calculation of a developmental score – the
N2 score – that would replace or supplement the DIT “P” score, and (3) development of
better ways to check for participant reliability and get rid of bogus data (Rest et al. 647).

The DIT-2 is a multiple choice test that consists of a set of five non-engineering-specific
scenarios presenting various ethical dilemmas without obviously right answers. These
dilemmas concern (1) famine where a father considers stealing food from a rich man’s
warehouse in order to feed his starving family, (2) a reporter must decide whether or not
to report a controversial story about a political candidate that could impact the politician’s
career, (3) a school board has to decide if it will hold a public meeting over a
controversial issue that could end up hostile and dangerous, (4) a doctor has to decide
whether to give an overdose of a painkiller that could kill the terminal patient, and (5) an
issue involving students demonstrating on campus against U.S. foreign policy (Rest et
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al. 649). The DIT-2 is included in its entirety in Appendix C. In addition, participants are
asked to agree or disagree with several controversial public policy issues (abortion,
euthanasia, homosexual rights, due process, women’s roles, and religion in public
schools issues), and they answer questions about their religious ideology, political
identity, demographics – age, religious affiliation, whether U.S. citizenship, and whether
English is the participant’s first language; gender is asked but is collapsed for analysis
because the data has shown that gender does not make a significant difference in terms
of participants’ responses (Rest et al. 649–650).

The DIT-2 analysis gives two principal scores, the P (which aligns with Kohlberg’s “Post
Conventional” or “principles reasoning”) score and the N2 score, both of which
quantitatively measure the participant’s ethical or moral reasoning skills (Thoma 2006;
Rest, et.al 1999). The N2 is designed to provide a better measure of ethical reasoning
than does the P score; however the DIT-2 continues to report both P and N2 scores for
comparison. As Rest, et al. describe it, the “N2 index takes into account preference for
postconventional schemas and rejection of less sophisticated schemas, using both
ranking and rating data” (649). A detailed explanation of the N2 score is beyond the
scope of this dissertation (but see Rest et al.; Thoma for a description of the design and
interpretation of the N2 and other DIT-2 scores). In addition to the P and N2 scores, the
DIT-2 provides a Personal Interest score and a Maintain Norms score. These two scores
align, respectively, with Kohlberg’s Stages 2/3 and Stage 4 levels of moral development.
It is expected that, as P and N2 scores rise, indicating a person has achieved higher
levels of moral development, Personal Interest and Maintain Norms scores will go down.
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The DIT and DIT-2 have been validated and are used extensively by researchers and
educators for the purpose of measuring ethical reasoning skills, including the ethical
reasoning skills of engineering students (Thoma; Self and Ellison; Drake et al.; Finelli et
al., “An Assessment of Engineering Students’ Curricular and Co-Curricular Experiences
and Their Ethical Development”). Its chief advantages are that it is a self-administered
test that is objectively scored and that the Center for the Study of Ethical Development
has compiled tens of thousands of participant data across all age ranges and
educational levels so that scores can be compared to this national database (Rest and
Narvaez; Shawver and Sennetti). It has also proven its validity and reliability for use in
assessing the effects of educational interventions such as ethics education (Drake et al.
6).

But the DIT and DIT-2 are not without their critics (Rizzo & Swisher 2004). Most of the
criticism is directed toward the original DIT and less so toward the DIT-2 because the
DIT-2 was revised in response to many of the criticisms of the DIT. For example, Drake
et al. credit the DIT-2 with recognizing that moral development is more integrative and
doesn’t go through distinct “self-contained stages.” At the same time, the DIT-2 allows a
researcher to see which of the four scheme (personal interest, maintain norms,
postconventional, N2) is dominant in a participant’s moral reasoning. Additionally, the
DIT-2 goes beyond Kohlberg’s principled reasoning about justice as the highest level of
moral development. The DIT-2 responds to the criticism of people such as Gilligan and
is designed to take into account the fact that moral thinking is driven by more than just
rational, principle-based reasoning. Accordingly, the DIT-2 claims to no longer privilege
any particular moral theory (Drake et al. 6–7).
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But the revised DIT-2 did not quell all criticism. Shawver and Sennetti identify seven
limitations of the DIT-2: (1) the dilemmas used in the test are “fixed and limited”, (2) the
test is non-discipline specific, (3) it creates a “one dimensional score” that cannot validly
be used as (4) a “valid pretest/post test measurement of the same respondent,” (5) it
measures only the first two of Rest’s Four Component Model, that is, ethical sensitivity
and ethical judgment, (6) it is subject to “gender, geographic, religious, and disciplinerelated biases,” and (7) it may not be reliable to measure cognitive moral development in
persons under age 20 because they would not likely show sufficient variation in scores
at this young age (664; see also Rizzo and Swisher). Nucci argues that the DIT-2 may
be useful for research and practice in ethics pedagogy, but it is unsuited for basic
research in the field of moral development – he argues that research methods in one
paradigm are not suited to another paradigm. Moreover, because the DIT-2 follows
Kohlbergian theory on moral development, he is concerned that there is a risk of
reification of that method and that researchers will fail to explore new directions and
alternatives (Nucci 317–318, 323).

The concern that the DIT-2 is non-discipline specific is expressed within engineering.
Anecdotally, I work with faculty teaching a first year Engineering Fundamentals course.
We are implementing and testing a revised ethics module used in a course taken during
the first semester by entering undergraduate engineering students. The course is taught
by several faculty who use the same curriculum. Among the measures we want to use
for testing student outcomes among pilot and control groups of students is the DIT-2
However, several faculty refused to have their students use their time taking the DIT-2
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because the dilemmas were not engineering related. Their rationale was that the
students would not learn anything about engineering from taking the DIT-2.12
In response to these criticisms, alternative measures of ethical reasoning are being
designed, tested, and introduced. Borenstein, et al. developed the Engineering and
Science Issues Test (ESIT) that uses job-related ethical dilemmas from science and
engineering, rather than the non-engineering-specific problems of the DIT-2, to measure
moral judgment (Borenstein et.al 2010). Purdue University has developed an
Engineering Ethics Reasoning Instrument (EERI) that also uses engineering job-related
scenarios to quantitatively measure the ethical reasoning skills of undergraduate
engineering students. The EERI is still being tested for validity and reliability (Michigan
Tech is a partner institution helping with the testing and validation of the EERI). Neither
the ESIT nor the EERI is available for general use at this time. New instruments continue
to be developed and tested. Funding from agencies such as NSF provides important
support for this work.
Notwithstanding its inadequacies and detractors, the DIT-2 remains the dominant
available quantitative test of ethical reasoning. It continues to be used by researchers to
measure ethical reasoning. For example, the SEED study, which tested the ethical
reasoning skills and professional ethics knowledge of approximately 4000
undergraduate engineering students across 18 engineering programs in the U.S., used

I note, however, that when we replaced the DIT-2 with the Engineering Ethics Reasoning
Instrument (EERI) being developed by Purdue University (Michigan Technological University is
participating in the study as one of the research sites) – the EERI also uses narrative ethical
dilemmas but they are all related to issues that an engineer may encounter on the job – the same
faculty still chose not to ask their students to take the test. So that begs the question about the
importance of the test being engineering-related versus the time commitment required for
students to take the test – about an hour for either the DIT-2 or the EERI. I also note that the
purpose of either test is not to teach engineering ethics but to measure ethical reasoning skills.
12
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the DIT-2 as the measure of ethical reasoning skills. When I began my research into the
potential of phenomenology to inform engineering ethics pedagogy in 2011, the DIT-2
was the only instrument widely-available nationally. As mentioned, it has the advantage
of a national database of tens of thousands of participant results. At the time, it was the
best choice for my work. I continue to use it because it is probably as good as any other
measure of ethical reasoning and because I can maintain consistency in my data from
one year to the next. While objections may be raised that it is non-discipline specific, I
don’t consider this a serious problem. Students are as able to apply ethical reasoning to
a famine problem as they are to an engineering design problem. I understand and
accept that the DIT-2 has limitations in what it can measure (ethical sensitivity and
reasoning), and my use of the instrument is confined to those measurements. I am
willing to use other instruments such as the EERI in the future but, for my research here,
I chose to use the DIT-2.

The DIT-2 is proprietary. It is owned and administered by the Center for the Study of
Ethics at the University of Alabama. The DIT-2 is administered locally using Survey
Monkey. Data is then compiled and sent to the Center for analysis. The Center issues a
report with its analyses. Data is returned in SPSS format so that we can conduct
additional tests on our own for correlations (based, for example, on demographic data)
or for statistical significance (for example, comparing pre and post test results).
Even though improvement in and measurement of ethical reasoning is not the primary
focus of my work, it remains an informative component. If the emotional engagement
and understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities of my students improves, it
would be logically consistent that their ethical reasoning skills would improve as well.
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After all, using Kohlberg’s theory, ethical reasoning is earlier stage of and necessary
precursor to higher level moral development. I would not expect to find significant
emotional engagement and understanding of ethics but decreased ethical reasoning
skills; if that happened, it would be an indicator that something is amiss. So there should
be a positive correlation between increased emotional engagement and understanding
of professional and ethical responsibility and improved ethical reasoning skills. Of
course, the reverse is not true – higher ethical reasoning skills do not necessarily lead
to greater emotional engagement as observed, for example, by Newberry in his
engineering ethics classroom (Newberry).

Ethical Sensitivity and its Measurement:
Ethical sensitivity, as used here, is not the same as it is used by Rest in the Four
Component Module. For Rest, ethical sensitivity is more narrowly construed as the
ability to recognize the presence of an ethical dilemma. Narváez describes a richer and
broader scope of ethical sensitivity, one that includes seven skills: (1) understanding
/reading and expressing emotions, (2) taking the perspectives of others, (3) caring by
connecting to others, (4) working with interpersonal and group differences and
responding to diversity (5) preventing or controlling social bias, (6) generating
interpretations and options, and (7) communicating effectively (previously, identifying the
consequences of actions and options) (Narvaez and Endicott; Narvaez 717). This is the
type of ethical sensitivity I want to test and measure.

Researchers and educators are increasingly concluding that ethical sensitivity may be a
more important indicator of ethical decision-making and behavior than ethical reasoning
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as measured by the DIT-2 (Clarkeburn 2002). According to Narváez, ethical sensitivity is
the most important of the four skills generally associated with moral development (ethical
sensitivity, ethical judgment, ethical motivation, and ethical action): “Ethical sensitivity is
the emphatic interpretation of a situation in determining who is involved, what actions to
take, and what possible reactions and outcomes might ensue” (Narvaez and Endicott).
So there is a growing demand for tests to measure ethical sensitivity as a learning
outcome for students, and considerable efforts are going into developing such tests.
Kuusisto, et al. used Narváez’s seven-dimension skillset for ethical sensitivity to create
the quantitative Ethical Sensitivity Scale Questionnaire (ESSQ) and analyzed its
psychometric qualities by testing it with Finnish teachers (Kuusisto, Tirri, and Rissanen).
The developers consider the ESSQ to be an instrument that can be used “in all contexts
and can be employed as a self-evaluation tool” (Kuusisto, Tirri, and Rissanen 2; Gholami
and Tirri).

Shawver and Sennetti used the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) (Reidenbach &
Robin 1990) to develop a Composite MES that uses Likert-type scale measures to
explain ethical evaluations and moral reasoning of accounting students responding to
short ethical vignettes (Shawver & Sennetti 2009). Clarkeburn developed the Test for
Ethical Sensitivity in Science (TESS) to assess the impact of a short ethics course on
the ability of students to recognize ethical problems (Clarkeburn 2002). Building on
Clarkeburn’s work, Swann, et al. developed the Test of Ethical Sensitivity in Science and
Engineering (TESSE). Recently, Davis and Feinerman developed and tested a “proof of
concept” ethical sensitivity pre- and post-test to assess progress in ethics sensitivity
among engineering graduate students but concluded that the type of testing used (short
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answers to ethic-related questions in a non-engineering course; answers were
quantitatively scored) was too unreliable without any control over what was being taught
across many engineering courses (Davis and Feinerman 2010).

My interest was in testing more than the ability to recognize ethical problems, so the
ESSQ, because it is grounded in the seven skills associated with ethical sensitivity that
were identified by Narváez, seemed to offer the possibility of testing ethical sensitivity
from a broader scope, one that also had potentially overlapping elements with both
ethical reasoning and emotional engagement. The ESSQ is a 28-item questionnaire that
is divided into seven sections corresponding to Narváez’s seven skills of ethical
sensitivity. Participants rate themselves on a Likert scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high). The
ESSQ is included in Appendix D. I had at first considered using the Test of Ethical
Sensitivity in Science and Engineering (TESSE) – a more limited test of ethical
sensitivity designed to test the ability to spot ethical issues in science and engineering
contexts – but was advised, when I contacted its developers at Georgia Institute of
Technology, that the instrument has not been fully developed and seems to be at a
standstill with no plans to move forward. I was welcome to use the instrument, I was told,
but no one would be able to provide guidance in the interpretation of results. So I didn’t
pursue that option. I chose to use only the ESSQ. I administered, compiled, and
analyzed the ESSQ survey data.
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Emotional Engagement and Understanding of Professional and Ethical
Responsibilities and their Measurement:
Most research and assessment concerning the effectiveness of engineering ethics
education excludes anything beyond the quantitative measurement of ethical sensitivity
and ethical reasoning. This aligns squarely with Kohlbergian thinking about moral
development and ignores the role of emotion in ethical decision-making and behavior. It
also assumes that learning about ethics is purely cognitive or, at a minimum, that
development of cognitive skills is the most important academic outcome for students. In
terms of engineering ethics, this would assume that engineering ethics instruction is
about students being able to recognize ethical problems, know the applicable rules and
decision-models, apply them to an engineering ethical problem, and arrive at and justify
an ethically-acceptable resolution (see, for example, Davis and Feinerman; Sindelar et
al.). These approaches ignore the value of emotional engagement of students and its
role in achieving student learning outcomes. There is an extensive body of educational
and psychological research that demonstrates the connection between student
engagement and student success. My purpose here is not to review this vast field of
work. I take it as proven. Rather, I will consider two recent studies that together build a
persuasive case for the importance of generating student emotional engagement in
order to achieve student learning outcomes at the college level. More relevantly, these
studies became a catalyst that shifted my focus from emotional engagement as an end
in itself – an outcome to be achieved – to emotional engagement as a mediator of
learning outcomes.
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Handelsman, et al., whose research arose out of their frustration with teaching lower
level undergraduate courses, asked this question: “How do we optimize the learning
environment and outcomes?” (184). They review prior research on student engagement
and general findings that affirmed “engaged students are good learners and that
effective teaching stimulates and sustains student engagement” (184). But they also
conclude that college level studies of student engagement had addressed the “macro
level”, that is, institutional levels rather than individual courses. So their work undertook
to examine student engagement at the coursework level with the intent to improve the
courses they taught. They approached “engagement” as a “multidimensional”
phenomenon that has both behavioral and emotional (affective) elements. They
developed and tested the Student Course Engagement Questionnaire (SCEQ). The
SCEQ asked participants to rate their responses to multiple behaviors and attitudes
associated with engagement on a scale of 1 (not at all engaged) to 5 (very characteristic
of me). There were additional questions related to their specific classes, their attitudes
toward incremental theory (the idea that learning is not fixed), and their personal goal
orientation. Using factor analysis, Handelsman, et al. identified four internally consistent
engagement factors: skills engagement, emotional engagement, participation/interaction
engagement, and performance (academic achievement) engagement. The researchers
consider their work to be preliminary (the sample sizes were small and not randomly
selected) and they draw no conclusions about causation. But one of the important
findings to emerge was that, while all four of these engagement sub-types were
positively associated with academic achievement, only emotional engagement was
positively associated with the intrinsic outcomes of learning, in other words, students
valued learning for its own sake rather than as a way to achieve grades or other extrinsic
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goals (190). This correlation between emotional engagement and learning – as opposed
to academic achievement or grades – was the strongest correlation found among the
four factors. Their results suggest that college instructors who want to see improved
student learning – something other than grades – may do well to foster emotional
engagement of their students in the classroom.

Sagayadevan and Jeyaraj built on the work of Handelsman, et al. They define
engagement as “the connection between an individual and the activity in which one is
involved” and identify engagement as a “multidimensional construct consisting of three
main sub-types: behavioral, emotional, and cognitive engagement” (1-2). Of these three
sub-types, the researchers note that emotional engagement receives the least attention,
in part, because it may be the most difficult to study and measure. They further divide
the effects of emotional engagement into academic achievement marked by grades and
standardized achievement tests and academic learning. They note that here, too,
research has focused primarily on the impact of engagement on achievement outcomes,
rather than learning, because grades are an easily obtained and applied standard of
measurement. They also observe that prior studies typically combine all three
engagement sub-types so that evidence of the influence of any one sub-type is
inconclusive. Sagayadevan and Jeyaraj chose to study emotional engagement only.
They proposed to test three hypotheses: (1) whether students who report that they have
good interaction with their lecturer will have higher levels of emotional engagement than
students who report poor interaction with their lecturer; (2) whether students who report
good interaction with their lecturer will be more likely to have higher academic
achievement (i.e., grades) than students who report poor interaction; and (3) whether
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emotional engagement impacts lecturer-student interaction and academic achievement
and/or lecturer-student interaction and student learning. They used multiple quantitative
methods including questionnaires and grades (5-6) to test these hypotheses. Their
findings affirmed hypothesis 1, that students who report good interactions with their
lecturer have significantly higher levels of emotional engagement than students who
report poor relationships. This was not a surprise. But they found that, as to hypothesis
2, students who reported good interactions with their lecturers did not achieve better
grades than those who reported poor interaction. Finally, as to hypothesis 3,
Sagayadevan and Jeyaraj concluded that emotional engagement had “no significant
impact on academic achievement, but significant impact on student learning outcomes”
(15, emphasis added), suggesting that instructional methods should include ways to
enhance emotional engagement in order to maximize student learning (16).

The significance of these findings on my research is that I moved from an emphasis on
emotional engagement as an outcome to emotional engagement as a mediator of
student learning. The implication for my engineering ethics class is that I realized
emotional engagement was not what I needed to measure. Rather, although I wanted to
create a classroom environment that enhanced emotional engagement and, therefore,
student learning, in the end, the learning outcome that I wanted my students to achieve
and that I needed to assess was ABET’s Engineering Criterion 3(f): “an understanding of
their professional and ethical responsibility” That, after all, is what I am charged with
accomplishing in this class. I previously examined how this criterion has been interpreted
for assessment by various engineering programs and by ethics educators/scholars (see
Table 1.1 in Chapter One). My observation was that no one has hit upon the essence of
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what is or ought to be meant by this criterion and how its achievement can be
meaningfully assessed or measured. So I now address what is meant by an
“understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities” and how can we assess
whether students have attained such understanding.

ABET offers little help. Terminology used by ABET is vague and undefined (Felder and
Brent 7). Before ABET EC 3(f) was adopted in 2000, Harris, et al. distinguished between
morality – where the standards of ethical behavior apply to everyone – and professional
ethics – where the rules of ethical conduct apply to members of a group simply because
they belong to that group. So, in the case of engineering ethics, the proper and limited
focus of teaching should be on standards of conduct that apply to engineers because
they are engineers ((Harris et al. 93). This focus hasn’t necessarily changed since the
adoption of EC 3(f). Davis and Feinerman, writing in 2010, continue to limit the study of
engineering ethics to “those (morally permissible) standards of conduct that apply to
members of a group simply because they are members of that group (and to the conduct
those standards make appropriate). Engineering ethics is for engineers because they
are engineers; research ethics is for researchers because they are researchers; and so
on. We are not here concerned with ordinary morality as such or moral philosophy as
such (two other senses of ‘ethics’)“ (Davis and Feinerman 2). Pfatteicher advises that
ethics instructors should “teach” rather than “preach.” She offers three objectives for
undergraduate engineering ethics education: provide students with “an understanding of
the nature of engineering ethics”, “an understanding the of value of engineering ethics,
as opposed to the values of an ethical engineer”, and “an understanding of the resolution
of problems in engineering ethics” (Pfatteicher 138, emphasis in original). This means
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that instructors should teach and evaluate students on their knowledge and skills, and
not what they think about values or ethics (Sindelar et al. n.p.; Pfatteicher 138).

Pfatteicher refers to “understanding” in each of the three goals, but her emphasis is on
what needs to be understood (which, I admit, is not unimportant) rather than on what
constitutes “understanding.” I think it’s a fair characterization to say that most
engineering ethics instruction focuses on the what – ethical knowledge and skills that
engineering students are expected to demonstrate, rather than on their understanding of
professional and ethical responsibilities. I contend that the explicit language of ABET EC
3(f) encompasses more than the “what.” My thesis for what follows is that an
“understanding of professional and ethical responsibility” is meaningful as a learning
outcome for engineering students only when it is taken as a hermeneutic, prejudicerisking, dialogic, and “horizon-fusing” experience as explicated by Gadamer. Gadamer
described the immanent conditions under which understanding takes place and the
nature of what happens as understanding occurs. I posit that we can use this framework
as a useful way to think about what an “understanding of professional and ethical
responsibility” is and should be for engineering students and to help reveal evidence that
students have achieved this understanding. I propose that a philosophical hermeneutic
approach to assessment can be used, not only in this instance, but for the qualitative
assessment of a wide range of student learning outcomes.

Hermeneutic phenomenology is a research method often used in educational research
to investigate and understand experiences of students, teachers, and others who work in
education (see, for example, Hermeneutic Phenomenology in Education: Method and
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Practice; Cole). Neither hermeneutics nor phenomenology of any kind is regularly
employed as a method for assessment of learning outcomes. Gadamer himself does not
offer any “method” of philosophical hermeneutics (Schwandt, "Three Epistemological
Stances for Qualitative Enquiry” 196). As Gadamer writes, “[I]t follows that [the work of
hermeneutics] is not to develop a procedure of understanding, but to clarify the
conditions in which understanding takes place” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 295). I
propose, however, that the core work of hermeneutics, which is to explain the conditions
for understanding – the conditions that are essential for understanding to take place at
all – can be adapted into a set of markers that, when used to assess written student
narratives, can reveal whether students have achieved an understanding of what they
have studied. These markers need not be specific to a particular classroom or subject
matter because the markers of understanding are universal. Rather, the instructor or
assessor, by reading for evidence of the markers in the students’ written work, can
determine if understanding of particular subject matter has occurred.

Solloway and Brooks designed a model for assessment of student learning based on
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and, in particular, his concepts of erlebnis and
erfahrung. Erlebnis is “something experienced in the moment and experienced in the
moment as a jolt out of the ordinary, out of the familiar which awakens us to ourselves in
a way we have not been awakened before” (Solloway and Brooks 46). Gadamer likens
this to an adventure which “interrupts the customary course of events” as compared to
an “episode” which is routine and not normally of any unusual significance (Gadamer,
Truth and Method 69–70). Erfahrung is our way of being in the world, a very condition of
our being, and “a basic structure of our experience of life” (Schwandt, “Three
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Epistemological Stances for Qualitative Enquiry”; Solloway and Brooks 194). It is how
we use experience and how we become experienced. Gadamer writes:
The truth of experience always implies an orientation toward new
experience. That is why a person who is called experienced has become
so not only through experiences but is also open to new experiences. The
consummation of his experiences, the perfection that we call “being
experienced,” does not consist in the fact that someone already knows
everything and knows better than anyone else. Rather, the experienced
person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who is radically
undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had and the
knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have
new experiences and to learn from them. The dialectic of experience has
its proper fulfillment not in definitive knowledge but in the openness to
experience that is made possible by experience itself (350).
Solloway and Brooks provide a compelling argument for why Gadamer’s philosophical
hermeneutics offers a framework of assessment that better reveals student
understanding than traditional assessment based on quantitatively measurable
standards:
Traditionally, assessment is disconnected from learning. The event
usually requires an engagement of verbal linguistic or logical
mathematical knowledges and demands that idiosyncrasies of personal
relevance, cultural context, and historical context be eliminated. The
assessment is disconnected from the learner. She leaves the event none
the wiser as to how these knowledges have affected the meaning and
purpose of her existence; she has not been invited to confront her own
being in the space of a dialectical experience of the Other.
A model of assessment that takes erlebnis/erfahrung, the hermeneutic
imagination, as a framework for identifying what counts as evidence of
learning would look for ways to engage the student more holistically.
Such a model would allow the student to bring his personal history to the
table. It would encourage the recognition of how knowledge is embodied
rather than stored. It would encourage the exploration of the encounter
with a text as an embodied experience. It would not ask for evidence of
learning as a replication of what the dominant tradition already knows. It
would instead suggest that learning be evidence that the student
encountered the text as an aesthetic experience, evidence that the
student’s hermeneutic imagination came into play in the encounter (51).
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Gadamer’s conception of understanding rejected the Cartesian subject-object
dichotomy. Interpretation and understanding were no longer conceived as a subject
interpreter approaching an object text in order to discern or “understand” the objective
meaning given it by the author, and such understanding then being added to the
accumulated knowledge of the subject. Instead, “understanding is interpretation”
(Schwandt, “Three Epistemological Stances for Qualitative Enquiry” 194) – we cannot
understand without interpreting. Moreover, understanding and interpretation “has the
nature of a dialogue in which the meaning of a text emerges through a conversation
between the interpreter and the text . . . in which the interpreter puts questions to the
text, and the text, in turn, puts questions to the interpreter. The questions put by the text
challenge the truth of the interpreter’s prejudices. The goal of this dialogue between the
interpreter and the text (i.e., the goal of interpretation) is to find those questions to which
the text constitutes the answers. . . . Indeed, it is only by finding out such questions that
we can genuinely understand a text (as “logical,” “reasonable,” etc.), and not dismiss it
as nonsense” (Prasad 20). This hermeneutic dialogue – which takes an interpreter as
always already located within a foregrounded horizon with all one’s biases and
prejudices (Gadamer, Truth and Method 303), who encounters a new or alien text and is
open to testing or risking one’s existing horizon, enters into a conversation with the text
and, through interpretation, and comes to a new understanding – is a “fusion of
horizons” – a new horizon because the interpreter’s foregrounded horizon has now
changed. This is our ever-going process and our way of being (Prasad).

What, then, are these markers or conditions of understanding that can guide
assessment of student learning? I suggest four: (1) a foregrounded horizon wherein are
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found one’s biases and prejudices, (2) an openness to engaging and placing those
biases and prejudices at risk, (3) a dialogical encounter or conversation with a “text,” and
(4) interpretation and emergence of a new understanding or a “fusion of horizons.” If we
can locate evidence of these markers within the narratives written by students, I suggest
we can be confident that understanding has occurred and that students have achieved
understanding as a student learning outcome. I’ll examine each of these within the
theoretical grounding of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and discuss how these
markers or conditions of understanding would apply to assessment of undergraduate
engineering students’ understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities.

A foundational element of Gadamer’s theory of hermeneutic experience is the
hermeneutic “horizon.” Gadamer describes it as follows:
The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be
seen from a particular vantage point. Applying this to the thinking mind,
we speak of narrowness of horizon, of the possible expansion of horizon,
of the opening up of new horizons, and so forth. . . . A person who has no
horizon does not see far enough and hence over-values what is nearest
to him. On the other hand, “to have a horizon” means not being limited to
what is nearby but being able to see beyond it. A person who has an
horizon knows the relative significance of everything within this horizon
whether it is near or far, great or small. Similarly, working out the
hermeneutical situation means acquiring the right horizon of inquiry for
the questions evoked by the encounter with tradition (301-302).
The concept of “horizon” suggests itself because it expresses the superior
breadth of vision that the person who is trying to understand must have.
To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close
at hand – not in order to look away from it but to see it better, with a larger
whole and in truer proportion (304).
This hermeneutic horizon, in other words, is the foreground that exists for all of us at any
given moment. It is “always already” there. Essentially, our horizons are “determined by
the prejudices that we have. These prejudices constitute, then, the horizon of a particular
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present, for they represent that beyond which it is impossible to see” (Gadamer, Truth
and Method 304). These prejudices, biases, and prejudgments arise out of our histories
and traditions and, far from being things that we can rid ourselves of or distance
ourselves from at will, they are integrally part of who we are. They “define the limits and
the potentialities of our horizon of understanding (or our ‘hermeneutic horizon’). Hence,
rather than being viewed as obstacles to understanding, prejudices need to be regarded
as the necessary conditions of all understanding” (Prasad 18). That said, Gadamer does
not sanction a free-for-all for all prejudices: “Thus we can formulate the fundamental
epistemological question for a truly historical hermeneutics as follows: what is the
ground of the legitimacy of prejudices? What distinguishes legitimate prejudices from the
countless others which it is the undeniable task of critical reason to overcome?”
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 278). Legitimate prejudices are those that contribute to
understanding and the “countless others” are those that impede or prevent
understanding. “It is the tyranny of hidden prejudices that makes us deaf to what speaks
to us in tradition” (272). “The point is not to free ourselves of all prejudice, but to examine
our historically inherited and unreflectively held prejudices and alter those that disable
our efforts to understand others, and ourselves” (Schwandt, "Three Epistemological
Stances for Qualitative Enquiry”; see also Garrison). This is not a simple matter, to be
sure. “The prejudices and fore-meanings that occupy the interpreter’s consciousness are
not at his free disposal. He cannot separate in advance the productive prejudices that
enable understanding from the prejudices that hinder it and lead to misunderstandings.
Rather, this separation must take place in the process of understanding itself”
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 295).
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We gather from this that foregrounded horizons are never fixed and unchanging. “In fact
the horizon of the present is continually in the process of being formed because we are
continually having to test all our prejudices” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 305). And so
the second condition of understanding is an openness to engaging and putting those
biases and prejudices at risk. Unless we are open to contesting our prejudices,
understanding cannot take place. “The fact that we ‘belong’ to tradition and that tradition
in some sense governs interpretation does not mean that we merely reenact the biases
of tradition in our interpretation. Although preconceptions, prejudices, or prejudgments
suggest the initial conceptions that an interpreter brings to the interpretation of an object
or another person, the interpreter risks those prejudices in the encounter with what is to
be interpreted” (Schwandt, "Three Epistemological Stances for Qualitative Enquiry" 195).
Gadamer explains: “All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other
person or text. But this openness always includes our situating the other meaning in
relation to the whole of our own meanings or ourselves in relation to it. . . . [A] person
trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell him something. That is why a
hermeneutically trained consciousness must be, from the start, sensitive to the text’s
alterity. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither ‘neutrality’ with respect to content nor
the extinction of one’s self, but the foregrounding and appropriation of one’s own foremeanings and prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that
the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s
own fore-meanings” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 271–272). Gadamer compares the
openness of hermeneutical experience to what he calls the “I-Thou” relationship:
“Openness to the other, then, involves recognizing that I myself must accept some
things that are against me, even though no one else forces me to do so” (355).
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Our prejudices are put at risk in the course of a “dialogical encounter with what is not
understood, with what is alien, with what makes a claim upon us” (Schwandt, "Three
Epistemological Stances for Qualitative Enquiry” 195). Contrary to what is often an
underlying approach in the teaching of texts, the meaning of a text is not fixed with only
a single permissible or possible way to understand it. We must be open to this possibility
when we encounter a text:
The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter, does not
depend on the contingencies of the author and his original audience. It
certainly is not identical with them, for it is always co-determined also by
the historical situation of the interpreter and hence by the totality of the
objective course of history. . . . [A]n author does not need to know the real
meaning of what he has written; and hence the interpreter can, and must,
often understand more than he. But this is of fundamental importance.
Not just occasionally but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its
author. That is why understanding is not merely a reproductive but always
a productive activity as well (Gadamer, Truth and Method 296).
The dialogical encounter is in the nature of a question and answer conversation.
According to Gadamer, “[t]he hermeneutical task becomes of itself a questioning of
things” (271):
The close relation between questioning and understanding is what gives
the hermeneutic experience its true dimension. However much a person
trying to understand may leave open the truth of what is said, however
much he may dismiss the immediate meaning of the object and consider
its deeper significance instead, and take the latter not as true but merely
as meaningful, so that the possibility of its truth remains unsettled, this is
the real and fundamental nature of a question: namely to make things
indeterminate. Questions always bring out the undetermined possibilities
of a thing. That is why we cannot understand the questionableness of
something without asking real questions, though we can understand a
meaning without meaning it. To understand the questionableness of
something is already to be questioning. There can be no tentative or
potential attitude to questioning, for questioning is not the positing but the
testing of possibilities.
This is the reason why understanding is always more than merely recreating someone else’s meaning. Questioning opens up possibilities of
meaning, and thus what is meaningful passes into one’s own thinking on
the subject (367-368).
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Gadamer describes the qualities of hermeneutic questioning or dialectic: First, it is
“reserved to the person who wants to know – i.e., who already has questions.”
Questioning is not the same as “resisting the pressure of opinion” or argumentation for
the sake of winning a debate. Rather, “dialectic proves its value because only the person
who knows how to ask questions is able to persist in his questioning, which involves
being able to preserve his orientation toward openness. The art of questioning is the art
of questioning ever further – i.e., the art of thinking. It is called dialectic because it is the
art of conducting a real dialogue” (360).

This questioning is an interplay between the text and all that the interpreter already
brings to the interpreting of the text, and this creates a “tension between the text and the
present. The hermeneutic task consists in not covering up this tension by attempting a
naïve assimilation of the two but in consciously bringing it out” (Gadamer, Truth and
Method 305). This conversation between the interpreter and the text is where the
interpreter brings his or her own preconceptions into play, puts them at risk, and allows
the meaning of the text to “really be made to speak for us” (398).
Hence the meaning of a text is not to be compared with an immovably
and obstinately fixed point of view that suggests only one question to the
person trying to understand it, namely how the other person could have
arrived at such an absurd opinion. In this sense understanding is certainly
not concerned with “understanding historically” – i.e., reconstructing the
way the text came into being. Rather, one intends to understand the text
itself. But this means that the interpreter’s own thoughts too have gone
into re-awakening the text’s meaning. In this the interpreter’s own horizon
is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that he maintains or
enforces, but more as an opinion and a possibility that one brings into
play and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one’s own what the
text says. I have described this above as a “fusion of horizons.” We can
now see that this is what takes place in conversation, in which something
is expressed that is not only mine or my author’s, but common (Gadamer,
Truth and Method 390).
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Interpretation, understanding, and the “fusion of horizons” are not separable and distinct
units of activity but comprise, instead, a seamless, ongoing, negotiated, and dialectic
back-and-forth movement between the interpreter and a text. Gadamer writes repeatedly
that understanding and interpretation are “indissolubly bound together” and that
“understanding always includes interpretation” (Truth and Method 400). “Thus
interpretation is not a means through which understanding is achieved; rather, it enters
into the content of what is understood” (399). When we understand a text, we have
actually created a new foregrounded horizon:
In fact the horizon of the present is continually in the process of being
formed because we are continually having to test all our prejudices. An
important part of this testing occurs in encountering the past and in
understanding the tradition from which we come. Hence the horizon of the
present cannot be formed without the past. There is no more an isolated
horizon of the present in itself than there are historical horizons which
have to be acquired. Rather, understanding is always the fusion of these
horizons supposedly existing by themselves.
Projecting a historical horizon, then, is only one phase in the process of
understanding; it does not become solidified into the self-alienation of a
past consciousness, but is overtaken by our own present horizon of
understanding. In the process of understanding, a real fusing of horizons
occurs – which means that as the historical horizon is projected, it is
simultaneously superseded (305-306).

The “fusion of horizons” is not unlike nuclear fusion in which atomic nuclei collide and
join to form a new type of atomic nucleus. This is true in the sense that the new fused
horizon emerges from but is not the same as either the previously foregrounded horizon
or the text that was interpreted. However, we cannot predict what the fused horizon will
be, only that it will never be the same for any two persons interpreting the same text.
“[I]nterpretation in the medium of language itself shows what understanding always is:
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assimilating what is said to the point that it becomes one’s own” (Gadamer, Truth and
Method 400).
Understanding, like action, always remains a risk and never leaves room
for the simple application of a general knowledge of rules to the
statements of texts to be understood. Furthermore where it is successful,
understanding means a growth in inner awareness, which as a new
experience enters into the texture of our own mental experience.
Understanding is an adventure and, like any other adventure is
dangerous. . . . But. . . .[i]t is capable of contributing in a special way to
the broadening of our human experiences, our self-knowledge, and our
horizon, for everything understanding mediates is mediated along with
ourselves (Schwandt 196, quoting Gadamer, Reason in the Age of
Science 109-110).

That said, understanding is never a final, complete, certain, or correct interpretation:
The text is made to speak through interpretation. But no text and no book
speaks if it does not speak a language that reaches the other person.
Thus interpretation must find the right language if it really wants to make
the text speak. There cannot, therefore, be any single interpretation that
is correct “in itself,” precisely because every interpretation is concerned
with the text itself. The historical life of a tradition depends on being
constantly assimilated and interpreted. An interpretation that was correct
in itself would be a foolish ideal that mistook the nature of tradition. Every
interpretation has to adapt itself to the hermeneutical situation in which it
belongs (Gadamer, Truth and Method 398).

Gadamer denies, however, that, because the fusion of horizons will be different for each
individual interpreting a text in a particular situation, interpretation is thus relative or
subjective:
We saw that to understand a text always means to apply it to ourselves
and to know that, even if it must always be understood in different ways, it
is still the same text presenting itself to us in these different ways. That
this does not in the least relativize the claim to truth of every interpretation
is seen from the fact that all interpretation is essentially verbal. The verbal
explicitness that understanding achieves through interpretation does not
create a second sense apart from that which is understood and
interpreted. The interpretive concepts are not, as such, thematic in
understanding. Rather, it is their nature to disappear behind what they
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bring to speech in interpretation. Paradoxically, an interpretation is right
when it is capable of disappearing in this way. And yet at the same time it
must be expressed as something that is supposed to disappear. The
possibility of understanding is dependent on the possibility of this kind of
mediating interpretation (399).

Philosophical Hermeneutics as a Paradigm for the Assessment of
Understanding Professional and Ethical Responsibilities:
For assessment purposes, faculty should not assume (or fear) that a qualitative
interpretive method requires special skills that they do not already use in grading nonquantitative work. This is as true for engineering (STEM) faculty as it is for non-STEM
faculty. As Goldman argues, engineering is inherently a value-laden profession, and the
decisions engineers make in the daily course of their practices are almost always made
in the realm of uncertainty and speculation. Yet, judgments must be made about how to
proceed. This happens in the engineering classroom as well. Students are involved in
the often ambiguous and largely uncertain work of engineering design; yet engineering
faculty routinely evaluate and grade non-quantitative student work. From a practical
perspective, a philosophical hermeneutic assessment approach requires a modification
in what we are looking for, not a paradigm shift.

I propose that, if we can locate evidence of these four markers of hermeneutic
understanding – (1) a foregrounded horizon characterized by the interpreter’s biases and
prejudices (2) an openness to engaging and placing those biases and prejudices at risk,
(3) a dialogical encounter or conversation with a “text” (4) interpretation and emergence
of understanding or a “fusion of horizons” – within the narratives written by students, we
can then make an authentic assessment or judgment about whether students have
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achieved an understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities. Before I discuss
how we can use these markers, some foregrounding comments are needed. First,
method and rigor are not disregarded. I will explain in detail the methods used in the
assessment process later in this chapter. Because this project is also a research inquiry
into whether a philosophical hermeneutic approach can be effectively used for
assessment of student understanding, there will be more to the process than if this were
a pure assessment project. For now I stress that the assessment method is necessarily
interpretive and uses interpretive methods essential to qualitative research to arrive at
themes that can reveal student understanding. This is a process of understanding in its
own right because it requires a constant movement – an interpretive conversation – by
the interpretive researcher/assessor between the coded and themed data and the
narrative “texts” themselves, i.e., the narratives written by the students.

Second, just as understanding is not a sequential process with discrete units of activity,
so the expressions of understanding written by the students do not align linearly with
each of the four markers of understanding. Gadamer explained that “how hermeneutics
works” can be envisioned as a hermeneutic circle: “We recall the hermeneutic rule that
we must understand the whole in terms of the detail and the detail in terms of the whole.
This principle stems from ancient rhetoric, and modern hermeneutics has transferred it
to the art of understanding. It is a circular relationship in both cases. The anticipation of
meaning in which the whole is envisaged becomes actual understanding when the parts
that are determined by the whole themselves also determine this whole” (Gadamer,
Truth and Method 291). So it is with understanding and interpreting these student
essays. We must understand and allow that the interpretive assessment of these essays
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mirrors the hermeneutic circle in that the whole and the parts are all in play
simultaneously and inseparably. What this means is that the four markers of
understanding are not likely to appear as discretely identifiable and sequential “steps” in
students’ essays because that is not how understanding occurs and it is not how
understanding is expressed.

Third, I suggest that a philosophical hermeneutic approach for assessment of student
understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities may be the best, and perhaps
the only, means to acquire authentic feedback about what students are actually getting
from the course. In the classroom, the traditional measures of ethics have focused on
objective knowledge of codes and ethics theories and the skill of being able to pull out
the relevant rule and apply it (usually by using a heuristic or decision-making model) to
an engineering ethics problem. Most of the answers will look the same, and that is the
expectation. Assessment by engineering programs and by institutions to ascertain if
students are achieving academic learning outcomes often takes the form of “rubrics” or
what has been referred to as the “quantitization” of data, a sort of hybrid between
qualitative and quantitative assessment (Borrego, Douglas, and Amelink 59). The
traditional approach is to develop and use an assessment rubric designed to minimize
and control interpretation as much as possible by providing guidelines as to how a
reader should “rate” narrative material and then locate a student’s work on a quantitative
scale. Philosophical hermeneutic assessment, on the other hand, depends on – indeed
is – interpretation with no scale for measuring or categorizing understanding.
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Whether for classroom grading or program/institutional assessment purposes, these
tests and rubrics “rarely demonstrate something particular about how a student is
thinking or assimilating new information” (Solloway and Brooks 44). A philosophical
hermeneutic approach to assessment, on the other hand, can move from assessment of
“knowledge“ or “the mastering of facts” to understanding whether or not students have
achieved an understanding of the material, whether they are more than “repositories for
discrete bits of knowledge” and prepared instead to “gain insight from the knowledge,
opening up possibilities for transformation” (46–47). By using an interpretive approach,
we can read student narratives as windows to student expressions of understanding
about professional and ethical responsibilities. It is a perspective that is unavailable by
any other traditional mode of assessment.

Fourth, an explication of how these markers might appear is not the same as specifying
what those markers must say. This distinguishes assessment grounded in philosophical
hermeneutics from most quantitative assessment that requires data to fit into pre-defined
items of knowledge. We know what the markers of understanding are but we do not
know how those “understandings” will be manifested or expressed. Importantly, it is
identification that the markers are present and not what the specific content of the
markers is that constitutes the substance of the assessment. We will not find student
expressions of universal essences of what it is to be an ethical engineer. What we do
expect to read are expressions that indicate a process of understanding has occurred
and evidence that each student may have experienced some unique and individual
fusion of horizons.
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Fifth, although a philosophical hermeneutic approach can be used effectively for both
assessment and grading purposes, my research addresses the assessment of student
understanding of ethics. While grading is concerned with individual student outcomes,
assessment is concerned with finding out if we are achieving intended student learning
outcomes and using this information to inform our teaching. We evaluate student
expressions, not to judge “better” or “worse” in order to assign a grade, but to
understand if our students understand. We acquire this understanding through our own
interpretations of the “thick” descriptions expressed by students in their essays.
Interpretation does not end with identification of the presence or absence of the markers
of understanding evidenced in these essays. The work of philosophical hermeneutic
assessment asks what these expressions of understanding mean, for example, in terms
of student learning and attitudes about professional and ethical responsibilities, their
preparation to exit the university and enter the work of engineering, their dispositions
toward citizenship, and their vision of how they see themselves being in the world.
Although the expressions of these students cannot and should not be interpreted as
generalizable to all engineering students who are about to graduate and enter the
professional workforce, an interpretive assessment approach can nevertheless can give
us a unique insight and perspective in order to inform stronger and more useful
engineering ethics education.

So how can these four markers of understanding be used to assess undergraduate
engineering students’ understanding of their professional and ethical responsibilities?
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The hermeneutic horizon is a condition of understanding characterized by the
interpreter’s prejudices. If we are assessing student narratives for signs of
understanding, it makes sense that one of the markers we should find in reading and
interpreting the narratives written by our students is evidence of their foregrounded
horizons and the prejudices or biases that shape that horizon. Gadamer writes that our
prejudices are rooted in our traditions, and this constitutes our historic consciousness. I
suggest that we can think of our prejudices as the values we hold. After all, our
prejudices and biases – and the traditions from which they emerge – are a reflection and
manifestation of our values and how we prioritize them. Our values determine who we
are and what is important to us at any given moment. If students are to understand the
texts related to ethics – be that a written work or an interview with another person – they
must encounter those texts with some awareness of their foregrounded prejudices or
values. Although it is neither possible nor desirable, as Gadamer reminds us, to
disregard our prejudices or values, it is nevertheless necessary to sort out legitimate
prejudices or values from the ones that impede understanding (Truth and Method 272),
and this necessitates examination and reflection (Schwandt, "Three Epistemological
Stances for Qualitative Enquiry” 195). In my engineering ethics class, students start by
reflecting on values – their own values and the influence they have in everyday decisionmaking, the values that underlie rules and policies that govern their personal and
professional behaviors, and how values help explain the complexity of ethical decisionmaking. If our values are a condition of understanding and if we are responsible for
having an awareness of our values – prejudices, biases, and traditions – then this is an
important place from which to approach the study of professional and ethical
responsibilities. This position is in sharp contrast to the admonition that proper
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engineering ethics instruction should avoid discussing the “values of an ethical engineer”
and focus instead on an “understanding of the value of engineering ethics” (Pfatteicher
138). Reflection on values is not undertaken so as to tell students what values they
should have but to give them the opportunity to become aware of the role of values and
to engage their own values in the process of understanding professional and ethical
responsibilities.

If we want to understand a text, we must not only have some awareness of the values or
prejudices we bring to the text, we must also be open to engaging our values and
testing them or placing them at risk. If we approach a text with a determination to
resist putting our values at risk or with a conviction that our horizon is acceptable as it is,
if we “stick blindly to our own fore-meaning about the thing” (Gadamer, Truth and
Method 271), we will never understand the meaning of another. “Rather, a person trying
to understand a text is prepared for it to tell him something” (271). So, in assessing
student narratives for signs that they understand professional and ethical
responsibilities, we should look for expressions that evidence their openness to the texts
they encounter, their preparedness to be told something, and their willingness to put
their values or prejudices at risk.

Next, do students discuss their dialogical encounters or conversations with the
various assigned “texts” – written materials, interviews, class discussions, and so
forth? “Questioning opens up possibilities of meaning, and thus what is meaningful
passes into one’s own thinking on the subject” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 368). Within
and through the dialectic of these dialogs, interpretation and understanding occur.
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Students emerge with a “fusion of horizons” – a different horizon of understanding that
is no longer the prior foregrounded horizon or the mere reflection of the text they have
“read.”

There is a distinction to be made between applying knowledge and understanding
knowledge. Gadamer articulates this distinction. The difference is also critical to
meaningful assessment of whether students have reached an understanding
professional and ethical responsibilities. Gadamer examined Aristotle’s analysis of the
virtue of moral knowledge and the question of whether moral knowledge is acquired and
applied or, as Aristotle maintains, whether it arises out of one’s life experiences.
Gadamer says that the same problem exists for understanding in general. He clarifies
that understanding is not a two-step process where a person first acquires an
understanding and then applies this understanding to a situation: “We too determined
that application is neither a subsequent nor merely an occasional part of the
phenomenon of understanding, but codetermines it as a whole from the beginning. Here
too application did not consist in relating some pregiven universal to the particular
situation. The interpreter dealing with a traditionary text tries to apply it to himself. But
this does not mean that the text is given for him as something universal, that he first
understands it per se, and then afterward uses it for particular applications.” (Gadamer,
Truth and Method 320–321).

Traditional ethics instruction is a two-step process – acquiring knowledge of rules and
theories and then applying them to an ethics problem. A phenomenological approach to
ethics instruction asks students to encounter a variety of “texts” concerned with
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professional and ethical responsibilities, to engage in a dialog with those texts, and to
emerge from that interpretive experience with new understandings – “a fusion of
horizons” – of professional and ethical responsibilities. Their foregrounded horizons have
changed and “thus, nothing ever appears the same again following a hermeneutic
experience. . . . Our ‘world’ undergoes a change, and we become changed as people
along with it” (Kakkori 25). This means, for assessment purposes, that we should look,
not for reports or reproductions of what students have studied, but for expressions of
mutually negotiated meanings with and new understandings of these texts and new
outlooks that have occurred in the process of interpretation and understanding.

Research and Assessment Design:
I now face the conundrum that has lingered in the background since I first identified this
work as the focus of my graduate research: what am I going to do with my data? What is
the methodological approach that I will use to understand the meaning of the narrative
data (essays) that I have collected? The instruction methods I used for the design and
delivery of my ethics course are informed by hermeneutic phenomenology – asking
students to investigate and interpret the essences of what it is to be an ethical engineer.
The qualitative assessment approach that I have developed uses conditions of
understanding as markers of student understanding of professional and ethical
responsibilities and is grounded in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. But how do I
apply this assessment approach to the narrative data and how do I interpret and
understand meanings that are in the data?
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I began by ruling out methods. I considered grounded theory but soon realized that my
work was not concerned with generating or discovering a theory “in which the inquirer
generates a general explanation (a theory) of a process, action, or interaction shaped by
the views of a large number of participants” – a process in which the theory truly arises
from the data itself such that it is “grounded” in that data (Creswell 62-63 citing Strauss
and Corbin). Contrary to how grounded theory originates and proceeds with the
investigation of data – without a theory but allowing a theory to emerge – I have already
developed an assessment framework based on, first, ABET Criterion 3(f) and, second,
on Gadamer’s explication of the conditions of understanding. The question for me is how
I will approach and interpret the textual data within the hermeneutic framework I have
developed.
I returned to phenomenology – specifically “hermeneutic phenomenology” – as a
research method. “Hermeneutic phenomenology” became problematic for me as well. I
struggled with the fact that my research was not intended to investigate or reveal the
essences of any lived experience. Although my students were asked to investigate the
experience of being an ethical engineer, my research interest was not with their
discoveries but with assessing if that process of inquiry had resulted in new
understandings of professional and ethical responsibilities. I sought evidence of
understanding and, while student expressions of essences might disclose evidence of
understanding, the essences of an engineer’s ethical experiences were not themselves
the object of assessment. The more I read about hermeneutic phenomenology, the
greater my recognition became that hermeneutic phenomenology as a research method
is not the same as the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer.
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But this distinction is seldom made. Schwandt is a stanch proponent of the philosophical
hermeneutics of Gadamer, and he argues forcefully that the “interpretive” tradition in
qualitative inquiry – which claims alignment with Gadamer and philosophical
hermeneutics – actually remains much closer to a positivist paradigm. As he explains,
although there are various interpretive approaches used, “interpretivists argue that it is
possible to understand the subjective meaning of action (grasping the actor’s beliefs,
desires, and so on) yet do so in an objective manner. . . .This, of course, does not
necessarily deny the fact that in order to understand the intersubjective meanings of
human action, the inquirer may have to, as a methodological requirement, ‘participate’ in
the life worlds of others” (Schwandt, "Three Epistemological Stances for Qualitative
Inquiry" 193). Kakkori argues that hermeneutics and phenomenology are distinct
philosophies that were joined by Heidegger but in ways that most researchers do not
recognize, practice, or acknowledge. Her critique focusses centrally on the hermeneutic
phenomenological methods of van Manen, whom she credits for his “fruitful description
of hermeneutic phenomenological reflection and hermeneutic phenomenological writing”,
but critiques for his unacknowledged “theoretical problems and contradictions between
hermeneutics and phenomenology in his argumentations.” She gave voice to the
conundrum I faced: “It is not enough to say that phenomenological research eventually
becomes hermeneutic-phenomenological research simply because we always
understand and interpret things” (Kakkori 20, 25, 26).

To state this once again, philosophical hermeneutics is not a research method: “[The
work of hermeneutics] is not to develop a procedure of understanding, but to clarify the
conditions in which understanding takes place. But these conditions do not amount to a
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‘procedure’ or method which the interpreter must of himself bring to bear on the text”
(Gadamer, Truth and Method 295). “The goal of philosophical hermeneutics is
philosophical – that is, to understand what is involved in the process of understanding
itself” (Schwandt, "Three Epistemological Stances for Qualitative Inquiry" 196). “The
method of phenomenology is that there is no method. The fact that there is ‘no’ method
might leave us with a feeling of abandonment, of being left in the middle of nowhere. . . .
In phenomenological philosophy and methodology we find the tools we need to design a
method for our research question; the phenomenological scholars provide us with
theoretical knowledge. But in the process of understanding this knowledge, there is an
obvious danger that literature confuses more than it clarifies. When we find that there is
a plethora of perspectives within phenomenology, our mind might turn into the antithesis
– a closed mind” (Henriksson and Friesen 12).

This helped to explain my quandary and confusion about research methods. But how,
then, am I supposed to know what to do? The answer, I discovered, is simple but not
immediately apparent, and it returned me to where I had started: “If there is no method
and if the philosophers we turn to do not challenge us, there is just one salvation on the
road to method: the research question” (Henriksson and Friesen 12). Ah ha. Go back to
my principal research question:
Can a phenomenological approach to engineering ethics instruction
improve students’ understanding of professional and ethical
responsibilities?

Research is an effort to understand something. I realized that the most important part of
my research design is to determine and invent as necessary a method that will help
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discover the answer to my research question. I have already proposed using
philosophical hermeneutics to design a framework for assessment of students’
understanding professional and ethical responsibilities. My research will deploy and test
that framework of understanding so that I, as an instructor, can better understand the
“understanding” of my students. Phenomenological methods are amenable to adaptation
for such an investigation. Schwandt advocates for such methodological adaptation. In an
article entitled “On Understanding Understanding”, Schwandt observes that qualitative
researchers – and specifically those trained in philosophical hermeneutics – are
“uniquely suited to help us understand what it means to understand” and then asks:
“Might not we better grasp the significance of qualitative inquiry if we worried less about
justifying and locating it as a particular form of research and more about linking it to the
practices of teaching and learning?” (Schwandt, “On Understanding Understanding”
462–463). That is my perspective as well and it is what I aim to do.

Phenomenology research is concerned with discovering human meaning from the
standpoint of lived experience, that is to say, “a return to embodied, experiential
meanings” (Finlay, “Debating Phenomenological Research Methods” 17).
Phenomenology is generally considered to be in the “interpretive” or “constructivistinterpretive” paradigm of qualitative research. The other three paradigms are variously
referred to as positivist, postpositivist, and critical (Lindlof and Taylor 5–13) or,
alternatively, positivist/postpositivist, critical (Marxist emancipatory), and feministpoststructural (Denzin and Lincoln, “Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of
Qualitative Research” 13). There is by no means universal agreement about these
paradigms, how they should be defined, or what the appropriate research methods for
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each one should be. Schwandt, for example, makes clear epistemological distinctions
among interpretivism, philosophical hermeneutics, and social constructionism – three
approaches that generally are lumped within the interpretive or constructivist-interpretive
paradigms (Schwandt, Three Epistemological Stances for Qualitative Enquiry).

As a brief review, there are multiple variants and schools of phenomenology research
(Finlay, “Debating Phenomenological Research Methods”). Most of these, whatever their
differences, share certain common philosophical perspectives:
x

Qualitative research marks philosophy’s return to the traditional task of
philosophy, which is the search for wisdom instead of a focus on empirical
science.

x

Qualitative research requires researchers to suspend all judgments about what is
real. This is also called “bracketing out” or “phenomenological attitude” or
“reduction” – the researcher leaves behind the “natural attitude” and tries not to
let his or her own presuppositions get in the way of data collection and to be
open to whatever may be revealed about the phenomenon being studied.

x

Qualitative research subscribes to the intentionality of consciousness, that is, that
consciousness if always directed toward something (destroys the Cartesian
duality of separate subjects and objects), and

x

Following from this, qualitative research is premised on the understanding that
reality is perceived within the meaning of the experiences of an individual.
(Butler-Kisber 51, citing Creswell 58-59, citing Stewart and Mickunas).
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The phenomenology research process generally consists of three broad steps (Orbe;
Creswell; Lindlof and Taylor; Butler-Kisber; Finlay, “Debating Phenomenological
Research Methods”) and there are abundant examples in the literature on the
application of these steps (see, for example, Butler-Kisber; Orbe; Creswell; Finlay,
Introducing Phenomenological Research; Smith and Osborn; Groenewald):
1. Data collection (descriptions of lived experiences). Data collection methods vary
according to the research question and project. The most common form of data
collection for phenomenology research is the personal interview (Seidman) but
data can include observations, focus groups, already existing recordings (visual
or audio), or texts such as documents or narratives.
2. Reduction of data into themes. This is a multi-step process of coding the written
or transcribed data so that significant statements are first identified, the meanings
of these statements are formulated, and these formulated meanings are then
consolidated into emerging themes. There is much variation in how researchers
choose to code data and what the steps in the process are called. Butler-Kisber
gives an example in which “significant statements” are extracted from a
transcribed interview, “formulated meanings of significant statements” are then
compiled, and from these “clusters of common themes” are identified (ButlerKisber 55–58). Perhaps the key outcome of this step is the elucidation of “thick
rich descriptions” of the participants’ experiences. One notable exception to this
process of data reduction by coding is the hermeneutic phenomenological
approach of van Manen. Van Manen refers to “methodical reduction”, which asks
the researcher to “[b]racket all established investigative methods or techniques
and seek or invent an approach that seems to fit most appropriately the
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phenomenological topic under study” (van Manen, “Inquiry: Methodology:
Reduction” n.p.). Van Manen’s hermeneutic phenomenology is remarkable for its
absence of prescribed method.
3. Hermeneutic interpretation of themes or the search for essences. This step is
highly integrated with the reduction of data into themes. Throughout the process
of data reduction, the researcher is engaged in a back and forth conversation
with the data, and interpretation is already occurring. This process is also
iterative in that the researcher will need to consistently return to the data to reexamine and validate themes and interpretations. This includes the original data
as well as coded data. The key for hermeneutic interpretation of qualitative data
is to reveal themes that have an “emergent and inductive orientation” and that
the analyst “see[s] the world through participants’ eyes” (Daly 219).

Qualitative researchers aim for scholarly rigor. They want their research results to be
trustworthy, accepted by their peers, and publishable. Leydens, et al. compiled an
extensive listing of methods for establishing trustworthiness and scholarly rigor in
qualitative research which includes an audit trail (tracking findings back to the data),
clarifying researcher bias, coding and re-coding, external audit (external consultants to
review process and product), member checking (asking participants to review and give
feedback on transcripts and findings), peer examination (panel of peers to examine
meanings and interpretations), purposeful sampling (deliberate selection of research
participants), reflexivity, rich thick description, and triangulation (using more than one
research method to compare results) (68).
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Additional measures for ensuring trustworthiness and rigor include stating and
maintaining theoretical consistency throughout one’s research (Borrego, Douglas, and
Amelink; Koro-Ljungberg and Douglas; Orbe; Prasad) and, according to van Manen,
concern for factors such as orientation of the researcher in the lifeworlds of the
participants, strength of the data in representing the intentions of the participants,
richness or aesthetic quality of the summaries written by the researcher, and depth of
the researcher in accessing the meanings given by the participants (Researching Lived
Experience). Kafle adds a component that we don’t often consider, particularly in
hermeneutic phenomenological research – paying attention to the rhetoric – a language
that “does justice to express what is intended by the participants” (Kafle 196).
Reflexivity is an essential practice in rigorous and ethical scholarly qualitative research.
Guillemin and Gillam distinguish between procedural ethics (complying with Internal
Review Board requirements, for example) and ethics in practice. They remind us that
researchers must constantly “take stock of their actions and roles in the research
process and subject these to the same scrutiny as the rest of the data” (Guillemin and
Gillam 274). “Reflexivity involves critical reflection of how the researcher constructs
knowledge from the research process – what sorts of factors influence the researcher’s
construction of knowledge and how these influences are revealed in the planning,
conduct, and writing up of the research. . . .Adopting a reflexive research process means
a continuous process of critical scrutiny and interpretation, not just in relation to the
research methods and the data but also to the researcher, participants, and the research
context” (275). With this background on methodology and method, I describe the
research methods chosen and designed for my project:
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Research question: Can a phenomenological approach to engineering ethics
instruction improve students’ understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities?

Data Collection and Storage: Students in ENT3958 Fall Semester 2014 wrote a
final research essay (approximately 1800 words), due at the end of the semester,
addressing the question: what is it to be an ethical engineer? Essays were graded
according to course standards. After grading and grade submissions were completed, I
downloaded all essays from Instructure Canvas (online course delivery system used by
Michigan Technological University) to my home personal computer. All names were
removed from the essays. The essays were numbered and then compiled into a single
file with each essay comprising a separate section of the document. Line numbers were
added and numbering was restarted for each new section. Data storage is on Canvas
(for the coursework only) and on my secure home personal computer (research data).
Data is in Word format. Data is backed-up daily. No data is stored in any “cloud
computing or data storage” site and is not subject to breach.

Identification of Themes: I decided to code the data twice using different
approaches. There are two reasons for this. First, when I started this project, my focus
was on measuring “emotional engagement with ethics” as an outcome. During the
writing of this dissertation, that focus shifted from emotional engagement as an outcome
per se to emotional engagement as a mediator of the learning outcome: “an
understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities.” Before this change, however,
I had already started coding the narrative data with emotional engagement in mind. I had
not attempted any intentional and conscious interpretive work with the preliminary coding
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but I did have this work partially completed and did not want to discard that effort. So,
second, I decided to complete this coding using conventional phenomenology reduction
methods to discover what it might reveal in its own right (emotional engagement is still
relevant) and to use it as a comparison for the second approach to coding. The second
round of coding begins with the original data (numbered anonymous essays) and uses a
combination of targeted reading and coding that centers on the four conditions of
understanding but also keeps open the possibility that other significant themes may
emerge. For convenience I will call the first round of coding “Emotional Engagement and
Other Themes” and the second round of coding “Understanding Professional and Ethical
Responsibility and Other Themes.”

1. Emotional Engagement and Other Themes: The essays will first be coded using a
phenomenological inquiry method demonstrated by Kim Havard and included in
Butler-Kisber (55–58). This work was done shortly after the end of the semester in
December 2014. I had no specific theoretical perspective for either research or
assessment in mind at that time, so coding was done completely without
preconception. I did hope to find evidence of students’ emotional engagement with
ethics though I attempted to code without reference to that outcome, to let the data
speak for itself. This round of coding will serve two purposes: (1) the results can
stand on their own for whatever themes and interpretations emerge and (2) those
results can be compared to outcomes from the second round of coding. The coding
process consists of the following steps:
a. Read each essay in its entirety without making any notations. Then return to
the beginning of the essay and proceed with the next step.
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b. Identify “significant statements.” In this study, I have in mind initially
“engagement” – in particular, emotional engagement with ethics. I might be
sensitive to trigger words that indicate emotion, such as enjoyment, anger,
anxiety, pride (Pekrun et al.). But “engagement” is only one possibility. I
approach this stage with an openness to all statements that have the
possibility of significance.
c. Group together like statements (“formulated meanings of significant
statements”) to eliminate redundancy.
d. Cluster themes from the formulated meanings – identify common themes that
begin to emerge. Requires movement back and forth with original data to
“check that the themes were really grounded in the data.” Note any
discrepancies – conflicts or tensions between themes.
e. Description of phenomenon – identify the general and unique themes for all
the essays and write a composite descriptions.
f.

Prepare a composite summary and conclusions.

2. Understanding Professional and Ethical Responsibility and Other Themes: Here I will
use a selective reading approach (van Manen, Researching Lived Experience). I will
uses as my base position the philosophical hermeneutic model of assessment and
the four markers of understanding (foregrounded horizon and values; placing
prejudices at risk; dialogic conversation; and interpretation, understanding and fusion
of horizons). In addition, I will be reading for other statements of significance. I will
read each essay in its entirety, one at a time, and then begin selective reading. I am
looking for what constitutes the essence of student experiences of “understanding
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professional and ethical responsibility.” I will ask “What statement(s) or phrase(s)
seem particularly essential or revealing about the phenomenon or experiences being
described?” (van Manen, Researching Lived Experience 93). Selective reading
assumes that markers of understanding will not be enumerated, discussed in any
order, or identified by the participants as such. No student will describe his or her
“foregrounded horizon” or refer to “prejudices” or “placing them at risk.” Instead, I will
look for expressions that indicate these markers.

Rather than coding particular phrases, words, or a sentences, a selective reading
approach requires me to look at the entirety of what is written as well as the parts.
“The researcher must account for the contribution of each part to the whole.
Everything is interrelated: the whole is more than the sum of its parts and the whole
makes the parts what they are” (Guimond-Plourde 4). The aim here is to give know
the data well enough in its entirety as well as in its specificity in order to, in the end,
give “shape to the shapeless” (van Manen, Researching Lived Experience 88). This
process of data analysis is often visualized as a hermeneutic cycle consisting of the
rigorous practice of reading, reflective writing, and interpretation (Kafle 195–196).

In this process, it is essential that the researcher be open to possible meanings of
“error” or “misunderstanding” because “every effort to understand runs the risk of
misunderstanding, that every effort to interpret faces the possibility of
misinterpretation” (Schwandt, “On Understanding Understanding” 462). This is
important, first, because it is the ethical thing to do. Research is about understanding
something – in this case, understanding whether students have an understanding of
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their professional and ethical responsibilities. If I find that they do not, I have an
ethical responsibility to report that finding as part of my research. Second, if students
have “misunderstandings” (really off on the wrong track as opposed to an opinion or
conclusion that differs from mine), then that is necessary information for me, as the
instructor, to know. That is the purpose of assessment.

Prepare Descriptions and Interpretations: The key to interpretation is to be
immersed in and well acquainted with the data and to have the ability to move across
and within the data so that the interconnectedness of themes can emerge. Daly
describes this process as a “double hermeneutic – a “dialectical interplay“ between
subjective meaning as described by participants (students) and the researcher’s (my)
“reconstruction” of those meanings. Rich, thick descriptions taken from the students’
essays will elucidate and support interpretations. I will compare the two sets of
interpretations to identify synthesis between them and to reflect on how each way of
looking at the data has yielded knowledge that can inform better undergraduate
engineering ethics pedagogy. As Orbe reminds us, “The most important lesson of this
process is the impossibility of a complete reduction/interpretation” (Orbe 616).
Interpretation and understanding in qualitative research are never final, exhaustive, or
perfect. But we should aim for the clearest and most honest interpretations we can give
to our work.

Additional data: I wrote field notes and reflexive notes during the semester and
during the research collection and explication process, as well as during the dissertation
writing. I had in-person meetings with each student twice during the semester. Those
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meetings were not recorded. I wrote field notes afterwards as reminders about possibly
significant discussions but no student names or other identifying information appear on
those notes. I’ll use them to inform my perspectives and to help reflect on the process.

My Role as a Researcher: The students were aware that this class would be
structured uniquely, that they would be studying ethics using a phenomenological
approach, and that this pedagogy was somewhat experimental. However, my primary
duty as the instructor was to instruct and not to experiment with my students or to have
them feel they were being experimented with. In that regard, I intended to maintain a
normal classroom environment and I think that was successful. I received IRB approval
(exemption) before the semester started and so I did not need to secure informed
consent from the students.

Procedures for rigor and trustworthiness: I selected several appropriate
methods to ensure scholarly rigor. Not all methods are necessary or possible. For
example, a common method in most qualitative research is member checking, going
back to the participants with one’s themes and interpretations and getting their
perspectives on whether their experiences have been accurately described and the
essences captured. That isn’t an option in my case as most of the students have
graduated. The methods I selected are varied and should ensure that the research is
trustworthy.
1. State and maintain theoretical perspectives: I have identified, explained, and
defended the theoretical perspectives underlying instructional methods
(hermeneutic phenomenology), assessment methods and research methods
(philosophical hermeneutics). My work is consistently grounded in theory.
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2. Peer examination: When all coding (including clustering of themes, description of
the phenomenon, and preliminary explication) was completed for both rounds of
coding of the final research essays, I convened a small group of interdisciplinary
peers to study the narrative data to solicit their independent interpretations of
themes and meanings.
3. External audit: My dissertation committee serves in this capacity, to examine the
credibility of the research process and products.
4. Audit trail: It will be possible to track back from findings to the data. Some data
will be reproduced in the text of this Dissertation.
5. Reflexivity: Reflexive statements have been and will be included as appropriate.
Reflexivity will address possible stances, preconceptions, biases, and
orientations that might influence my interpretations.
6. Coding and re-coding: the double coding process for the final research essays
may disclose meanings in the data that might not be apparent using one coding
process only.
7. “Triangulation”: Measurements (quantitative) of ethical reasoning (DIT-2) and
ethical sensitivity (ESSQ) skills should correlate with qualitative assessment
results.

Chapter Four presents and discusses findings and outcomes of this research.
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Chapter 4
Findings and Explication
The research question I am addressing is whether a phenomenological approach to
engineering ethics instruction can result in improved ethical sensitivity and reasoning
skills as well as increased emotional engagement with ethics and an understanding of
professional and ethical responsibilities by undergraduate engineering students. All data
was collected from students enrolled in ENT3958, Ethics in Engineering Design, during
the fall semester of 2014. This class was chosen because it was the only ENT3958 class
I taught in which data was collected for all three measures: ethical sensitivity, ethical
reasoning, and understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities. This chapter
presents the data, findings, and explications.

Summary of Findings
Measure
ESSQ – Quantitative
testing of ethical
sensitivity
DIT-2 - Quantitative
testing of ethical
reasoning

Qualitative Assessment
of emotional engagement
and understanding of
professional and ethical
responsibilities

Findings
No statistically significant change in results from pre-test to posttest
Statistically significant improvement in ethical reasoning skills from
pre-test to post-test
1. Undergraduate engineering students enter their final year of
studies ill-prepared for and with apprehensions about what it is
to be an ethical engineer.
2. Students recognize their “foregrounded horizons” and the
traditions and values that shape these horizons and they are
open to putting their traditions and values at risk by
encountering other points of view.
3. Students understand that professional and ethical
responsibilities are complex, expansive, and not confined to
the workplace.
4. Students understand that engineers have special duties to the
public; they begin to problematize technology and recognize
that engineers do not operate as ethically neutral technicians.
5. Students are developing a practice of reflection and
questioning.
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Ethical Sensitivity
Students completed the Ethical Sensitivity Scale Questionnaire (ESSQ) as a pre-test
during the first week of the semester and as a post-test after completion of classes at the
end of the semester. The ESSQ consists of 28 questions answered using a Likert scale
of 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The ESSQ was developed based on the seven
skills of emotional development identified by Narváez, and there are a set of questions
on the ESSQ specific to each of these skills. The results are reported in Table 4.1. On
the questionnaire completed by the students, the 28 questions were listed in the order
shown in Table 4.1 but without identification of and association with any of the seven
skills. Results in Table 4.1, however, are differentiated by each of the seven skills. Mean
scores and standard deviations for all students are reported for each of the 28 questions,
each of the seven skill categories (top line in each skill category) with percentage
change from pre-test to post-test, and composite of all questions (bottom line of table)
with percentage change from pre-test to post-test. Because the students took the tests
anonymously and without any identifying information to pair pre and post-test scores, it
was not possible to conduct a paired analysis that would compare results on a studentby-student basis. Also, students were not differentiated by gender but, of the 13 students
completing both the pre and post ESSQ tests, there was only one female student. There
was no control group due to the small number (13) of students enrolled in the ENT3958
class.
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Table 4.1 - ESSQ Results for ENT3958 - Fall Semester 2014
Pre-Test
Mean

S.D.

Reading and expressing emotions:
1. In conflict situations, I am able to identify other persons’
feelings.
2. I am able to express my different feelings to other people.
3. I notice if someone working with me is offended by me.
4. I am able to express to other people if I am offended or hurt
because of them.
Taking the perspective of others:
5. I am able to cooperate with people who do not share my
opinions on what is right and what is wrong.
6. I tolerate different ethical views in my surroundings.
7. I think it is good that my closest friends think in different ways.
8. I also get along with people who do not agree with me.
Caring by connecting to others:
9. I am concerned about the well-being of my partners.
10. I take care of the well-being of others and try to improve it.
11. In conflict situations, I do my best to take actions that aim at
maintaining good personal relationships.
12. I try to have good contact with all the people I am working with.
Working with interpersonal and group differences:
13. I take other peoples’ points of view into account before making
any important decisions in my life.
14. I try to consider another person’s position when I face a conflict
situation.
15. When I am working on ethical problems, I consider the impact of
my decisions on other people.
16. I try to consider other peoples’ needs, even in situations
concerning my own benefits.
Preventing social bias:
17. I recognize my own bias when I take a stand on ethical issues.
18. I realize that I am tied to certain prejudices when I assess
ethical issues.
19. I try to control my own prejudices when making ethical
evaluations.
20. When I am resolving ethical problems, I try to take a position
evolving out of my own social status.
Generating interpretations and options:
21. I contemplate on the consequences of my actions when making
ethical decisions.
22. I ponder on different alternatives when aiming at the best
possible solution to an ethically problematic situation.
23. I am able to create many alternative ways to act when I face
ethical problems in my life.
24. I believe there are several right solutions to ethical problems.
Identifying the consequences of actions and options:
25. I notice that there are ethical issues involved in human
interaction.
26. I see a lot of ethical problems around me.
27. I am aware of the ethical issues I face at school.
28. I am better than other people in recognizing new and current
ethical problems.

3.06
3.31

0.51
0.85

Post-Test
Mean / %
S.D.
change
3.19 / +4.25%
0.56
3.69
0.63

2.92
3.46
2.54

0.86
1.05
0.88

3.00
3.46
2.62

0.91
0.78
0.96

3.50
3.23

0.95
1.17

3.79 / +8.29%
3.62

0.56
0.77

3.69
3.62
3.46
3.98
4.15
3.85
3.85

1.11
1.04
0.97
1.08
1.28
1.14
1.21

4.08
4.08
3.38
4.23 / +6.28%
4.54
4.15
4.00

0.64
1.04
0.65
0.45
0.66
0.69
0.58

4.08
3.48
3.15

1.12
0.62
0.90

4.23
3.94 / +13.22%
3.77

0.73
0.54
0.93

3.15

0.90

3.92

0.64

3.92

0.76

4.08

0.95

3.69

0.75

4.00

0.41

3.38
3.62
3.77

0.93
1.45
1.17

3.75 / +10.95%
3.77
4.15

0.56
0.93
0.80

3.46

1.05

3.69

0.75

2.69

0.75

3.38

0.65

3.60
3.85

0.84
1.28

3.85 / +6.94%
4.15

0.69
0.38

3.69

0.85

4.31

0.85

3.46

0.78

3.46

1.05

3.38
3.40
4.00

1.26
0.59
0.91

3.46
3.87 / +13.82%
4.46

1.33
0.40
0.66

3.62
3.46
2.54

0.65
0.78
0.78

3.77
3.85
3.38

0.83
0.69
0.65

Composite

3.49

0.57

3.80 / +8.88%

0.33

Questions
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Findings:
Overall composite ESSQ scores increased from 3.49 (S.D. = 0.57) to 3.80 (S.D. = 0.33).
However, this was not a statistically significant increase (2-tailed independednt t-test
t(df=19) = -1.73, p=0.10) from the pre-test to the post-test using p>.05 as the indicator of
statistical significance. So I cannot conclude that the course caused or contributed to a
statistically significant improvement in ethical sensitivity skills.13 Appendix E includes the
statistical report on the ESSQ data.

Explication, Discussion, and Conclusions:
There are no comparable norms for the ESSQ (studies with scores of undergraduate
engineering students in the U.S.) and there was no control group of students in this
project, so there are no available direct comparisons to be made. Studies have shown
that undergraduate engineering and science students demonstrate lower ethical
sensitivity skills than students majoring in human services related fields, such as
medicine or social sciences (Rasoal, Danielsson, and Jungert; Clarkeburn; Colby and
Sullivan). The developers of the ESSQ hypothesized and found that the same holds true
for science teachers as compared to elementary education, social science, and
language teachers in Finland (Kuusisto, Tirri, and Rissanen 5, 7-8). They also found that
ethical sensitivity increases as an individual moves from a “novice” to an “expert” in
one’s field of practice (Kuusisto, Tirri, and Rissanen 3). If we were to compare the scores
for the seven ethical sensitivity skills of student teachers (“novice” teachers) in Finland to

13 I failed to consider in advance that administering the pre and post-tests so that data would be
paired (that is, gathering data so the pre and post-test results were known on a student-bystudent basis) – which is a more powerful statistical analysis – could yield different p-values. Also,
refer to Appendix E statistical report for ESSQ which shows that a one-tail analysis would yield a
statistically significant increase in scores from pre to post test.
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those of the ENT3958 students (“novice” engineers), we would find that the range of
scores for the teachers was 3.6 – 4.2 (Kuusisto, Tirri, and Rissanen 4), while the range
of post-test scores for the ENT3958 students was 3.19 – 4.23. So the range of ethical
sensitivity scores of ENT3958 students and the Finnish student teachers is comparable.

The data does offer some useful information about the different ethical sensitivity skills
and the degrees to which our students have them. We can see some strengths of our
students and also some skills to be improved. I did not expect and was surprised to find
that students in ENT3958 had their highest scores in the skill of “caring by connecting to
others” (3.98 pre-test and 4.23 post-test). “Reading and expressing emotions” had the
lowest scores and the lowest percentage improvement. The skills with the highest
percentage increase in scores were “identifying the consequences of actions and
options” (13.82% increase), “working with interpersonal and group differences” (13.22%
increase), and “preventing social bias” (10.95% increase). Because all the students were
affiliated with Enterprise or senior design teams, it’s possible that the increases in
identifying consequences and working with interpersonal and group differences could be
explainable to some extent by their team experiences during the semester. These
undergraduate engineering students would still be “novices” and, based on prior findings
of the ESSQ creators, we can expect that their ethical sensitivity scores will increase
with career and life experiences (Kuusisto, Tirri, and Rissanen).

My conclusions for this part of the study are that students’ ethical sensitivity skills
improved overall but that the improvement was not a statistically significant increase.
Improvement was uneven across the seven skills and students have some skills that are
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stronger than others. The improvement that did take place could be attributed to other
factors, such as students’ involvement in design team work. If the ESSQ (or any similar
test) is used again in ENT3958 or another class, it will be useful to have the students
identified in some way so that the pre-test and post-test data can be paired for analysis
because that could yield different results in terms of statistical significance.

Ethical Reasoning
The DIT-2 was used to measure ethical reasoning skills and possible improvements in
those skills after taking ENT3958. Students completed the Defining Issues Test – 2 (DIT2) as a pre-test during the first week of the semester and as a post-test at the end of the
semester after all other coursework was completed. Thirteen students completed the
pre-test and twelve students completed the post-test. All students are U.S. citizens and
English is their primary language (important factors for the DIT-2). The tests were taken
anonymously. Data for the two tests was not paired, and there was no control group of
students, again, owing to the small enrollment in ENT3958.14 There is, however, a
substantial amount of DIT-2 data from other sources and other studies available for
comparison.

Findings:
The results for ENT3958 are summarized in Table 4.2, along with a comparison of
results from the SEED Study and the DIT-2 National Norms compiled by the Center for

14 As previously noted, ENT3958 was offered in spring semester 2015 (it is usually offered only
once a year in the fall semester). I intended to teach that class using a traditional ethics
instruction approach and administer the same tests: ESSQ, DIT-2, and essay narratives.
However only 2 students enrolled and the class was cancelled.
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the Study of Ethics (Dong). A brief review of the scoring components of the DIT-2 will
help in understanding these results. Recall that the DIT-2 is based on a Kohlbergian
scheme of moral development which holds that a person’s personal interest (stages 2
and 3) gradually decreases as the person gets older, his or her stage 4 or “maintains
norms” stage develops and becomes stronger, and ideally the person achieves a post
conventional stage where one’s moral decisions are increasingly based on higher level
principles such as justice. These were the stages associated with the original DIT. When
the DIT-2 was introduced, the N2 score was added to take account of post-Kohlbergian
theories (such as Gilligan’s) and today the N2 score is considered a more accurate
measure of ethical reasoning skills. All four scores continue to be reported by the Center
for Ethical Development with its data analysis of DIT-2 tests. The Center maintains a
national database of DIT-2 scores and periodically provides updated information about
national norms. This now includes a table of norms for in-college students who take the
DIT-2 because the test is used so pervasively as a testing measure for ethical reasoning
skills of college students. Previously, data was reported by education level achieved but
it did not differentiate by whether the subjects were still in their education setting when
they took the DIT-2 or if they had left/graduated. So the in-college data offers a better
comparison of the DIT-2 results for ENT3958. Because all but one of the students in
ENT3958 were in their final year at Michigan Tech, I selected the national data for
“senior” in-college students for comparison. This data covers all majors and is not
engineering specific.
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Table 4.2 - DIT-2 Results: ENT3958 2014, SEED, National Norms
ENT3958 - 2014

SEED Study

DIT-2 Score

Pre-test
(S.D.)
n=13

Post-test
(S.D.)
n=12

Personal Interest
(Stage 2/3)
Maintain Norms
(Stage 4)
Post Conventional
(P Score)

22.93
(16.44)
39.38
(14.01)
30.77
(13.20)
34.08
(14.28)

14.50
(11.35)
37.33
(14.05)
43.33
(12.37)
47.16
(12.11)

N2 Score

MTU
(S.D.)
n=238

Other 17
Institutions
(S.D.)
n=~3700

NA

NA

NA

NA

29.9
(NA)
29.7
(NA)

32.9
(NA)
32.4
(NA)

DIT-2 National
Norms
(Senior)
(S.D.)
n=12207

23.67
(12.27)
35.71
(14.13)
35.97
(15.27)
36.01
(15.42)

I include the SEED study data because this study (see Introduction, supra) sought to
measure the ethical development skills of undergraduate engineering students at
eighteen U.S. institutions with high undergraduate engineering enrollment. Michigan
Technological University was one of the participating institutions. About 800 students
were randomly selected from Michigan Tech to participate in the study; 238 actually
participated. One of the aspects of ethical development that was studied by SEED
researchers was ethical reasoning, and the DIT-2 was used for this purpose. This study
had no intervention (ethics instruction) and its purpose was to provide a snap-shot of the
levels of ethical development of undergraduate engineering students across all grade
levels (freshmen through seniors). Each participating institution received a written report
of the results for that institution and some data for comparison to the other institutions
(Carpenter, Harding, and Finelli). No Personal Interest or Maintains Norms scores were
provided; nor were standard deviations for the P and N2 scores included in the results.

The SEED study data is relevant and informative because it gives us a picture of the
average state of ethical reasoning skills of our students at Michigan Tech and how they
compare nationally. It does not differentiate by whether or not students have taken an
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ethics course or by any level of ethics instruction students may have received. The
picture for Michigan Tech is not a healthy one. It was noted in the SEED report
prepared for Michigan Tech that its undergraduate engineering students’ DIT-2 scores
were below the mean for the other seventeen institutions by a “statistically significant”
amount (44). That said, the results for the engineering students at the other seventeen
institutions that participated in the SEED study were, themselves, not stellar. The mean
N2 score for Michigan Tech students was 29.7 and the mean N2 score for the other
seventeen institutions was 32.4. Both are below the national norms for in-college
students, which range from 34.11 for freshmen to 35.97 for seniors (Dong 12). One of
the conclusions of the SEED study was that the ethical development of undergraduate
engineering students is lower than their non-engineering peers, and part of the work of
the study was to prompt a conversation about how ethics instruction and moral
development experiences could be introduced or enhanced for undergraduate
engineering students in order to improve these outcomes.

Explication, Discussion, and Conclusions:
ENT3958 students’ P and N2 scores increased substantially – the mean P score
increased from 30.77 to 43.33, and the mean N score increased from 34.08 to 47.16.
The DIT-2 pre-and post-test scores were unpaired. Using the mean N2 pre and post-test
scores for analysis (the N2 is considered the more reliable measure of ethical
reasoning), the improvement was statistically significant (2-tailed independent t-test
t(df=23) = -2.48, p=0.02) from the pre-test to the post-test. (p<0.05). Based on these
results, I reject the null hypothesis of no change in DIT-2 scores; there was a statistically
significant improvement in ethical reasoning skills as measured by the DIT-2 for students
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who completed the ENT3958 ethics course. Based on these findings, I conclude that
there is a correlation between the phenomenological approach to ethics instruction and
improved ethical reasoning skills for undergraduate engineering students at Michigan
Tech. There is also a strong possibility that the instructional approach used in the course
may have had some positive causal effect on this improvement in ethical reasoning skills
but this can be established only by testing with control groups. Perhaps the most
important outcome with the greatest relevance for engineering ethics instruction is that
undergraduate engineering students who take a one-credit engineering ethics course
demonstrate a statistically significant improvement in their ethical reasoning skills.

Students began the semester with mean P and N2 scores that were lower than national
norms for their peers but, after completing the course, achieved mean P and N2 scores
that are well above the national norms both for their peers in all majors and for persons
with graduate degrees in all fields (national norms for graduate degree are P score =
41.06 and N2 score = 41.33) (Dong 2-3). So the students in ENT3958 are
outperforming, not only other engineering students, but students from all majors and
students with advanced degrees. Moreover, in line with Kohlbergian theory, as the mean
P and N2 scores increased, the students’ mean “personal interest” scores decreased
substantially, implying that they are motivated less by what is in their own best interests
and more by higher ethical principles. Mean “maintains norms” scores decreased slightly
but this score, which is based on a person’s desire to uphold rules and laws, is not
expected to decrease as much as the “personal interest” score.
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There are several limitations of this study that could impact the results. First, there were
no control groups. There was no group of students who took the class and received
traditional ethics instruction. Nor was there a group of students who took no ethics
course at all. For this reason, it isn’t possible to conclude that the phenomenological
approach to instruction was the cause of the improved DIT-2 scores or of improved
ethical reasoning skills. Based on the SEED study results, which tell us the snapshot
status of engineering students’ ethical reasoning skills with no control for ethics
instruction, it is reasonable to conclude that there certainly is a correlation and may be a
causal relationship between taking a one-credit course in engineering ethics and
improved ethical reasoning skills as measured by the DIT-2. Whether any ethics
instruction – traditional, phenomenological, or something else – may produce the same
or similar outcomes is admittedly not demonstrated by this work.

One of the problems with the DIT-2 – and something that becomes a problem when
testing small populations for improvements in ethical reasoning scores and achieving
changes that are statistically significant – is the large standard deviations that occur with
the DIT-2. We can see from Table 4.2 that the S.D. in national norms is 15.27 for the P
score and 15.42 for the N2 score. The S.D. for the post-test mean P and N2 scores for
students in ENT3958, however, are 12.37 and 12.11 respectively, quite a bit lower than
the national norms, indicating that the students are all closer to the average with more
uniformity and less divergence in their scores than in the national averages.

Additionally, the number of students enrolled in the course each year is small. However,
a total of 53 students have taken the pre-test and 45 have taken the post-test during the
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2011, 2013, and 2014 terms, with all groups showing consistent and substantial
improvement in ethical reasoning skills. When considered from that perspective, the
numbers are more meaningful. It would be desirable to have larger numbers of students
but, given that ENT3958 is an elective course and is not required for any major, the use
of a control group does not seem likely. This is the third class in which I have used the
DIT-2 as a pre-test and post-test, and results each year are consistent in that the mean
P and N2 post-test scores are substantially higher than the pre-test scores. Table 4.3
reports the results from 2011, 2013, and 2014.
Table 4.3 - DIT-2 Results ENT3958: 2011, 2013, 2014
ENT 3958
DIT-2

2011

2013

2014

Score
Pre-test Post-test Pre-test Post-test Pre-test Post-test
(n=20)
(n=16)
(n=20)
(n=17)
(n=13)
(n=12)

P Score

30.1

35.75

26.10

31.29

30.77

43.33

N2
Score

28.59

35.28

26.82

33.96

34.08

47.16

I don’t include these results in the overall data for this study because the ESSQ and
narrative analyses were not done during those years and because I do not have access
to the full DIT-2 test data for analysis of statistical significance. But, at a minimum, the
prior data show a consistent pattern of improved ethical reasoning test scores and would
tend to affirm the results of the 2014 data.

Other studies have used the DIT or DIT-2 to measure the ethical reasoning skills of
undergraduate engineering students. The SEED project is perhaps the largest study
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conducted. The SEED researchers undertook a subsequent study that looked at
changes in ethical development two years after the original SEED study. They selected
a sub-set of ~450 undergraduate engineering students from the original study (this
subsequent group did not include Michigan Technological University engineering
students) and had these students complete a modified DIT-2 to measure ethical
reasoning skills. As with the original SEED study, this follow-up study did not include or
control for any ethics instruction or other intervention other than the passage of time in
school. Perhaps the most noteworthy finding in their follow-up work is that students
seemed to regress rather than progress in some respects of their ethical development as
they advanced in their undergraduate studies (Harding, Carpenter, and Finelli). The
researchers did not account for this regression. One conclusion that might follow from
these results is the importance of maintaining a persistent presence of some sort of
formal ethics instruction throughout the undergraduate engineering curriculum.

Other studies using the DIT or DIT-2 to test the impact of ethics instruction on the ethical
reasoning skills of undergraduate engineering students show mixed results. Self and
Ellison used the Defining Issues Test (DIT) as a pre-test and post-test to measure
quantitative changes in ethical reasoning skills of undergraduate engineering students
who took an engineering ethics course. They found that DIT scores improved
significantly and concluded that students can be taught ethical reasoning skills (Self and
Ellison). Their research, however, did not include a control group who did not take an
ethics course so it is unknown if factors other than the course might have caused
improved DIT scores. Loui tested undergraduate engineering students to determine if
the instructional video Incident at Morales, designed as an aid for teaching engineering
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ethics, could improve students’ ethical reasoning and opinions. He used two tests, a fiveitem survey with a Likert-type scale ranging from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree”
and the DIT-2. Both tests were administered to groups of students at two universities
before they watched the video and after they watched it. There were no control groups.
Louis found that, after watching the video, students improved their ethics opinions on the
survey and their DIT-2 ethical reasoning scores by statistically significant amounts. Louis
concluded that a single watching of the video could improve moral reasoning but could
not conclude if the video was the sole cause of the increases or if these improvements
would be retained by students over the long term (Loui, “Assessment of an Engineering
Ethics Video: Incident at Morales”). Drake, et.al, used pre and post DIT scores to
compare the ethical reasoning skills of three groups of undergraduate engineering
students: (1) students who took a three-credit semester-long ethics course, (2) students
who received a few modules of ethics instruction included in a regular engineering
course, and (3) a control group who received no ethics instruction. They affirmed results
from prior work showing that it takes more than a few modules of ethics instruction to
impact ethical reasoning. But, contrary to the findings of Self and Ellison, they found no
significant increases in ethical reasoning of the students who took the three-credit ethics
course when compared to the control group (Drake et al.).

The results of these studies affirm that testing for the impact of ethics instruction on
undergraduate engineering students has not given us certain answers about what or
how much ethics instruction is needed to make a difference, whether ethics instruction
has an impact at all, what the impact is, whether any impact persists over a long term, or
whether the DIT-2 is a good measure of impact. In this regard, my research contributes
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to the evidence that an engineering ethics course can result in statistically significant
improvement in ethical reasoning scores as measured by the DIT-2 but has limitations
and leaves room for additional corroborating research and testing. My work strongly
suggests that a one-credit engineering ethics course – in this case, one that uses a
phenomenology-informed approach where the students investigate what it is to be an
ethical engineer – can yield credible and important evidence of improvements in ethical
reasoning. As with other studies, however, I cannot conclude if these improvements will
persist over time or if they would occur with traditional ethics instruction. These are
appropriate and worthwhile questions for future work.

It should be noted that the DIT-2 is not recommended for use as a pre and post-test
because there is some concern that there could be an effect caused by simply taking the
same test twice. Obviously, this hasn’t prevented researchers from using the DIT-2 for
pre and post-test purposes (Self and Ellison; Drake et al.; Loui, “Assessment of an
Engineering Ethics Video: Incident at Morales”). Moreover, I have not been able to find
data in the literature that confirms this double-test effect and I question the actual effect
of taking the test twice, or at least the assumption that this could improve scores. The
questions are designed so that “right” answers are not obvious, so it is just as likely that
students would score lower on the post-tests because they have no point of reference
from which to gauge how to answer the questions differently or “correctly.” The
consistency of the increases in scores each year would appear to confirm this. If I were
to surmise anything, it would be that the tests, when taken anonymously, do not motivate
students to care much about their answers. They are not tested on the content and
grades do not typically depend on the actual answers. Yet, despite the absence of
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grades as a motivation for good performance, student scores consistently improve in
each class. If I were to use the DIT-2 again, I would now make two changes: first, I
would not make it anonymous so that students might be more motivated to put forth an
honest effort (even though I would not make grades dependent on actual results) and,
second, I would use identities of students to pair pre and post-test results for analysis of
statistical significance. That said, and considering both the criticisms of the DIT-2 and
the increasing availability of validated alternatives to the DIT-2, I would consider using
another measure, such as an ethical reasoning test that is engineering specific. I would
make this change, not because I am convinced that another test would produce more
reliable results (alternative tests that are currently available still use the same model as
the DIT-2 – a collection of scenarios presenting ethical dilemmas with multiple choice
answers) but because the students may be more engaged in taking a test that includes
scenarios related to engineering.

An Understanding of Professional and Ethical Responsibilities
The narrative data – the final research essays written by the students addressing the
question: what is it to be an ethical engineer? – were analyzed twice using difference
analytical approaches. The first round, which I refer to as “Emotional Engagement and
Other Themes,” followed a standard hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry and data
analysis model. As I undertook this process, I hoped to gain insight into the engagement
of the students with ethics, with ethical engineering practice, and with being an ethical
engineer – to find out what was going on for them. In the coding process, significant
statements were identified in the narrative data; formulated meanings were developed
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from the significant statements; finally, interpretive themes were considered, reflected
on, and tested by continuous referencing back to the original essays.

The second round of analysis addressed whether the students in ENT3958 achieved
ABET’s ethics requirement that they have “an understanding of professional and ethical
responsibilities.” For this analysis, I used an assessment approach grounded in
philosophical hermeneutics. This was informed by van Manen’s approach to
hermeneutic interpretive research which emphasizes holistic reading, writing, and
interpretation – often reading between the lines – rather than a formal coding process. I
read through each essay in its entirety, getting a feel for the whole picture, its possible
holistic meaning. Then I returned to each essay and read them with an eye for
understanding students’ thoughts about their “foregrounded horizons,” that is, their
values, “traditions,” and personal histories when they came into the course; their mindset
toward consideration of new or alternative perspectives; descriptions of “dialogs” with the
curriculum, texts, other people, and themselves about aspects of being an ethical
engineer and professional and ethical responsibilities; and discussions of what came of
this, how did they use these texts to arrive at meaning, how did they make sense of
these texts, what changed for them, did they reach a new understanding? I asked: what
does this essay tell me about this student’s understanding of professional and ethical
responsibilities, and does this student seem prepared to begin a career as an ethical
engineer? I had no fixed or predetermined expectations because there were no “correct”
answers. I was open to reading and trying to understand what each student had to say. I
noted comments in the margins to note the presence of the four markers of
understanding.
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Finally, I considered the interpretive meanings from the individual essays and began
thinking and writing about the coded themes from round one and the entire body of
essays from round two. What seemed to hold true in general for the students’
understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities? Were there problems that
were common to students or anomalies with understanding that stood out for some
students? Do these students, as a whole, have a sufficient understanding of professional
and ethical responsibilities to enter the world of engineering practice? From this, what
could I learn about teaching ethics to undergraduate engineering students and what
could I do to strengthen the course so that student learning outcomes would improve?

When I considered the themes and findings that emerged from these two analytical
strategies, I recognized that there was a great deal of common ground between them.
That, of course, is reassuring and what I had hoped. The principle distinction was that
analysis by coding yielded a set of specific significant statements, formulated meanings,
and themes, all of which could be directly referenced back to the essay data. This
traditional phenomenological inquiry is a rigorous and methodical process designed to
allow the researcher to systematically identify and sort through significant statements so
that, by employing a series of steps and with a back and forth reading of the statements
and their context, a set of themes emerges. This was a classically inductive process. A
philosophical hermeneutic approach, on the other hand, allowed me to consider trains of
thought, to follow dialogs, and to “observe the mind in its processes” (Solloway and
Brooks 60) without the constraint of coding and the necessity to always decide what
“category” or theme a snippet might represent. The researcher becomes embedded in
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the data in either type of analysis but philosophical hermeneutics really does throw the
researcher into a “hermeneutic circle” of understanding.

As a beginning researcher and reflecting on both cycles of analysis, I would say that
they offered complementary but not identical ways to investigate the data. They did
serve as cross-checks on possible themes. My honest assessment must acknowledge
that it took both approaches to complete the whole of the research and that neither
approach would have opened the possibility for all insights and findings in itself.
Hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry and coding yielded a set of specific “out-ofcontext” statements and themes15 that, when considered alongside the broadly
interpretive reading approach of philosophical hermeneutics whereby I highlighted
contextual lines of thinking that signified the markers of understanding, provided a
framework to integrate the data and answer the research and assessment questions –
did these students emotionally engage with ethics and did they achieve an
understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities? Going back and forth
between the formulated meanings and themes identified in Round One coding and the
thoughts expressed by students that I highlighted during my Round Two reading of
essays (philosophical hermeneutics), I eventually arrived at five principal findings.

Round One coding (hermeneutic phenomenology as method) resulted in identification of 295
“significant statements” that were then reduced to 11 “formulated meanings” (with multiple submeanings within each of the formulated meanings), and six “themes” (again, with multiple subthemes within each theme). The formulated meanings and themes are included in Appendix G. In
my Round Two reading for markers of understanding, I noted markers as “comments” – a sample
of one of the thirteen essays is also included in Appendix G. The “comment” step of Round Two
represents only the beginning of the interpretive process, which becomes highly iterative,
involving multiple readings and comparisons of both Round One and Two original data and
coding, reflecting on meanings and significances, note taking and writing, to arrive at final
findings.
15
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Findings:
Finding 1: Undergraduate engineering students enter their final year of studies illprepared for and with apprehensions about what it is to be an ethical engineer. One of
the opportunities this phenomenology-informed class affords students is the chance to
be reflective about their fast-approaching transition from student to practicing engineer.
They are not judged or graded on the content of their thinking, so most students seem to
trust that they can be honest. The interview with an experienced engineer – which is a
one-on-one conversation between an engineering student and a practicing engineer that
is centered on the experience of being an ethical engineer – is a unique chance to
change the dialog from knowledge and skills associated with quantitative design to
understanding what it is to be an ethical engineer. Reflecting on the interview, students
reveal some key concerns about being an ethical engineer and how the knowledge they
gained from the interviews helped fill gaps in their understanding of professional and
ethical responsibilities. One student explained this well:
At the beginning of the semester, I had a very general idea of what would
be considered ethical behavior and what wouldn’t. However, I never had
given too much thought on either my personal values or how these values
aligned with any professional engineering codes of conduct. In general,
I’d like to believe I had a pretty good moral compass, but it wasn’t
especially calibrated. Additionally, I see now in retrospect that I had a
misaligned idea of how working in the automotive industry would be as far
as where the responsibility for ethically challenging decisions was placed.
Thanks to the interview I conducted, I realized I held some
misconceptions about the day-to-day realities of working as an engineer in
the automotive industry.
Students expressed two concerns in particular about the transition to practicing
engineer: the fear that they will be left to make ethical decisions in isolation and the
concern that professional ethics is often a matter of choosing between job retention and
being ethical.
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Students express that they are afraid they will be on their own when an ethical dilemma
occurs. The image they have is of the isolated and solitary engineer who discovers some
design error that could cause grievous harm and now faces the ethical dilemma of what
to do about it, without guidance or support from anyone. This image seems to be firmly
assimilated by the students. During their interviews with engineers, students are
surprised and palpably relieved to learn that this is rarely, if ever, the situation faced by
engineers and that “being an ethical engineer” includes knowing that one is not alone in
decision-making. One student wrote about this as follows:
Some information that was a new way of thinking about was that you can
go to your supervisor or other management staff for help resolving an
ethical issue. You’re never on your own completely to make a decision on
anything, at least in the automotive industry (and especially when you’re
just starting out). This was never a consideration for me in the past. . . . I
had always for whatever reason assumed that I would be all alone to
make my decision; the revelation that that’s never the case especially in
the automotive industry was a bit of a paradigm shift in any imagined
future scenarios I would be involved in. . . I won’t be thrown into the thick
of a project all on my own and be expected to fend for myself; there will be
a lot of other engineers around with many years of experience whose
experiences and advice I can utilize to develop professionally and
personally. In retrospect, this seems obvious, but it just wasn’t something
I’d considered in the past. . . . I am a lot less nervous about starting fulltime as I know I won’t be expected to make big ethical decisions all by my
own; I will have guidelines, coworkers, and my supervisor/management to
get help with the decision. This may seem obvious but it had simply never
occurred to me prior to conducting the interview.
Students are also concerned that ethical dilemmas will boil down to a choice between
keeping one’s job or remaining silent and going along with a potentially faulty design or
other unethical conduct. Several students reflected on experiences described to them by
the engineers they interviewed. Every engineer had examples of ethical dilemmas they
had faced and how they had dealt with them. Students derived reassurance and even
confidence from these examples, realizing that an engineer can be ethical and not
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necessarily have to make a career-ending choice. Interestingly, only a few of the
experiences described by the interviewed engineer involved ethical dilemmas
concerning a design flaw or illegal activity, which are the predominant foci of engineering
ethics case studies. This is important because the students are introduced as well to the
socially situated nature of engineering and to the fact that the scope of being an ethical
engineer is not singularly about avoiding or reporting design flaws.

In one example, the practicing engineer told of an experience when he was working for
an oil company. The company decided to lay off over 3000 workers right before the
Thanksgiving holiday but, at the same time, donated a large amount of money toward a
golf outing for industry executives. The engineer believed this was an unethical decision
and resigned because of it. When he interviewed for his next job, he explained this
reason for leaving the prior company. He was hired by the new company and, later, was
told that he was hired in part because he stood up for what he thought was right. The
student wrote:
With the pressure from the company I work for, it will not always be easy
to carry out the most ethically ideal project. While I will want to follow the
most ethical path, the resources or time will not always be there. Although
many companies share the same ethical interests that I do, they may not
be as strong. Also, the company has to make a profit. While I understand
this is all necessary, I still must do my best with the resources they give
me to reduce the risks of a project.
At a certain point, however, I may have to draw the line where my
company does not meet the ethical standards that I have put for myself.
When this happens, it may be time to either compromise my beliefs or
move on. This can be extremely difficult because of how intimidating and
difficult it can be to try and find another job. However, after my interview
with _______, I feel much more comfortable with making the decision to
leave a company. . . . This story showed me that people value ethical
decisions. Because of this, I am less afraid of quitting for a reason having
to do with ethics.
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Another student wrote of the engineer’s experience with a company he worked for. The
student had asked this question: “Has making an ethical decision ever held you back in
your career?” The engineer explained that he had developed a new manufacturing
process that would increase the safety of jet airplane engines. The president of the
company he worked for chose to disclose this design with the broader industry out of
concern for public safety although the company and its shareholders could have profited
from a market advantage by keeping the process confidential. The student wrote:
I received a story that would teach me a lesson that I have never
considered before in my life. The ethical question here was whether or
not to share this information with the rest of the industry, as it would result
in greater safety for everyone who gets on a plane, but giving up this
information would loss [sic] the market advantage that they had just
obtained. The decision was brought to the owner of the company, who
ultimately decided that the only way to be ethical in this situation was to
share the information with every company in the industry to ensure the
safety of everyone who flies. There were no laws pertaining to this
situation, the decision was made in the name of safety for the human
population, the owner of the company took to heart the first fundamental
cannon of engineering, “hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of
the public” (Code of Ethics). This was a perfect example of this
fundamental cannon in practice, as the company gave up a huge market
advantage to offer safety to public.
My take away from this answer was that the ethical decision is more
important than having a market advantage over other companies even
when there is no alternative reasoning to help your competition. It is
always most important to first consider the safety of the public, and the
betterment of society as a whole rather than the betterment of the
company that you work for. A second take away from this is that a
decision of this caliber does not lie solely on the shoulders of the
engineer; other people need to be brought into the situation to make a
fully informed ethical decision.

As I considered what the students wrote, I was struck by how troubling and prevalent
these concerns are for the students. And I began to wonder how these students arrived
at the threshold of their professional careers with no idea of the available support and
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resources for handling the ethical problems they will encounter. After years of immersion
in engineering coursework – preparing them for the day they enter the professional world
– these students are still afraid that they will be abandoned and alone when ethical
problems arise and that they will likely have to choose between ethics and employment.
Engineering programs increasingly pride themselves on the fact that – with an emphasis
on experiential engineering education – they are preparing graduates who can enter the
professional workforce and be immediately productive. That is almost certainly true as to
their technical training. But these students are not prepared for the realities of being an
ethical engineer, and it appears that neither their engineering coursework nor prior ethics
training has addressed these concerns. ENT3958 gave them an opening to express and
address these authentic concerns.

Finding 2: Students recognize their “foregrounded horizons” and the traditions and
values that shape these horizons and they are open to putting their traditions and values
at risk by encountering other points of view. I never asked my students to think about
their “foregrounded horizons” but I did ask them to think about their values and reflect on
their significance. It’s probable that most engineering students have not been asked to
“reflect” about their values much at all during their undergraduate training. Rather than
rejecting reflection about values as something that does not come naturally to
engineering students, my students seemed to welcome the chance to think and write
about their values, what they mean, how they influence who they are and how they act,
and what role they might have in being an ethical engineer. Our values are rooted in our
traditions, and it is through reflection that we begin to make sense of these traditions and
how they account for who we are, how we interpret and understand all things including
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ethics, and how we behave. This is the point of asking students to think about their
values. Gadamer wrote: “Long before we understand ourselves through the process of
self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society,
and state in which we live” (Gadamer, Truth and Method 278). On the practice of
thinking about values, a student wrote:
Too often in today’s society do we forget to take some time for
introspection. Work, school, bills, family, friends, and to do lists fill our
minds day in and day out, leaving no time to think about what we value
most. I’ve learned each of these things I invest time in are in some way
directly valuable to me, but how valuable are my own opinion and
thoughts? Taking the time to reflect on what is important to me, what I
find moral, or how I prioritize things in my life is a critical aspect in how I
will respond ethically in future conflicts and situations in my life and
career. Through this class I have taken that time to think for myself,
discovered ideas regarding ethics in today’s world, and worked to
understand how they will affect me in being an ethical engineer. I have
created a basis of information that will guide me to only develop in
recognizing what qualities make an ethical engineer

For most of the students, understanding that our values determine our priorities and that
there is a connection between our values and our ethical decisions simply opened a
space where they could put those values at risk by encountering ethics, ethical decisionmaking, and being an ethical engineer from perspectives not previously known to or
considered by them:
At the beginning of the semester, I had a very general idea of what would
be considered ethical behavior and what wouldn’t. However, I never had
given too much thought on either my personal values or how these values
aligned with any professional engineering codes of conduct.
………………..
One of the most important ideas that I have taken away from my studies
is that these principles of human conduct concerning what is right and
what is wrong has everything to do with someone’s point of view and
beliefs. These views on what is morally right can be brought about by
religious beliefs, political stances, scientific knowledge or even daily
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observations and will highly influence an engineer’s decision on how to
proceed with a give [sic] task. For example, if you take the case of an
engineer looking to construct a new mall into a heavily forested area.
Some would believe that this would be a great idea to attract more people
to spend more money in their area in order to stimulate their economy
and create jobs, while others would believe that this would be considered
unnecessary deforestation (contributing to higher amounts of C02 in the
air), and could potentially kill off lots of animals, forcing the others to
relocate to less suitable areas.
…………………..
For me, this could be learned through self-reflection and experience.
Considering I will soon be an entry-level engineer, it’s harder to have
multiple experiences in the engineering industry for me to form my ‘set of
ethics’. However, I recognize that my ethics may change through
experiences and years of working in industry. Each experience in a
design process or a day at work may open my mind further and expand
my understanding of ethics.
……………….
An important part of being an ethical engineer may be to take a class on
ethics, and determine what it means to be ethical, but a big part of it
seems to come from the values you were taught growing up. To quote
_____ at NASA, “Sometimes ethical behavior is compared to ‘Things I
Learned in Kindergarten’ (Share things, play fair, don’t hit people, put
things back where you found them, etc). If you learned these values early
in life and have attempted to live by them, then you have a solid
foundation for the ethical challenges in the workplace.” Appears that the
foundation of being an ethical engineer is the common sense and values
engrained into each individual growing up.
…………………….
There was a lot of information for me to take away from this interview.
Some helpful information was the advice to figure out where you stand on
a given ethical issue before you’re actually faced with it. Things may not
especially be easy but then at least you already know your preferred
outcome, all that’s left is getting it to happen. I’m about to enter the
automotive industry whereas he [interviewee] has 25+ years of industry
experience, both with Chrysler and other companies. He said to make
sure that one understands their beliefs about right and wrong, respect
other people’s health and safety, and make sure to live what you believe.
You should do these things both to help your career and to help you live
with yourself. This advice is very useful to me, as I hadn’t ever really
thought about ethics in this way. However, I now know some introspection
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is needed before I start working in the automotive industry, at least some
of which I’ve hopefully captured in this paper.
Nearly all students commented on one of the assigned readings, “Engineering ethics
and identity: Emerging initiatives in comparative perspective” (Downey, Lucena, and
Mitcham) in which the authors compare how engineers perceive being an ethical
engineer in French, German, and Japanese cultures. This excerpt exemplifies how one
student used dialog with the text and the interview with an engineer to read between the
lines and think about values:
In each of these cultures, it is possible to identify the values which
influence societal views of engineering. The French value human
progress through technological advancement as it provides prosperity
and comfort for French people. The Germans value advanced technology
and its use in ways that are not in conflict with humanity or human rights.
The Japanese value the Japanese household identity and seek its
empowerment through the ingenuity of Japanese engineers. These
values, not a code of ethics, guide engineers as they operate in their
respective cultures. In reality, all engineers are guided – knowingly or not
– by their values. When asked if he applied particular values to ethical
decision in an engineering context, Dr. _____ said no. He does not have
clearly defined values which he methodically applies to engineering ethics
questions. However, it was clear when talking to him that Dr. _____
operates with a particular mindset that automatically keeps him within the
realm of ethical engineering.
The following essay demonstrates a student’s exploration of values and the new
understanding that emerged about both values and an engineer’s professional and
ethical responsibilities following the student’s dialogs with the assigned texts and the
practicing engineer:
Many of my previously believed ethical values still support my ethical
foundation, such as honesty, integrity, reliability, accountability,
perseverance, and capability. I hesitate to incorporate efficiency as a
virtue because I believe a variety of increasingly important virtues, such
as honesty, integrity, and accountability have the potential to conflict with
efficiency. However, these virtues provide only one level of engineering
morality to me, and I am just beginning to delve into the further
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categories. While I have always considered myself a fairly independent
person, I have learned from my interview that independence is an
extremely important trait for providing an unbiased judgment on ethical
concerns, and, as such, needs to be practiced to the same extreme that
honesty should be.
Importantly, students come to understand that values inform their professional and
ethical responsibilities, influence their ethical decisions and actions, and can change and
be shaped by experience:
Ultimately, it seems that all engineers are guided by their values since
values can quickly guide decisions. Codes of ethics are and other such
tools are too cumbersome for the fast paced world of engineering
decisions. In their paper considering the possibility of a global code of
ethics for engineers, alZahir and Kombo cite some authors who suggest
that codes of ethics are more a method to enhance the respectability of
the engineering profession than to adjust the behavior of engineers
[citation]. In this context, “making an honest effort” means developing
good values and intentionally applying them, or reaching a state where
they are applied naturally. For older engineers, this comes through
learning from experience. For younger engineers, it is necessary to
consult with veteran engineers to gain from their experience.
[E]ngineers are mostly guided by their values when faced with ethical
decisions. These values are developed through experience. Young
engineers do well to enlist the help of those more experienced when
faced with decisions that have real consequences in a fast paced world.
I’ve grasped that most people, engineers specifically, are inherently good
people. As said before, ethical engineers have a desire to improve the
world, not destroy it. Very rarely do individuals use their talents to
knowingly cause more harm over benefits. However, situations can skew
people’s values and cause them to act differently than they ideally would.
In a future tough situation, I may see that a coworker does not want to
blatantly make an unethical design, he or she may be driven by an
outside factor: profit, reputation, or even job security. Engineers don’t just
decide to be careless or to be unethical with no reason

One student observed that personal and professional values do and ought to reinforce
each other:
Another interesting aspect involves flooding one’s personal life with
virtues from the ethical engineering life. As an ethical engineer is
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required to consistently uphold ethical values within one’s work for any
given situation, upholding these particular virtues at home assist the
engineer in solidifying them as a part of oneself.
Finding 3: Students understand that professional and ethical responsibilities are
complex, expansive, and not confined to the workplace. This finding covers a lot of
ground. Almost every student wrote at some point in the essay that “ethics is a
complicated subject” that “brings more questions than answers” and that “an ethical
engineer, let alone ethics, cannot be defined in one word, sentence, or even an entire
essay,” and thoughts to this effect. All of the students comment that rules such as the
NSPE Code of Ethics are guidelines but that this set of professional rules of conduct is
inadequate for answering all the ethical questions they may face. These statements, as
self-evident as they seem, represent a growing maturity and understanding of
professional and ethical responsibilities than most of the students have when they begin
the course:
At the beginning of the semester, I may have simply defined ethics as
“what is right or wrong”. I now have a more complex understanding that
ethics encompasses more than that; it is values, decisions, desires, and
what drives an individual to do what they do.

We must remember that these are young adult engineering students who have no
professional engineering experience. Changes in understanding are big – and
challenging – steps:
Over the course of this whole semester (thirteen weeks and counting) I’ve
been contemplating the one question, “what does it mean to be an ethical
engineer?” It has turned out to be one of the most ambiguous,
complicated and debatable answers to a question I’ve been asked to
explain. This might be hard for many engineers and technicians to answer
as well due to the fact that most of us have been programed to think
quantitatively through lots of our studies and research. Ethics isn’t so cutand-dry like solving a math problem, it has a lot more gray area compared
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to the calculus classes most struggle through. Through my semester of
research focused on thinking more qualitatively than usual and I’ve
stumbled upon many interesting points of view concerning ethics
including viewpoints from other parts of the world and treating technology
as an ethical element, as well as learned a decent amount about myself
and my own ideas on what it should mean to be an ethical engineer.
………………….
First and foremost is the understanding that although the purpose of this
class is to understand what it means to be an ethical engineer, it would be
a mistake to try and treat the subject as if it were something separate
from ethics at large. As an engineer it is easy for us to treat subtopics as
if they are completely independent of other topics, mostly because what
we work on tends to be complicated as a whole making concentration
upon the particulars a necessity in order to perform any meaningful work.
This is our strongest asset as engineers; the ability to filter out noise and
focus on the substantive portions of a problem. However this is also our
blind spot, as it makes it much easier to forget the whole picture.
Therefore, as I see it, ethical engineering is designed, and ethics in
general for everybody, is to draw us out of our narrow interests and
remind us of the whole.

Students begin to understand that professional and ethical responsibilities are complex
because the answers depend on so many factors. One student explained his
understanding after he discussed the question with his interviewee:
The situational aspect of this question lead perfectly into the next
question I had prepared which was, “Do you believe that ethics questions
are all situational?” This is a question that I began thinking about after
one of the class readings, Ethics and Competitive Advantage in a FastPaced Industry, which touched on the idea that ethical questions are
entirely different depending on the situation in which they are presented
in. It was stated in this article that “Ethical behavior may be seen
differently from different perspectives” (Hylton). The Ethics and ICT article
also held this same view, as the author stated “But what is right or what is
wrong is not fixed, it may change over time and is context dependent”
(Oortmerssen). I tend to agree with the idea that ethical questions change
based on the situation and background of those involved, but I also
wanted to hear the answer from a practicing engineer.
The answer I received to this question was “yes, ethical questions usually
have a clear cut answer, but that is because of the situation at the
moment, if the situation changed I may have made a different decision
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pertaining to the same question” (Engineering Ethics). There was more
to the answer that I received, but I believe that this first sentence here
was enough to explain his view on this question. All the sources I have
looked into point me in the direction of all ethical decisions being a
product of the entire situation, a look at the big picture. I believe that
being able to see the whole picture in a situation is the most important
part of being an ethical engineer, as the only way to make the ethical
decision is to be fully informed of the situation at hand.
Another student wrote about the contextual nature of professional and ethical
responsibilities of engineers:
I have also determined from the assigned readings that many moral
issues are contextual, so generalized solutions cannot be formulated that
will properly apply to most situations; therefore, the ethical engineer must
remain vigilant and critically apply themselves to solving any moral
conflict that arises. This is further supported by the notion that future
anticipation of potential product impacts on the world is a responsibility of
the ethical engineer, and not just an added task that they may choose to
complete.

Students encountered and considered issues of professional and ethical responsibilities
that arise in contexts they’d not previously considered, such as risk versus reward in
seeking competitive advantage, sustainability and profit, and ethical responsibilities of
engineers in the public sector. Students are not expected to resolve these issues, but
the dialog with these problems creates awareness of the complex scope of professional
and ethical responsibilities, exposes students to ways of thinking about these issues,
and better prepares them to deliberate these problems. As one student wrote:
The numerous assigned readings exhibit various situations and the
ethical aspects imbued within them; thus, they focus on the decision
aspect of ethics. The texts strengthened my understanding of the
importance of challenging the complex regions of ethics, as morality is not
just a simple black-and-white choice. Furthermore, these articles
provided numerous real-world examples that provided a foundation for
me to begin questioning my own ethical habits.
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Indeed, many students recognized that professional and ethical responsibilities must be
an ongoing lived commitment for engineers:
This led me to the question of how I will continue to educate myself
further once I’m in the position of an engineer developing products used
by humans. I believe one of the best ways for an engineer to understand
ethics is to communicate and teach others. By helping to develop the
understanding of ethics in my coworkers someday, I’ll better understand
my own view on ethics. In addition, discussion of ethics with coworkers
may increase agreement on the design process.

Finding 4: Students understand that engineers have special duties to the public, they
begin to problematize technology and recognize that engineers do not operate as
ethically neutral technicians. Students recognize that engineers possess specialized
knowledge and this gives them, not only a unique level of responsibility to the public, but
also a great deal of power that they must use in ethical ways. Although they don’t use
this terminology, these students are thinking about the socially situated nature of
engineering and the extent of an ethical engineer’s responsibility:
As an ethical engineer, I know that I must put the public's wellbeing
before my own. With the power I will have, I must take care of those who
do not have the knowledge from an engineering degree or the time to
figure out the risks themselves. Therefore, it must be my duty to serve the
public to the best of my ability without stepping over the line of controlling
them. Although making every project perfectly ethical isn't realistic, I know
that others will respect my choices if I ever need to go against the
company I am working for. Engineering is much less clear cut than most
people make it out to be. When designing products that people use every
day, engineering, necessarily, becomes value-laden.
…………....
At the core of morality, being able to distinguish the best choice or
deriving an alternative one with regard to ethical virtues and standards is
considered ethical itself, which is sufficient for many engineers in the
profession. Unfortunately, this is a very narrow-minded approach towards
engineering morality, and it does not consider the long-term impact of the
decisions they make; hence, most engineers do not fundamentally
understand how far their responsibilities go for the goods/services they
provide.
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……………..
Engineers must care about ethics because of what engineering is.
Because of their skills, position, the things they work on, they have power
over others. Therefore it is their duty to make, to the best of their ability,
ethical decisions.
……………….
I believe as engineers that we should look above just the interests of
ourselves and look at the bigger picture of who we impact. That doesn’t
mean that you have to consider everything from a global perspective
(although some technologies may require that); but at the perspective that
is large enough to encompass everything and everyone that may be
affected by what we are doing. Because we have specialized knowledge it
is incumbent upon us to consider the wider aspect of what we are doing.
………………..

Often times when talking about ethics in engineering, or when ethical
codes are written, they talk about how ethical decisions will affect the
public. What do they mean when they say “public”? Downey talks a lot in
his article about how ethics varies in countries such as France and Japan
and contrasts them to the United States. He talks about how France
doesn’t get much formal education about ethics in Engineering, and how
Germany has 8 metrics of value when determining ethical decisions.
While it was super interesting to learn about, it got me pondering about
what it means to affect people as engineers in different regions, and to
serve the “public”, and public shouldn’t be divided by borders: state,
country, or otherwise.
………………...
Ethical engineers need to keep everyone in mind when making ethical
decisions, not just local people of a certain race, religion, or gender.
Engineers are regarded as experts in their fields, and need to take that
responsibility seriously. While engineers may not always be consciously
thinking about ethics, those decisions affect people, the environment,
health, and so much more, and engineers having a strong foundation of
ethical values will allow mankind to thrive, and those decisions will be left
behind and will lay the foundation for generations of engineers to come.

Students grapple with coming to terms with many concepts in their research for this
class, and the socially situated nature of engineering is one of the most challenging
because it removes them from the laboratory and places them squarely in the world.
When they actually think about it, this isn’t altogether problematic for them. But there is
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one question that remains, justifiably, quite boggling to them, and that is the question
concerning technology. Engineering students are prone to thinking that all technology is
good as long as it is designed as safely as possible, and they are committed to the idea
that it is technology that will solve the world’s challenging problems. The questions
concerning technology remain a problem for all of us, myself included. Most students
wrote that their view of technology has changed and that they no longer think of
technology as merely an “ethically neutral” object of their work. Instead, they consider
that technology will and already does add to the complexity of being an ethical engineer.
Still, they struggle with this relationship because they are generally conditioned to think
that it will be someone else’s responsibility to decide what technologies will be
developed and how they will be used. The following selections from their essays reflect
their diverse and unsettled thinking on the question of technology and the ethical
engineer:
As the field of engineering evolves, corresponding ethics for an engineer
will need to as well. Technology has become such a great tool, yet may
cause a strain in a set of ethics. As stated by Oortmerssen, “our values
direct the development of technology, but at the same time technology
has an effect on our values.” New technology will mean new decisions to
be made about what defines an ethical engineer. In addition, as
technology and science develop, I will need to personally be aware my
ethics will need to drive my decisions even more.
………………….
As I have labeled technology to be the largest mediator for engineering
design, I believe a large first step towards these predictions revolves
around the philosophy of technology, and understanding that technical
artifacts are much more than just neutral tools. This fact alone causes
me to consider that many “ethical” engineers are very narrow-minded in
their morals, and the true ethical engineer will need to draw upon multiple
disciplines to properly succeed at their engineering work. All in all, I have
concluded that ethical engineering takes on a dynamic form and followers
will need to perform constant, consistent investigations in the field to
properly become ethical in the discipline.
…………………..
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As an attempt to understand the extent of morality of my interviewee, I
questioned him on his ethical views of technology. Expectedly, I received
no indication that he would purposefully consider the long-term effects of
his engineering and design decisions, nor the predictions of harm
associated with the misuse of any engineered product/service. For him,
these aspects are miniscule when compared to first party associates of
the company, and the ethical standards he is expected to uphold.
Therefore, I have concluded that many “ethical” engineers do not actively
consider the impacts their engineering and design choices have on the
world, especially for long periods of time.
…………………
When asking “what does it mean to be an ethical engineer,” one must
research and weigh the effects for them working for a specific company
where the product or job they are asked to complete could have ethical
problems down the road. For example, if an engineer is offered a job
working for Lockheed Martin and they will be working in their missiles and
guided weapons department, that person must look inside and decide for
themselves if they want to develop new weapons that kill people every
day (bad and good people), because that is what Lockheed Martin needs
in order to be able to make a profit. There is a risk versus reward element
here as well due to the fact that if you will be rewarded with a nice
paycheck to provide your family with, but might risk your own emotional
wellbeing. A perfect example of this is the Manhattan Project during
World War II when physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer and a team of US
Army engineers conceived the first atomic weapons to use on the
Japanese in order to end the war.
…………………
“Engineers should know that the product they design could end up
injuring or killing people or being used in a manner to harm someone or
something,” (interviewee) stated. “This applies to almost any product.”
And if you really think about it, it makes sense. Do you think that the
people who created the first cellphone thought that millions of automobile
accidents and thousands of deaths a year would be a direct result of
cellphone used in a car in a couple decade’s time? How many times in
the medical field does a new vaccine give a handful of people an extreme
(sometimes deadly) reaction? These kind of examples also show that
sometimes things go wrong even when you are ethically in the right state
of mind, with your product’s main function not intended to cause harm.
………………….
Although I’ve read several papers this semester that talk about how
technology itself can be ethical, I have denied this opinion from the start. I
believe that it is the developer and the user of the technology who have to
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be held accountable for the actions that the technology takes. Those who
see extreme ethical concerns and develop the product anyways are for
sure to blame, and those who use a product not in the fashion for which it
was intended are also to blame. For the Manhattan project, the engineers
and physicists took it upon themselves to unveil nuclear weapons
knowing that the world could never be the same, and that these weapons
could be used for strategic political gain. In order for something to be
ethical, I believe it must be able to think ethically itself.
…………………..
In “Engineering Ethics and Identity,” the Verein Deustcher Ingenieure’s
Fundamentals of Engineering guideline states that an engineer should
analyze “the societal, economic and ecological feasibility of technical
systems; their usability and safety; their contribution to health, personal
development and welfare of citizens; their impact on the lives of future
generations [citation].” This seems a little overwhelming for any engineer
who is unable to foresee events in the distant future. An engineer is
probably concerned with the usability and safety of a product on a daily
basis, but looking into a product’s impact on society and future
generations seems like a rather nebulous task to carry out. It is easier to
agree with the implications of the guideline; that an engineer is
responsible for the products they make and should be on the lookout for
products that will clearly have a negative impact on the welfare of The
Public. This idea is particularly meaningful when considered in the context
of the role that German engineers played in enhancing the efficiency of
the Holocaust.
…………………..
Nevertheless, analyzing the problems with engineering ethics and
implementing solutions are two very drastic problems. As many issues
and concerns revolving around engineering ethical fissures are
contextual, generalized ideas do not provide much reconstruction.
However, being able to consciously predict the implications engineered
products constitute is an immense act of ethical responsibility in both my
opinion and Verbeek’s.[citation] Procedures such as eliminating all
brainstormed ideas for a new product that do not satisfy an ever
increasing list of important moral values provide powerful ethical
enforcing tools to a variety of situations, and should be applied whenever
possible. It is the responsibility of an ethical engineer to consider all
moral virtues and decisions, functional or not, and act accordingly for the
“…safety, health, and welfare of the public.”[citation] While this is a
daunting task, at the very least, engineers should attempt to think, and
possibly philosophize, about all the impacts the potential products they
are designing have on the world.
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Finding 5: Students are developing a practice of reflection and questioning. In my
individual meetings, students often raised the question about what I expected from them.
My answer to them was to develop a habit of questioning and reflection and to take that
lesson with them from the course.
I personally have found that ethics is a very ambiguous subject that will
challenge the best thinkers and I know now that it is not something to take
lightly when one enters the work force I have given tons of examples
debating ethical risks versus rewards, how ethics are perceived based on
your upbringings, beliefs and experiences, and how an engineer must
think ethically in all phases of their work and research. And when I say
think, I don’t mean just quantitatively, but qualitatively as well! Think about
how the quality of life will be with your product in it. Will it be a presence
of good in the world, or something that is made to harm? How will affect
the quality of your life? Will the financial reward be worth the risk of a
clear conscience? So what does it mean to be an ethical engineer? I think
that if an engineer can honestly look inside and have a clear moral sense
and understanding of what they are working towards, then they can be
considered ethical, no matter what background or point of view they have!
……………….
In the following years, as I aspire to be an ethical engineer, I will need to
ask myself many questions. I’ll be challenged with the task of selfaccountability to uphold and maintain my standards of ethics, even in a
profit driven society. I’ll need to be aware of what I’m uncertain about. I’ll
need to make a decision on my personal boundaries of what will drive my
choices: my values or profit? I’ll grow to understand that ethics won’t just
impact decisions I’ll make at work; ethics will be in my everyday life. And I
understand the ethics I practice in my life outside of my career will
influence my set of ethics in my career, and vice versa. I’ll need to
establish for myself how far my responsibility as an engineer goes.
Reading the provided article “Engineering Ethics and Identity: Emerging
Initiatives in Comparative Perspective” made me consider how I will
interact with international colleagues. As many companies are developing
into international business, understanding how ethics differ in different
countries will become incredibly crucial. How will I determine which
countries set of ethics overrule the others? Also, will I design products
that may replace a human worker? How will I decide which is ethical in
my opinion, or in the opinion of my employer? I will ask all of these
questions, but may not have definite answers. Rules are black and white,
but ethics in real life have infinite gray lines. Ethics is not completely
definable, but it is unique to the individual. Simply put by Robison, “no
choice is ethically neutral”.
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Explication of Research and Assessment Findings
Emotional Engagement
I began this research with the hypothesis that a phenomenological approach to
engineering ethics instruction could help emotionally engage engineering students with
the study of ethics. Although I subsequently gave less prominence to emotional
engagement with ethics as a primary outcome of this project, I found that the students in
ENT3958 did, in fact, express emotional engagement with the study and practice of
ethics. In their essays, students in ENT3958 revealed various personal anxieties and
emotions about being an ethical engineer, such as the fear of being abandoned to make
ethical decisions in isolation and that they would be forced to choose between their jobs
and being ethical engineers. As the students wrote about their interview experiences and
reflected about the meaning of what they have read and heard, an underlying “care”
about ethics materialized. This was most apparent when students wrote about aspects
of being an ethical engineer with which they could relate, when they could see
themselves in the situation, and as they considered how some aspect of professional
and ethical responsibilities would concern them in their engineering careers. This finding
is consistent with the higher scores associated with “caring” skills that students achieved
on the ESSQ .

Engineering students are able and willing to care about the study and practice of ethics
but they must have a reason and context to do so. I suggest that the immanent nature of
phenomenology research provides both the reason and the context. “Phenomenology
not only finds its starting place in wonder, it must also induce wonder” (van Manen,
Researching Lived Experience 44–45). Guimond-Plourde writes that “this evocation of
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wonder refers to a kind of attentiveness to a lived experience” (4) and goes on to
describes how phenomenology research necessarily draws the researcher into a
relationship of meaning and wonder with the research participants even though the
researcher has not personally experienced the phenomenon being studied:
For the purpose of understanding a phenomenon described by those who
have experienced it, this hermeneutic phenomenological dynamic offers
an original and relevant framework; it makes it possible to look more
closely at the existential dimensions of the lived experience in order to
access its essential qualities and to formulate an intersubjective reflection
through interpretation. The listening and reflecting that are the central
pillars of this kind of dialogue do not merely constitute passive reflection
but illuminate thinking (Guimond-Plourde 4).

When the students in ENT3958 assume the role of researcher and use principles of
phenomenology to investigate the lived experience of being an ethical engineer, they
move from passive reflection to thought and wonder – engagement with and
attentiveness to the lived experience they are investigating. Because emotional
engagement of students is a known mediator of learning outcomes (Sagayadevan and
Jeyaraj), if the students in ENT3958 are emotionally engaged in the study and practice
of ethics, that has positive implications for their achieving an understanding of
professional and ethical responsibilities.

Understanding Professional and Ethical Responsibility
Philosophic hermeneutic assessment is, in effect, a “double hermeneutic” – I am trying
to understand what my students understand (Daly 211). I have argued that traditional
engineering ethics pedagogy and assessment methods aim to inculcate and measure
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“knowledge” rather than “understanding” of professional and ethical responsibility.
Schwandt elucidates the distinction between knowledge and understanding:
[W]hen we say that we understand what others are doing or saying, we
are stating something quite difference than that we know. To understand
is literally to stand under, to grasp, to hear, get, catch, or comprehend the
meaning of something. To know is to signal that one has engaged in
conscious deliberation and can demonstrate, show, or clearly prove or
support a claim. In Anglo-American thought, at least, knowing and
knowledge are more often than not associated with intellectual
achievement, cognitive performance, or a special kind of mastery of
subject matter” (Schwandt, “On Understanding Understanding” 452).
From their investigation into what it is to be an ethical engineer, did the students in
ENT3958 “stand under, grasp, hear, get, catch, or comprehend the meaning” of
professional and ethical responsibilities? A central question of assessment is: how will a
reader of an essay know if the student has an understanding of these responsibilities?
What would that look like and how would it be expressed? Solloway and Brooks tell us
that a hermeneutic model of assessment “would allow the student to bring his personal
history to the table. It would encourage the recognition of how knowledge is embodied
rather than stored. It would encourage the exploration of the encounter with a text as an
embodied experience. It would not ask for evidence of learning as a replication of what
the dominant tradition already knows. It would instead suggest that learning be evidence
that the student encountered the text as an aesthetic experience, evidence that the
student’s hermeneutic imagination came into play in the encounter” (Solloway and
Brooks 51). In assessing student work, Solloway and Brooks go on to suggest that we
look for how a student’s encounter with a “text” affected the student’s thinking – did it
confirm positions, did it deepen the student’s understanding and bring about a shift in
thinking, did it raise new questions? (51). Kakkori writes that “Thus, nothing ever
appears the same again following a hermeneutic experience. We see ordinary things
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(‘ordinary things’ in the former horizon, world view or paradigm) in a different light, and
we also become able to conceive of totally new entities. Our ‘world’ undergoes a
change, and we become changed as people along with it” (Kakkori 25).

As I read the essays written by the students and as I considered my findings, I kept in
mind what the essays themselves are: “The language of the interpretation does not
merely offer what is understood a means of presenting itself. Rather the presenting is
the understanding” (Dunne 142, emphasis in original). This is to say, these essays are
not mere instrumental representations of student thinking; the writing of these students is
their understanding. To assess whether the students in ENT3958 left the class with an
understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities, we can ask questions that
reveal the conditions of understanding – performance indicators, if you will – and that, in
turn, will tell us if there is understanding. These questions might include:
x

Do the students bring their own values – their own personal histories and
traditions – to their research inquiries into what it is to be an ethical engineer?
Were they willing to and did they place these values at risk?

x

Do they encounter the “texts” – readings, interviews, discussions – as aesthetic
experiences? “Aesthetic” is not meant as finding something beautiful or pleasing,
but rather as an approach to the texts that is imaginative, that is open to different
perspectives, and that leaves the student somehow changed.

x

Did they engage in a dialog with these “texts”? Are they interpreting the texts? Is
there evidence of a “hard road journeyed with the respectful engagement of the
Other (whether texts, ideas, objects, or persons)” (Solloway and Brooks 44)?
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x

Did the encounter with the “texts” affect the students’ thinking about professional
and ethical responsibilities – did it confirm what they already thought, did it
change their thinking, did it raise new questions?

x

Did their “worlds” undergo any change; did they change as people; do they
express new ways of being ethical engineers? Do they understand themselves in
new ways?

Referring back and forth between the five findings and the various excerpts from student
essays that support them, I asked: do these students on the whole have an
understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities such that I am comfortable
sending them off to begin their careers as novice engineers? They do. This is not to say
that I agree with all the ideas and understandings that the students express. It is also not
to say that every one of them will always make ethical choices. Nor does it mean that
every student has the same understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities
and what it is to be an ethical engineer. But each one has had the opportunity for deep
reflection about these topics and to begin a practice of questioning engineering practice
and their professional and ethical responsibilities in ways they had not previously done.
Every one of them has a personal view of what it is to be an ethical engineer and how
they might be personally in the practice of engineering. They are more confident about
facing ethical problems in that they understand that other people are there as resources
for them and that ethical decisions needn’t be career-ending decisions. They also better
appreciate and understand the complex nature of ethical decision-making and that it
nearly always involves difficult trade-offs, not tidy win-win solutions. They understand
that engineering practice and ethical decision-making occur in broader and underlying
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contexts that are not necessarily engineering-specific. I can say that these students, as a
group, when they step into the world of engineering practice, will be less surprised by the
ethical problems they encounter and better prepared than most of their peers to be
mindful of what it is be ethical engineers.

These students understand that ethical decision-making is more than heuristics; they are
exposed to and think about ethical decision-making in new and complex ways; they
demonstrate that engineering students are fully able to think outside the objective,
rational, and ethically neutral “box” of engineering. They are taking account of alternative
perspectives on the place of engineers in the world, for example, by considering that this
place for engineers may exist outside as well as inside the design lab, by thinking about
and redefining who the “public” is that they are responsible to, and by questioning
technology and the engineer’s relationship to it. They are asking new questions they
never before thought to ask about the professional and ethical responsibilities of
engineers. For at least the brief semester that they spent in ENT3958, being an ethical
engineer and all that entails became personal for them. Their relationship to the
knowledge they learned was embodied and contextualized, not merely replicated or
repeated by rote. Without a longitudinal study, it isn’t possible to speculate on what
these students will retain over the long term. But creating a temporary space to
investigate what it is to be an ethical engineer and to have a dialog about professional
and ethical responsibilities is a good beginning.

These conclusions apply generally to the entire class. But I must acknowledge that not
every student in ENT3958 fit into this overall characterization of outcomes. There was
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one student whose final essay consisted of a set of rules that [chemical] engineers must
follow if they are to be ethical. The paper did not refer to or incorporate any of the
assigned readings or the student’s interview with an engineer, though I know he did this
work. During our meetings, the student repeatedly asserted that he intended to work in a
laboratory and that he could not see how ethics would be relevant to him as long as he
complied with all the rules. We talked about possible scenarios where rules might not
apply or why his work in a laboratory might have ethical implications he hadn’t
considered, but his “foregrounded horizon” was quite rigid. During our meetings, I
explained that the final paper needed to integrate the assigned readings and the
interview, yet he did not do this. Do I think this student will be an ethical engineer? Yes,
at least in the sense that traditional assessment of and interpretations of ABET E.C. 3(f)
would define an ethical engineer. Will he be reflective about his professional and ethical
responsibilities beyond the laboratory? Probably not, though I am mindful of the
optimism expressed by Solloway and Brooks. They acknowledge that there are students
who have difficulty putting their values and traditions at risk and who demonstrate a
“passion for ignorance” as they resist any new understandings. Nonetheless, they write
“If the students continue to engage life in the open-ended reflection of mindfulness, each
may move beyond today’s limited horizons” (Solloway and Brooks 58). We never know
what seeds may have taken root.

I also considered the value of asking students to think about values. This can be a
contentious issue – recall, for example, the admonition that engineering ethics educators
“ought to provide students with an understanding of the value (why should an engineer
be ethical) of engineering ethics, as opposed to the values of an ethical engineer”
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(Pfatteicher 138, emphasis in original). Bucciarelli advises that engineering ethics should
be concerned with values and suggests that the “collective of persons who are members
of the profession – better said, participants in the professional culture – share certain
values and beliefs and abide by (mostly unwritten) norms about what contributes to, or
denigrates, the public welfare, that these shared values define the integrity of the
profession, and guide engineers in their day-to-day efforts” (Bucciarelli 12). Building on
this, “. . . professionals need to think through their own ethical standards before
situations arise in which they will have to apply those standards by making choices. The
moment of choice is no time to begin figuring out what you stand for . . .” (Stephan 11
citing Staudenmaier). Students begin ENT3958 by examining their personal values and
the professional values that guide engineering, for example, the values that underlie the
NSPE Code of Ethics. In their interviews, engineers regularly talked to the students
about their own reliance on values for guidance in ethical decision-making. Several
students were advised by their interviewees to do exactly what Staudenmaier counseled
– to think about their values ahead of time so they will have some idea of where they
stand when issues arise that require them to deploy those values. As Wike wrote, an
understanding of personal and professional values can help students get over the “hope
for easy answers” attitude toward ethics. Values are ubiquitous and are implicated in
nearly all our personal and professional decisions. Understanding our values “we don’t
get caught up in technicalities; instead we focus on what is of importance” (Wike, n.p.).
Values are not something the students in ENT3958 were, by their own admission, ever
asked to think much about, but they demonstrated an aptitude for doing so and a new
understanding of why values are important and why they should think about them.
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Although the DIT-2 quantitatively measures ethical reasoning skills, whereas this
qualitative work is intended to assess emotional engagement and whether students have
an understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities, we would expect there to
be a correlation between these skills. Ethical reasoning, emotional engagement, and
ethical understanding are increasingly sophisticated skills. So, if we find that students do
demonstrate emotional engagement with the study and practice of ethics and evidence
that they have an understanding of professional and ethical responsibility, then we can
justifiably expect that students will have improved their ethical reasoning skills, that
being a lesser skill but a prerequisite to emotional engagement and understanding.
Indeed, that is the case in this research. There is a positive correlation between the
statistically significant improvement in DIT-2 scores of the students in ENT3958 and both
their emotional engagement with ethics and their understanding or professional and
ethical responsibilities.

My research findings both support and are supported by theoretical assumptions
concerning the potential problems with traditional engineering ethics instruction.
Particularly implicated is the case study method. I discussed the shortcomings of the
case study method in Chapter One. Much of the criticism I presented of the case study
method is theoretical and not supported by actual research. So it is revelatory and
relevant that the findings of my research – which derive directly from the work of my
students – are consistent with the theory about the case study method. One of the
principal allegations made about the case study method is that it promotes an
“individualist” or “agent-centered” approach to engineering ethics which creates and
perpetuates myths about ethical decision-making. Most of the standard case studies

249

used in engineering ethics education depict the engineer as the “individual actor who,
alone, must make the ethical decision between ‘personal sacrifice’ or doing nothing”
(Conlon and Zandvoort 220; see also Kline 16–17). Students in ENT3958 expressed
considerable anxiety about this very situation – that they will be alone with the full weight
of an ethical decision riding on his or her shoulders. Prepackaged case studies leave
students with the impression that “the only choices one is given are to challenge
superiors, potentially losing one’s job, or accept the status quo, potentially leading to
serious, negative outcomes” (Lynch and Kline 208). This concern was also prevalent
among the students in ENT3958 and was expressed in their essays.

Case studies promote the unrealistic reliance on the NSPE Code of Ethics to resolve
ethical questions and “gives the false impression that rules of codes of ethics are clear
and unambiguous” (Conlon and Zandvoort 220–221; see also Bucciarelli 9; Loui, “Ethics
and the Development of Professional Identities of Engineering Students”). Nearly every
student acknowledged a new realization that codes of ethics are, at best, general
guidelines but do not resolve ethical issues. Case studies encourage students to see
problems as dichotomies with a “win-win” solution and selectively omit the complex
trade-offs and underlying contexts in which engineering and ethical decision-making are
practiced in the world (Colby and Sullivan 331; Conlon and Zandvoort 221). Most
students, learning from their interviews and interpretations of the readings, expressed an
understanding of the necessity of seeing the whole picture and the reality of complex
trade-offs without win-win answers.
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Case studies reinforce the idea that the engineering domain is ethically neutral and lead
engineering students to understand ethical problems as “specific troubling incidents
within what are assumed to be otherwise harmonious patterns in ongoing institutions”
(Winner, “Engineering Ethics and Political Imagination” 50) without ever questioning or
engaging the social situatedness of their work (Burbules, Lang, and Ramsey;
Bucciarelli). This might be the most difficult aspect of engineering ethics for students to
grasp, but student essays reflect that the concept at least took root in their thinking about
professional and ethical responsibilities. They are asking questions that, by their own
admission, they had not asked before, and that is an act of understanding.

These research results suggest that the long-standing, ubiquitous, and sacrosanct case
study method needs to be reexamined through further research that investigates its
unquestioned efficacious utility. Blending the theory that critiques case studies with the
perspectives expressed by my students, a more harmful than helpful picture of the
traditional case study method emerges. Importantly, I note that this research will
necessarily be qualitative because validation of the theoretical and actual inadequacies
of the case study method is not discoverable by quantitative means, which arguably
conceals more than it reveals. This, I submit, is a significant outcome of my research,
even though it is not one that I set out to find.

Rigor and Trustworthiness
Qualitative research requires rigor and trustworthiness, just as quantitative research
requires validity and reliability. If we want our research to be accepted, we must strive for
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and meet high standards for trustworthiness (Creswell; Borrego, Douglas, and Amelink;
Koro-Ljungberg and Douglas; Leydens, Moskal, and Pavelich). I have incorporated
several methods that help establish trustworthiness of my work on this project. My
qualitative research has been consistent in stating and maintaining its theoretical
perspectives grounded in phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics. Findings are
tracked to the supporting data and to the underlying theoretical support. As much as
possible, I have addressed and taken account of my own biases and orientations as I
worked with the data and arrived at interpretations. I have employed multiple methods or
“triangulation”, both quantitative and qualitative, to measure and understand results; this
included the ESSQ, the DIT-2, and both a traditional phenomenological approach and a
philosophical hermeneutic approach to qualitative data interpretation.

As a final check on the findings and conclusions about student understanding of
professional and ethical responsibilities, I convened a group of interdisciplinary external
reviewers who used philosophical hermeneutic principles to review the student essays.
The group of five included two engineers who had graduated from Michigan Tech and
worked in industry for decades, a person who graduated from Michigan Tech with a
degree in business and who has worked in several corporate and government positions,
a mathematician with a career background in information technology, and an assistant
teacher in the local Copper Country Intermediate School District. I provided the group
with a briefing on my research and teaching, including a description of the
phenomenology-informed approach I am using. I explained current dissatisfactions with
engineering ethics instruction in preparing students to deal with ethical issues, especially
those posed by emerging technologies. I did not discuss my own findings, but I did say
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that the goal of the class is to get engineering students to care about and to have an
understanding of personal and professional ethics. Each person received two
anonymous essays, selected randomly, for a total of ten essays. I asked them to read
the essays and think about what they thought the students got from the course. I
explained that this would involve occasionally “reading between the lines” to understand
and interpret what students meant. We then had a short discussion of their findings and
feedback.

The following summarizes their comments. Each person selected key words or
passages from the essays that helped shape their thinking and conclusions about the
essays. They looked for sincerity (versus trying to please the instructor to get a good
grade). They also looked for elaboration about personal meaning and interpretation
rather than mere reporting of interview results or readings. Everyone commented that
the two essays each of them read were different in content and style but there were
some common themes. The engineers both agreed that, based on their own
experiences, new engineers who enter the workforce have no clue about what their
ethical expectations will be and that they need something that better prepares them. All
five reviewers thought that, with one exception, each student seemed to genuinely care
about ethics and being an ethical engineer and that perhaps the class had contributed to
that outcome.

A couple of reviewers commented that students seemed perplexed about ethics, most
notably when they were discussing technology and its ultimate uses. These reviewers
seemed to think that the students should have a better idea of where they stand on the
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issue of technology. They were, however, expressing their own point of view and, when
pressed, admitted they didn’t have answers for themselves either and acknowledged
that being able to raise the question is probably better than most engineers will do.
Another reviewer said that the students showed a maturing attitude in that their circle of
empathy seemed to be expanding. One reviewer commented that he could see students
almost “thinking their way through the paper.” They also agreed that these students were
prepared – at least as prepared as we can expect young, inexperienced engineering
students to be – to enter the workforce. One of the engineers put it this way: “Most new
engineers don’t even know that there is something out there that they ought to know
about; these students are aware that there is something there and that they are going to
have to know about it – that puts them a step ahead of the game.” Everyone thought that
overall the students “got it” – that they had a personal idea of what it meant to be an
ethical engineer. This review process was certainly more cursory than was my own
research, and none of the reviewers had the benefit of reading all of the essays to form
judgments about general themes. It seemed, however, that this format allowed them to
come to some conclusions about their own assigned essays and, when they had the
opportunity to talk with the other four reviewers, their individual thoughts coalesced into
a general consensus that the students had a better understanding of professional and
ethical responsibility than most young engineering students and that, if it came from the
course, that was a good outcome.

Part of trustworthiness of research includes recognizing and acknowledging the
limitations of one’s work. Throughout this chapter I have acknowledged that the results
from the ESSQ and the DIT-2 tests did not include tests using control groups, that is, a
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group of engineering students who took an ethics course that was taught using
traditional methods and another group of engineering students who had not taken any
separate ethics course at all. Control groups (ideally, randomly selected) are part of the
gold standard of evidence-based research. This creates a tension between quantitative
and qualitative research because qualitative research is often faulted for the absence of
control groups. “Indeed, within the evidence-based community there is the
understanding that qualitative research does not count as research unless it is
embedded in a randomized control trial (RCT!). Further, within this community, there are
no agreed upon procedures, methods, or criteria for extracting information from
qualitative studies” (Denzin 140).

As I reached this place in my research, I have some thoughts about control groups and
the quantitative and qualitative work I have done on this project. First, my original plan
was to teach ENT3958 in the spring semester 2015 using a traditional ethics instruction
approach. The course is normally offered once a year during the fall semester. Only two
students registered for the spring 2015 course and so it was cancelled. As a practical
matter, it isn’t likely that a control group class can be obtained at Michigan Tech as long
as an engineering ethics standalone course remains elective. Arguably, I could use the
fall semester 2015 class as a control. Quite frankly, based on my research and the
student outcomes achieved, I think it would be a disservice to my students if I did so.
Second, my intent is not to prove that a phenomenological approach to engineering
ethics pedagogy is the “cause” of the student learning outcomes, though some of the
quantitative and qualitative results suggest that it is, and there is certainly a correlation.
Nor is my intent to prove that this approach is the best or only way to teach engineering
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ethics. Other educators and researchers are continually testing new methods and
outcomes, and that work should continue. Third, I can make a reasonable argument that
the status quo of undergraduate engineering student learning outcomes and ethical skills
does serve as a control group. The SEED study, for example, which included students
from Michigan Tech and 17 other domestic engineering programs, gave us that
snapshot or status quo of the overall level of ethical development of the general
population of undergraduate engineering students, and it was not a positive one. The
consensus within the engineering education community itself is that engineering
students fall short in their ethical development (see, for example, Pine; Colby and
Sullivan). We know the outcomes we get with what we are doing, and by engineering
educators’ own admission, it is not satisfactory. If we can develop engineering ethics
pedagogical methods that correlate with improved ethical sensitivity and reasoning and
that also help students and engineering programs meet the ABET ethics criterion of “an
understanding of professional and ethical responsibility”, why would we reject those
possibilities because they haven’t been tested on control groups? As the ancient maxim
holds, “the proof of the pudding is in the eating.” If we’ve tried it, we don’t have to
compare the pudding to something else to know if we like it. Denzin contends that we
need “flexible guidelines that are not driven by quantitative criteria” (140), that we “must
resist the pressure for a single gold standard” and that we “can not let one group define
the key terms in the conversation” (152). I suggest that, if qualitative research satisfies
the field’s and peer standards for rigor and trustworthiness, then the results can stand on
their own, without the corroborating evidence of a control group.
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A related objection often raised about qualitative research is the small sample size
included in qualitative studies, making it difficult – it is argued – to “trust” that the results
have meaning. I previously addressed this objection in Chapter Three’s section on
“Qualitative Research in Engineering Education,” but this is a good place to reiterate
comments made earlier. Quantitative research is usually designed in order to find results
that can be generalized across a population. This is not, however, the intended outcome
of qualitative research. Rather, qualitative research focuses on the particular and the
local, with care taken to secure “thick, rich descriptions” of the phenomenon or
experience under study to better understand the complexities of these experiences.
Qualitative research is “not meant to provide fodder for cross-case generalization”
(Leydens, Moskal, and Pavelich, 65). The concern is to ensure that the particular
experience under study is done in a thorough, rigorous, and trustworthy manner. In my
work, the qualitative research is intended, first and most importantly, to tell me whether
or not my ENT3958 class achieved an understanding of their professional and ethical
responsibilities and, second, to inform me about how the course can be strengthened to
achieve better learning outcomes for my students and to highlight best practices in the
course. The thick, rich descriptions taken from student essays and subjected to rigorous
interpretive methods are the sources of “evidence” to support my conclusions that my
students do understand their professional and ethical responsibilities after taking this
course. Whether these outcomes will be generalizable to all undergraduate engineering
students who take a similarly designed ethics course is not my principle concern. I offer
this pedagogy as an option to consider and the results from my class as simply that –
the results from my class. Whether results are transferable will be left to future studies
and applications.
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Using philosophical hermeneutic assessment to inform the future design
and delivery of the ENT3958 course curriculum:
What qualitative researchers must do, however, is provide guidance so that the
quantitative community can make sense of and use the results from qualitative research
and assessment in engineering education in order to conduct their own studies and to
improve learning outcomes for students. With that in mind, this work has undertaken to
test whether qualitative methods – in particular, the practice of philosophical
hermeneutics – can be used to assess the student learning outcomes required by ABET
Engineering Criterion 3(f) for my students in ENT3958 and to assess and improve ethics
curriculum design and teaching. A philosophical hermeneutic approach to assessment
allows me to read the student essays with eye toward understanding what is being said
beyond the explicit “author’s intention,” – reading between the lines so to speak – so I
can discover the strengths and the weaknesses of the course. What have I learned
about ENT3958 as it was designed and delivered in the fall semester of 2014?

The course syllabus explains that the course design is premised on several
assumptions: “First, most engineering students don’t care about learning ethics
philosophy – that’s a general observation made by most instructors who teach
engineering ethics. Second, most engineering students don’t actually engage with the
study of ethics even though this is one of the learning outcomes that we expect. Third,
engineering students prefer to investigate a question rather than study about it in books
– you want hands on projects. Fourth, engineering ethics will be more meaningful if you
study it in the context of everyday real engineering work. This is especially true because
most of you in the class are preparing to graduate very soon and enter the engineering
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profession.” Based on my experience teaching ENT3958 with this phenomenological
approach and considering student feedback at the end of the semester, I can confirm
that these assumptions are valid. The students respond positively to a pedagogical
approach to professional and ethical responsibility that gives them guided autonomy and
a way to investigate a question that has a meaningful context.

The class assignments differed in 2014 from prior years in one important respect. I
required two in-person individual meetings with each student during the semester, and I
think these meetings helped to emotionally engage the students in the coursework.
Several students commented about the value of these meetings in the course
evaluations completed at the end of the semester. These meetings narrowed the
difference between me and the students. It was an opportunity for them to briefly have
all my attention and to talk about anything that mattered to them in the class. Often this
included clarifying concepts and expectations, and I think this contributed to their
willingness to actually care about the class in general. When I decided to structure the
course to give students increased research autonomy, I added these individual meetings
as a way to track their progress and hold them accountable for getting the required work
done. I didn’t expect that the meetings would have as much benefit to the students as
they reported. These one-on-one meetings were effective for purposes of accountability
but, more important, they sent a message to the students that I cared about their work
and I wanted them to succeed. That was a surprise to me. I will retain these meetings in
future ENT3958 classes.
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By far, the most influential class activity for the students is their interview of an engineer.
The power of this experience cannot be overstated. While no student expressed it this
way, the understandings they derived from the interviews could not be reproduced in a
textbook or film case study. There is something about meeting one-on-one to have a
dialog with an experienced engineer about a topic that is probably the most unlikely thing
they could image themselves discussing. When I first included this assignment, I did so
without any idea of how meaningful it would be for the students. Van Manen writes of the
“wonder” that a phenomenology researcher finds in the work of investigating experience.
Although their research takes place on a very limited and simple scale, my students
consistently found “wonder” when they interviewed engineers about the experience of
being an ethical engineer. Of all the new understandings acquired by my students during
the class and described by them in their research essays, the most insightful arose
during these interviews or when students reflected on them afterwards. If this course
were offered for more than one credit, I would consider expanding the interview
requirement so that students could gain one or two additional perspectives on this
subject. I will also consider inviting engineers to talk to the class about what it is to be an
ethical engineer; this would be in addition to the individual interviews.

I paid attention to how the students wrote about the assigned readings. What I learned is
that it is important to review the course readings at least annually and to select readings
that engage the students. The case studies presented in most engineering coursework
or ethics instruction are well-known but ancient history as far as the students are
concerned – the space shuttle disasters, the exploding Pinto gas tank, collapsing hotel
walkways, and leaked chemicals. It isn’t that these problems are no longer relevant but
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the specific cases are not. Similarly, the standard fictional films developed for teaching
engineering ethics are boring and contrived. The students themselves report this when
asked! There are so many sources for fresh, engaging, and relevant readings that there
is simply no excuse not to review and update course readings regularly. Often, there’s a
good reason to keep historic readings, such as Heidegger’s The Question Concerning
Technology, as long as I explain why it is included. Students want to engage. I need to
be attuned to that and do my best to give them a reason to engage.

I have discussed the need to keep students accountable for doing the assignments. This
was especially important because students were given so much leeway in doing their
research work. Maintaining students’ accountability is always a problem for educators
and perhaps we need to let students do as little or as much as they want. But I am
responsible for creating conditions for success and that is why I required individual
meetings with the students. From those meetings, I learned that the absence of regular
class meetings was occasionally an excuse to delay the reading assignments. In the
end, they did the work, but some students had to scramble to get it done. In the future, I
have decided to include a timetable for the readings and to require my students to turn in
written notes from their interviews and summaries of how they relate the readings to the
research inquiry.

Concluding Thoughts on Qualitative Assessment in a Quantitative World
Qualitative assessment is far more difficult, time consuming, and complex than
traditional assessment (Koro-Ljungberg and Douglas). Nonetheless, the work I’ve done
here is intended to show that qualitative methods – in particular, assessment grounded
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in philosophical hermeneutics – can offer insight and understandings about students that
traditional assessment cannot. If an understanding of professional and ethical
responsibilities means that my students identified and engaged their foregrounded
horizons – their own values and traditions, that they were willing to place those values
and traditions at risk in dialogic encounters with new texts, and that they emerged with
some changed outlooks on professional and ethical responsibilities and what it is to be
an ethical engineer, then philosophical hermeneutics is an approach that can help me
get an authentic understanding of what my students understand as well as insight into
how the course can be continually improved to meet student-centered needs. This is the
work of philosophical hermeneutics, and it can arguably work far beyond the engineering
ethics classroom.

A positivist perspective will claim that we cannot assess students’ understanding of
professional and ethical responsibilities without specific, concrete, standardized
performance indicators that can be represented by quantitative values, what Dunne calls
the “behavioral objectives model” (Dunne 3–8). What I want to do here is demonstrate
how a philosophical hermeneutic approach to assessment can enhance and enrich
ABET assessment practices to give a deeper, thicker, and student-centered
understanding of whether and how students meet the requirements of E.C. 3(f). In doing
so, I do not suggest replacing institutional and program ABET assessment practices, but
I do support adding a method that gives us information about our students’ learning that
we wouldn’t otherwise have.
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ABET defines assessment as a process that “uses relevant direct, indirect, quantitative
and qualitative measures as appropriate to the outcome being measured” (ABET 2,
emphasis added). ABET mandates a set of student outcomes for accreditation of
engineering programs. Engineering programs, as part of the accreditation process, must
identify their own “performance indicators” which are “specific, measurable statements
identifying the performance(s) required to meet the outcome; confirmable by evidence”
(Rogers 7). ABET offers training for educators in assessment practices in order to
prepare for the accreditation review process. One of these has been the five-day IDEAL
(Institute for the Development of Excellence in Assessment Leadership) Scholars
program. I completed this program in 2010 and am considered an “ABET IDEAL
Scholar” with skills in program assessment. So I have some background and
understanding from which to critique these assessment practices.

Although ABET requires that we select measures – performance indicators – that are
appropriate to the outcome being measured, the actual practice is that all performance
indicators must be convertible into a quantitative rubric. A good part of assessment
practice is developing the content of these rubrics for each of the ABET Criteria,
including the eleven mandated Student Outcomes of Criterion 3. I will focus on E.C. 3(f),
an understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities. I previously examined
several rubrics used to assess E.C. 3(f) and included them in Appendix A for reference
(see also Chapter One, Table 1.1). An important feature of many of the performance
indicators used in rubrics is that they begin as qualitative measures but are then
converted to quantitative values expressed in a rubric format. My point is not to argue
with the quantitative format of a rubric but rather to highlight that we are already
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engaged in qualitative thinking when we begin to develop a rubric to assess students’
understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities. Rubrics represent a
conversion of qualitative thinking into quantitative measurement and an attempt to
reduce as much as possible the need for interpretation.

Ethics rubrics typically require an assessor to evaluate a student’s ability to identify
ethical issues in a case study, apply selected skills (knowledge of ethics codes, ethical
reasoning skills) to the case, and justify the ethical decision. There is nothing wrong with
this provided we acknowledge that the rubric aims to judge performance based on this
single structured case and that the assessor is [unrealistically] using the results from one
case study to represent students’ overall understanding of professional and ethical
responsibilities. We must question, in the first place, whether the use of a single case
study (which may well be a case or issue that the students have already studied) reflects
their understanding of professional and ethical responsibility. Moreover, this approach
toward assessment may prove Newberry’s observation that undergraduate engineering
students can apply ethics principles to engineering ethics problems and arrive at
ethically satisfactory answers but that they remain unengaged and uncaring about ethics
(Newberry). In the end, the single case study and the rubric assessment methods don’t
tell us much about students’ understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities.

And this takes us to the heart of the matter of assessment – how much do we want to
know and why do we want to know it? Is this a pro forma activity designed to look good
for accreditation purposes or do we really want to understand how our students
understand professional and ethical responsibilities? Do we want to be able to express
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something meaningful about whether and how we are preparing our undergraduate
engineering students to be ethical engineers? I suggest that the value of philosophical
hermeneutic assessment – its potential to add new dimensions to what we learn from
assessment – has been evidenced by my work on this project. This work has
demonstrated that philosophical hermeneutics can be used to meaningfully assess
undergraduate engineering students’ understanding of professional and ethical
responsibilities by giving us deeper insight about our students’ preparation to enter the
world of engineering practice. Additionally, philosophical hermeneutic assessment tells
us what is working and what needs to be improved in our ethics curriculum in order to
achieve better student learning outcomes.
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Chapter Five
Concluding Thoughts
Significance and Implications
The foremost question I ask is whether and how my work has added to knowledge.
When I first conceived of turning my classroom instruction into a research project, I felt
confident that the results could be transformative for engineering ethics pedagogy.
Nearly four years later, an honest assessment would be that my work suggests
propitious possibilities for engineering ethics pedagogy and assessment. My research
has been inspired by the work of many others before me who have been and continue to
be committed to the design and testing of best practices in engineering ethics
instruction. Were it not for their work, I would not likely have undertaken this project. I
have always sought to build on what has already been done.

I draw two primary conclusions from my work. The first is that a one-credit course in
engineering ethics can substantially improve undergraduate engineering students’
ethical sensitivity, ethical reasoning skills, emotional engagement with ethics, and their
understanding of professional and ethical responsibilities. I will go one step farther and
add that my work strongly suggests that a phenomenology-informed approach to
engineering ethics may account for the degree of improvement in student outcomes
shown by my research. I have been careful in this dissertation not to claim this method is
the cause of the improved student outcomes. Yet, for all that, I do have the experience
of teaching engineering ethics for several years using a traditional approach and being
able to observe and compare – albeit anecdotally – the differing student outcomes from
traditional versus phenomenological methods. Although I have no ESSQ or DIT-2 data
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for my earlier classes, I recall what prompted me to try something new in the first place.
Students did not care about studying ethics, and that attitude did not change appreciably
over the course of the semester. Students relied on rules and heuristics to make ethical
decisions when they entered the class and, with my reinforcement, left the class with the
same skill perhaps slightly improved. Students did not, in my opinion and with the benefit
of hindsight, have an understanding of their professional and ethical responsibilities.
From my personal point of view – and irrespective of the data that supports a
phenomenological approach – I would not return to a traditional ethics instruction model
because I do not find that it best serves student interests in preparing them to enter the
profession of engineering and to be ethical engineers.

The second conclusion I make is also an observation and critical comment. I have
learned from my research that we educators – of engineering, of ethics – are not attuned
to what is important to our undergraduate engineering students about being ethical
engineers. While we are concerned with imparting ethical knowledge, our students are
concerned with understanding how they are going to fit into the world of engineering as
ethically competent professionals when they make the leap from undergraduate student
to practicing engineer. This is the gap we must fill if we expect our students to graduate
with an understanding of their professional and ethical responsibilities. Why have we not
realized this about our students? I suggest that our focus on accreditation and the
attendant quantitative assessment of student outcomes is largely to blame. This
approach doesn’t allow for nuance and personal concerns to emerge. Some might argue
that the students don’t complain about their ethical preparation, giving us no reason to
question what we are doing. The SEED study that I’ve often referenced in this
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dissertation confirmed the ironic result that 92% of Michigan Tech undergraduate
engineering students are either “Very satisfied” or “Satisfied” with the quality of their
professional engineering ethics education although these same students demonstrate
ethical reasoning skills that are lower than their peers at other engineering schools by
statistically significant margins (Carpenter, Harding, and Finelli 37, 44). So it would be a
mistake to argue that it’s up to our students to initiate a change in ethics education. We
are the educators, after all.

Others will argue that our engineering programs are meeting ABET accreditation
standards, thereby proving that students are satisfying the engineering ethics
requirement of E.C. 3(f). That is a more difficult position to contest. But I respond that,
given the findings of my qualitative assessment using philosophical hermeneutics, we
must question, first, our definition of what is intended by E.C. 3(f) and, second, what
outcomes we genuinely want for our engineering students. Clearly, students have
legitimate fears about engineering ethics, and these are concerns that ethics instruction
can address and help prepare them to face, even if we cannot alleviate them altogether.
One of the most useful results of the peer review of student essays was an affirmation
that these students are expressing an understanding of professional and ethical
responsibility in ways that most young novice engineers do not, and that this would be
an advantage for them when they enter the engineering profession. Certainly the small
group of reviewers cannot speak for the entire engineering profession, but their feedback
should carry some weight. Isn’t this the reception we’d like our engineering students to
have when they graduate and go to work?
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As a result of my work on this project, I have concluded that a phenomenological
approach to engineering ethics education – where students are given the opportunity to
investigate, encounter, and understand the real, lived experience of what it is to be an
ethical engineer – can help fill this gap and that qualitative assessment – in particular the
use of philosophical hermeneutics – can tell us so much more about our students’ true
understanding of professional and ethical responsibility.

Recommendations
The question is what this means for engineering ethics instruction and the duty of
engineering programs to ensure that graduates meet the requirements of E.C. 3(f). I
offer two recommendations that correspond to my two principle conclusions. First, I
recommend that engineering programs require all undergraduate engineering students
to complete, at a minimum, a one-credit engineering ethics course or its equivalent. I
qualify this recommendation with the suggestion that the course be modeled, at least in
part, on the phenomenology-informed approach I have described and tested in my
research. I support this suggestion with several reasons. While future research can test
the causative aspects and outcomes of a traditional versus phenomenological approach,
my own work suggests that students will be more engaged in the study of engineering
ethics using a phenomenology approach and that they will emerge from the class with a
different and better understanding of their professional and ethical responsibilities than
they get from traditional ethics instruction or, as per the status quo, from engineering
programs that require no formal ethics instruction at all. The suggested
phenomenological approach doesn’t attempt to turn engineering students into
philosophers. Rather, it gives them a hands-on investigative role; it studies engineering
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ethics in the context of everyday real engineering work; and it gives them the unique
opportunity for a one-on-one conversation about being an ethical engineer. If the
students are engaged in the coursework, they are more likely to take something
beneficial from it.

The second recommendation is that engineering programs regularly conduct qualitative
assessment to find out what is going on with their students. In the case of my work, such
assessment would be with engineering ethics. I suspect that engineering programs
might be surprised to find significant differences between what they learn by quantitative
accreditation assessment and what they learn by qualitative assessment. If engineering
program faculty and administrators do not feel competent to conduct qualitative
assessment, they do have access to professionals on campus who could do this work
for and with them. It isn’t magic; it isn’t a mystery; it isn’t something that is too far “out
there.” I am not recommending that quantitative assessment be scrapped altogether, but
that qualitative be added to the process. Qualitative assessment will yield information
that engineering programs cannot secure through quantitative methods alone.

Future Directions for this Research
This work is a start. Where I or anyone else takes it from here depends on objectives
and resources. If the researcher is intent on testing whether a phenomenological
approach to engineering ethics education causes improved ethical sensitivity, ethical
reasoning, emotional engagement, and understanding of professional and ethical
responsibility, then it would be appropriate to expand the work that was done here to
include at least two control groups – one control group that studies engineering ethics
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using a traditional approach and a second control group that takes no engineering ethics
course at all. The same method could also be used to test other ethics instructional
approaches.

As to establishing statistical significance of changes in quantitative measurements
(ESSQ, DIT-2, or other tests for ethical sensitivity or ethical reasoning), my suggestion is
to use paired comparisons for pre-tests and post-tests. This approach can make a
difference in terms of whether the changes are statistically significant. I did not do this
because I did not recognize in advance that this could be true and that outcomes could
be different. When I retroactively and hypothetically assumed some paired data
comparisons for the ESSQ, for example, I found that those improvement in scores could
have been statistically significant.

It would also be worthwhile to try an alternative to the DIT-2 as a test of ethical
sensitivity, in particular, one of the new tests being developed with engineering-specific
scenarios. While I do not think that results would necessarily be different (both forms of
tests use ethical dilemmas and, when we think about it, there should be no difference in
outcomes), the comparison would be interesting to make. It is arguable that an
engineering specific test would operate to affirm that engineering ethics has only to do
with engineering design and work issues, but students may also be more engaged in
taking such a test.

For the past two years, I’ve worked with faculty from Engineering Fundamentals to
redesign the ethics modules used in the first year, first semester, introduction to
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engineering course. The new modules are a highly condensed version of the materials
students read in ENT3958. Additionally, because there is such great value for students
to interview an engineer about what it is to be an ethical engineer – but recognizing that
900 first year engineering students cannot realistically find and interview engineers – we
have devised an alternate approach. The instructors invite a panel of engineers to talk
with the students about what it is to be an ethical engineer. Two special evening
sessions are held and students must attend one of those sessions. Students are also
required to prepare five questions for this session. The feedback from students to the
instructors is that this is one of their most meaningful assignments of the semester. We
have attempted pre-tests and post-tests using the DIT-2 with a pilot group of
Engineering Fundamentals students who received instruction using the new module and
another group who received instruction with the traditional module. From the results
gathered, there has been no statistically significant change in scores for either group.
This was not an unexpected result as prior studies have shown that an ethics module
delivered in an engineering course is not effective in improving ethical reasoning scores.
Also there were problems with instructor buy-in which included objections to the time the
DIT-2 required for the students to take it (twice) and the fact that it was not engineering
related. Nonetheless, there are faculty in Engineering Fundamentals who are committed
to continuing this work. We will continue to work on the modules and attempt to measure
outcomes.

My focus will be on dissemination of results through publishing. I am still considering the
possibility of writing an ethics instruction workbook using the approach and assignments
developed in my ENT3958 course. Perhaps the most compelling outcome of my work is
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the discovery that a one credit ethics course can produce significant improvements in
ethical sensitivity, ethical reasoning and – most important – understanding of
professional and ethical responsibility for undergraduate engineering students. I will
encourage the adoption of some form of mandatory engineering ethics instruction for all
undergraduate engineering students.

Ideally, though this seems unrealistic for many reasons – but there is nothing wrong with
dreaming – I would like to study engineering ethics and the philosophy of engineering at
an institution such as Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands. Their Values,
Technology and Innovation Department includes an “Ethics/Philosophy of Technology”
section that focuses on engineering ethics education. Oh, to be a couple decades
younger.

Finally, and on a more realistic plane, I will be open to working with anyone else
interested in pursuing this work. This may include seeking sponsored research funding
through sources such as NSF’s Research in Engineering Education Program. I believe
that my work provides a solid place from which to launch focused engineering ethics
research, and I hope that this work continues. Important issues beyond the efficacy of a
phenomenological approach to instruction have also been raised. For example, the
philosophical hermeneutic assessment results must ask us to question how we use case
studies in ethics education. The case study is such a staple in engineering ethics and we
have to ask whether it is truly producing the intended results, at least in the ways it is
currently used.
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One aspect of engineering ethics that hasn’t been explored much but that could have
considerable significance for the effectiveness of pedagogical method is the long term
impact of engineering ethics instruction on students post-graduation. I referenced earlier
the work of Harding, et al. who followed up with some of the students who participated in
the SEED study to try to assess the impact of engineering ethics instruction two years
after the original SEED project. Their findings were mixed – ethical reasoning skills had
improved somewhat but ethical knowledge had not – but this study was conducted while
the students were still at their institutions and prior to graduation (Harding, Carpenter,
and Finelli). My interest would be in a more extensive longitudinal study of students from
ENT3958, following them post-graduation and after they had been working for five years
and, ideally, again after 10 years or even 15 years. Makkai undertook a longitudinal
study of engineering students – when they entered the university, after four years at
university, and as professionals 13 years after graduation – to ascertain the values they
identified and the extent to which those values remained stable over the 19 years of the
study. Her study was concluded in 1991, quite a while ago (Makkai). This area for
research is wide open, but it clearly requires appropriate financial resources to conduct
such studies.

So I hope that this work creates new education and research possibilities through the
questions that have been raised. That would be a gratifying legacy.
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Appendix D
The Ethical Sensitivity Scale Questionnaire (ESSQ)
Circle the number that most closely represents your self-evaluation of each statement with 1 being “totally
disagree” and 5 being “totally agree.”
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

In conflict situations, I am able to identify other persons’ feelings.
I am able to express my different feelings to other people.
I notice if someone working with me is offended by me.
I am able to express to other people if I am offended or hurt because
of them.
I am able to cooperate with people who do not share my opinions on
what is right and what is wrong.
I tolerate different ethical views in my surroundings.
I think it is good that my closest friends think in different ways.
I also get along with people who do not agree with me.

9. I am concerned about the well being of my partners.
10. I take care of the well being of others and try to improve it.
11. In conflict situations, I do my best to take actions that aim at maintaining
good personal relationships.
12. I try to have good contact with all the people I am working with.
13. I take other peoples’ points of view into account before making any
important decisions in my life.
14. I try to consider another person’s position when I face a conflict situation.
15. When I am working on ethical problems, I consider the impact of my
decisions on other people.
16. I try to consider other peoples’ needs, even in situations concerning my
own benefits.
17.
18.
19.
20.

I recognize my own bias when I take a stand on ethical issues.
I realize that I am tied to certain prejudices when I assess ethical issues.
I try to control my own prejudices when making ethical evaluations.
When I am resolving ethical problems, I try to take a position evolving
out of my own social status.

21. I contemplate on the consequences of my actions when making ethical
decisions.
22. I ponder on different alternatives when aiming at the best possible
solution to an ethically problematic situation.
23. I am able to create many alternative ways to act when I face ethical
problems in my life.
24. I believe there are several right solutions to ethical problems.
25.
26.
27.
28.

I notice that there are ethical issues involved in human interaction.
I see a lot of ethical problems around me.
I am aware of the ethical issues I face at school.
I am better than other people in recognizing new and current ethical
problems.

1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5

1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5

The Ethical Sensitivity Scale Questionnaire is copyrighted material but is made available as an open access
article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium provided the original work is properly cited. Proper citation is
included in the list of Works Cited in this dissertation (Kuusisto, et al.). Appropriate excerpt from printed
material documenting open access status is included in Appendix F.
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Appendix E
Statistical Reports for ESSQ and DIT-2
Excel report for Statistical significance of ESSQ Pre-test and Post-test
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances

Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

Variable Variable
1
2
3.486264 3.802198
0.327708 0.105998
13
13
0
19
-1.7297
0.049948
1.729133
0.099897
2.093024

Excel report for Statistical significance of DIT-2 Mean N2 Pre-test and Post-test
2014
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances

Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

Variable Variable
1
2
34.08154 47.15417
203.9566 146.5042
13
12
0
23
-2.47502
0.010562
1.713872
0.021124
2.068658
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Research Article
Finnish Teachers’ Ethical Sensitivity
Elina Kuusisto,1 Kirsi Tirri,1 and Inkeri Rissanen2
1Department of Teacher Education, University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 9, 00014 Helsinki, Finland
2 Faculty of Theology, University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 33, 00014 Helsinki, Finland
Correspondence should be addressed to Elina Kuusisto, elina.kuusisto@helsinki.fi
Received 23 February 2012; Revised 12 June 2012; Accepted 14 June 2012
Academic Editor: Elizabeth Campbell
Copyright © 2012 Elina Kuusisto et al. This is an open access article distributed under the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
The study examined the ethical sensitivity of Finnish teachers (N 864) using a 28-item Ethical
Sensitivity Scale Questionnaire (ESSQ). The psychometric qualities of this instrument were
analyzed, as were the differences in self-reported ethical sensitivity between practicing and
student teachers and teachers of different subjects. The results showed that the psychometric
qualities of the ESSQ were satisfactory and enabled the use of an explorative factor analysis. All
Finnish teachers rated their level of ethical sensitivity as high, which indicates that they had
internalized the ethical professionalism of teaching. However, practicing teachers’ assessments
were higher than student teachers’. Moreover, science as a subject was associated with lower selfratings of ethical sensitivity.
Troesch Note: The ESSQ is referenced in Chapters Three and Four in this dissertation
and is reprinted in Appendix D.
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Appendix G
Extracts of Qualitative Data Results
x
x
x
x

Significant statements
Formulated meanings
Six Themes from Round One Coding
Example of Round Two Essay coding for markers of understanding
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Significant Statements: Research Paper Essays: What is it to be an ethical engineer?:
Understanding of professional and ethical responsibility (numbers refer to essay number and line
number within essay. Example 1.1 = essay number 1, line one)
1. Ethics is a complicated subject 1.1
2. Aristotle states that “a man who possesses character of excellence does the ‘right’ thing, at
the ‘right’ time and in the ‘right’ way” 1.4-5
3. The problem with trying to create this definition [of “right”] is that every situation a person
encounters with ethics is entirely different based on the conditions of the situation and their
own personal beliefs 1.7-8
4. With engineering, this question is even more difficult to answer 1.9
5. more than your own personal beliefs 1.10
6. the ethical decision will have constraints to fit the decision into several different societies that
each defines the problem differently. 1.10-12
7. interview a practicing engineer whom I could get some serious answers from 1.14
8. a few of the answers opened my eyes to a new way of viewing ethics that I have never
thought of before 1.18-19
9. I feel I really learned something new from in this interview 1.19-20
10. resulting answer was not at all what I expected 1.22
11. “Has making an ethical decision ever held you back in your career,” 1.21
12. Rather than a simple yes or no with an explanation, I received a story that would teach me a
lesson that I have never considered before in my life. 1.22-23
13. There were no laws pertaining to this situation, the decision was made in the name of safety
for the human population 1.30-31
14. perfect example of this fundamental cannon in practice, as the company gave up a huge
market advantage to offer safety to public 1.33-34
15. My take away from this answer was that the ethical decision is more important than having a
market advantage over other companies even when there is no alternative reasoning to help
your competition 1.35-36
16. a decision of this caliber does not lie solely on the shoulders of the engineer; other people
need to be brought into the situation to make a fully informed ethical decision 1.38-39
17. I again was offered a learning experience 1.41
18. “Do ethical decisions always lead to the greatest good for the greatest number of people?”
1.43
19. that is not the answer that I was expecting 1.44
20. I asked for an elaboration on that answer 1.45
21. This was an answer that I grappled with understanding for a while 1.48
22. The question at hand is still very difficult to make a decision on 1.52
23. The take away from this question was a lot more difficult for me to understand; as there is not
exactly a clear cut answer in this situation on what is right. 1.61-62
24. I believe that the best way to handle questions like this is to look at the entire situation 1.66
25. “Do you believe that ethics questions are all situational?” 1.70
26. This is a question that I began thinking about after one of the class readings 1.70
27. I also wanted to hear the answer from a practicing engineer 1.77
28. I believe that being able to see the whole picture in a situation is the most important part of
being an ethical engineer, as the only way to make the ethical decision is to be fully informed
of the situation at hand. 1.83-85
29. added to my understanding of what it is to be an ethical engineer 1.86
30. most helpful to me as I seek to define and understand what it is to be an ethical engineer,
and why it is important. 1.87-88
31. the information that they know gives them a level of responsibility to the public that many
other professions do not have 1.89-90
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32. my ethical viewpoint when I started this course, what it has become by the end of the course,
and the transformative process 2.2
33. learning process and how my opinions changed over the course of this class 2.6
34. I never had given too much thought on either my personal values or how these values aligned
with any professional engineering codes of conduct 2.17
35. I’d like to believe I had a pretty good moral compass, but it wasn’t especially calibrated. 2.19
36. I had a misaligned idea of how working in the automotive industry would be as far as where
the responsibility for ethically challenging decisions was placed 2.20
37. course readings, there were several that I either strongly agreed with or strongly disagreed
with 2.26
38. made me think of certain aspects of ethics I had not considered in the past
39. there is still the recurring question of how to weigh this against profitability, safety, and
durability, to which there is no immediately apparent answer in my opinion. 2.109-110
40. Another related question is, when government regulations cover something, is the engineer
responsible for its design absolved of the ethical burden, and is that burden shifted on to the
lawmakers? 2.126-127
41. The interview was a good learning experience for me.2.132
42. There was a lot of information for me to take away from this interview 2.137
43. Some helpful information was the advice to figure out where you stand on a given ethical
issue before you’re actually faced with it. Things may not especially be easy but then at least
you already know your preferred outcome, all that’s left is getting it to happen 2.137-140
44. information that was surprising to me 2.141
45. Some information that was a new way of thinking about was that you can go to your
supervisor or other management staff for help resolving an ethical issue. You’re never on your
own completely to make a decision on anything, at least in the automotive industry (and
especially when you’re just starting out). This was never a consideration for me in the past.
2.145-148
46. asked about an ethical decision that was not clearly right and wrong 2.153
47. I also learned that the most difficult decisions that have to be made in the automotive industry
generally is when a problem is found late in the development cycle that will cost a lot of
money to fix, whereas it could cause a lot of warranty repairs and negative customer opinion
if it is let go 2.156
48. if there was advice Joe would offer to someone just entering the field of automotive
engineering 2.170
49. This advice is very useful to me, as I hadn’t ever really thought about ethics in this way 2.175
50. However, I now know some introspection is needed before I start working in the automotive
industry 2.176
51. issue I had always for whatever reason assumed that I would be all alone to make my
decision; the revelation that that’s never the case especially in the automotive industry was a
bit of a paradigm shift 2.180
52. This is another important piece of information for me because 2.185
53. In retrospect, this seems obvious, but it just wasn’t something I’d considered in the past.2.189
54. Obviously this is an extreme example, but it illustrates the difficulty of an engineer’s position.
2.199
55. A good ethical compass will help with making the required decisions, but that doesn’t mean
they’re all easy 2.203
56. Often engineers have conflicting ethical obligations, 2.216
57. I now understand more the difficulties associated with reaching a decision due to the multiple
factors that go into a design: 2.214
58. Ethics are going to have to be considered in the future more than ever as vehicles’ systems
become more and more sophisticated, approaching the theorized future of a self-driving car
2.218
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59. When the car becomes able to make a decision in place of the driver, there’s a lot riding on
that decision 2.220
60. In my journey this semester to discover what ethical engineering means 3.3
61. I am always learning and this paper is more of a clarification of what I have recently learned
and what I already know, so that I am internally consistent with my beliefs 3.5-6 (horizon)
62. This is our strongest asset as engineers; the ability to filter out noise and focus on the
substantive portions of a problem. However this is also our blind spot, as it makes it much
easier to forget the whole picture. Therefore, as I see it, ethical engineering is designed, and
ethics in general for everybody, is to draw us out of our narrow interests and remind us of the
whole. Without ethics we would be very remiss in our duty to others and to ourselves 3.1519
63. It is an interesting case of situation ethics in which an engineer could have lied about the
machine specifications to save the workers, but in doing so would have been dishonest to his
management, who he is bound by ethics to be honest and forthright with (speeding up the hot
dog machine) 3.64-65
64. We never found out and to my everlasting shame instead of reporting the missing ammo, I
panicked about losing track of them and doctored the numbers to make them match. That is
a mistake I never should have committed and is indefensible 3.93
65. my moral fiber is more resilient than when I was 18 and fresh out of high school 3.99
66. Because we have specialized knowledge we need to hold ourselves up to higher standards
and owe it to ourselves and others to use our knowledge and abilities towards a greater good
3.111-114
67. and I have since learned that admitting failure, although hard, and a large blow to my ego,
is necessary for preventing greater tragedy. 3/105
68. What is meant by ‘ethical?’ What does this mean? What role do ethics play in the
everyday encounters of an engineer? 4.2
69. brings more questions than answers. 4.1
70. collaborated with fellow students 4.5
71. to broaden my knowledge resource 4.7
72. by choosing to interview someone who I knew more personally I was able to receive more
unfiltered feedback without fear of portraying himself as a bad person. This was very
successful as our interview evolved into a conversation shortly after beginning as the topic
began to intrigue us 4.10
73. As expected I found that he does not consider what is ethical on a typical day 4.13
74. The critical decisions made by an engineer are often the ones that go unnoticed. 4.19
75. Through our discussion I realized that there is no correct answer to this dilemma and each
engineer must make decisions on a daily basis that may affect someone negatively 4.45
76. What is right and what is wrong? Each individual has their own distinction between the two
4.47-48
77. In many cases including my interviewee the decision must be shared among a group 4.49
78. I feel that Wade Robinson did a fantastic job of explaining not only how ethics can
unknowingly be intertwined in decision making relevant to engineers but also expresses why
engineers must not intentionally cause harm 4.58
79. There are also circumstances where there isn’t a set right or ethical code to follow (bombs).
4.72
80. . In an informal sense, it is a way of conducting yourself in a professional manner while trying
to do your best to not mess up 4.80
81. we will seek to understand how an engineer can conduct themselves ethically to properly
address these expectations. 5.8
82. In many cases an ethical chemical engineer will be of greater value in the workplace than
their counterparts 5.87
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83. Engineers of all sorts will have to take the interest of various parties into account when
choosing their actions. The ethical engineer will keep these interests in mind and choose to
act in a manner that minimizes injustice 5.109-111
84. Too often in today’s society do we forget to take some time for introspection. 6.1
85. Taking the time to reflect on what is important to me, what I find moral, or how I prioritize
things in my life is a critical aspect in how I will respond ethically in future conflicts and
situations in my life and career 6.4-6
86. I have taken that time to think for myself, discovered ideas regarding ethics in today’s world,
and worked to understand how they will affect me in being an ethical engineer.6.6-7
87. an ethical engineer, let alone ethics, cannot be defined in one word, sentence, or even an
entire essay 6.10
88. Ethics may mean something to different to each person 6.11
89. At the beginning of the semester, I may have simply defined ethics as “what is right or
wrong”. I now have a more complex understanding that ethics encompasses more than that;
it is values, decisions, desires, and what drives an individual to do what they do 6.12-13
90. an ethical engineer makes designs and decisions that improve the public good, who
understands their limits, and trusts their intuition 6.15
91. hope I can learn to be content and make an ethical call when needed 6.20
92. professional engineer I interviewed stressed the importance of being a good listener 6.22
93. work for a company whose passions align with mine. 6.25
94. . I value the ethical decision to integrate consumer values and opinions into the design of the
product and not let price solely drive the design process 6.26-27
95. most people, engineers specifically, are inherently good people 6.28
96. ethical engineers have a desire to improve the world, not destroy it 6.29
97. situations can skew people’s values and cause them to act differently than they ideally
would.6.31
98. Engineers don’t just decide to be careless or to be unethical with no reason. 6.33
99. I was surprised at her minimal understanding of what ethics means in the workplace.6.35
100.
she struggled to give good examples or even understand the difficult questions 6.36
101.
I believe she simply did not have an education in recognizing ethics 6.37
102.
education can help an individual identify and choose to be an ethical employee 6.39
103.
Understanding first that ethics differ across the world, with ages, or even between
genders is a step to then understand how and in what ways they differ 6.40-41
104.
learned through self-reflection and experience 6.42
105.
I recognize that my ethics may change through experiences and years of working in
industry 6.44
106.
Each experience in a design process or a day at work may open my mind further and
expand my understanding of ethics 6.45.
107.
experiences as a student has recently improved my understanding of ethics.6.47
108.
I was completely shocked at how little I knew about the ethics of our own nation’s past,
including the ethics of those developing the engineering and scientific world 6.50
109.
Scientists were driven by finding answers, not by protecting human health. 6.52
110.
. I wondered how I could have not learned about this sooner! 6.54-55
111.
question of how I will continue to educate myself further once I’m in the position of an
engineer developing products used by humans 6.55
112.
believe one of the best ways for an engineer to understand ethics is to communicate and
teach others 6.57
113.
helping to develop the understanding of ethics in my coworkers someday, I’ll better
understand my own view on ethics 6.57-58
114.
discussion of ethics is “needed to raise awareness, determine our common values and
find new strategies to safeguard these values to the maximum possible” 6.60
115.
An ethical engineer would understand the ethics of his or her coworkers, 6.64
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116.
I understand that if I am ever in the situation where I do not agree with my coworkers
ethics and cannot find a meeting point, I feel comfortable with leaving the company 6.65-67
117.
As the field of engineering evolves, corresponding ethics for an engineer will need to as
well 6.69
118.
Oortmerssen, “our values direct the development of technology, but at the same time
technology has an effect on our values 6.71
119.
The impact of age of technology makes it easier to be anonymous and unethical in an
online setting 6.73
120.
but no regulation is absolutely error proof.6.76
121.
“families are driving our cars”. 6.78
122.
as technology and science develop, I will need to personally be aware my ethics will need
to drive my decisions even more 6.83
123.
This enforces my opinion that ethics is much more than facts and much more than
emotions.6.89
124.
Ethics is a confusing mixture of both, with the recipe for one individual’s ethics different
than another 6.90
125.
In the following years, as I aspire to be an ethical engineer, I will need to ask myself
many question 6.91
126.
. I’ll be challenged with the task of self-accountability to uphold and maintain my
standards of ethics, even in a profit driven society 6.92
127.
. I’ll need to be aware of what I’m uncertain about. I’ll need to make a decision on my
personal boundaries of what will drive my choices: my values or profit? 6.93
128.
I’ll grow to understand that ethics won’t just impact decisions I’ll make at work; ethics will
be in my everyday life 6.95
129.
I understand the ethics I practice in my life outside of my career will influence my set of
ethics in my career, and vice versa 6.96
130.
I’ll need to establish for myself how far my responsibility as an engineer goes. 6.97
131.
consider how I will interact with international colleagues 6.99
132.
understanding how ethics differ in different countries will become incredibly crucial. How
will I determine which countries set of ethics overrule the others? 6.100
133.
may replace a human worker? 6.102
134.
I will ask all of these questions, but may not have definite answers 6.103
135.
Rules are black and white, but ethics in real life have infinite gray line 6.103
136.
Ethics is not completely definable, but it is unique to the individual.6.104
137.
sometimes the quest for profits may collide with ethical value 7.4
138.
is entirely up to the engineers as individuals to maintain and uphold ethical values.7.5
139.
right off the bat he was bridging the gap between engineering ethics and personal ethics
as an individual. 7.9
140.
valued honesty, integrity, and openness and fairness just as much in his work, as he
does in his personal life 7.10
141.
first step to practicing ethical engineering is to possess a strong ethical code, whether it
be the NSPE Code, religious, or whatever. 7.12
142.
Once ethical values are maintained, they easily fall into place as an engineer 7.14
143.
It seems in personal situations, ethics becomes a subconscious process 7.15
144.
but it seems to be that ethical behavior becomes a core value of the individual engineer
7.17
145.
Seems to be similar to any other repetitive process, and once an engineer possesses
and practices ethical behavior, it becomes a subconscious and automatic process. The
second step to becoming an ethical engineer seems to be the same way to get to Carnegie
Hall…practice! 7.17-19
146.
What do they mean when they say “public 7.22
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147.
, it got me pondering about what it means to affect people as engineers in different
regions, and to serve the “public”, and public shouldn’t be divided by borders: state, country,
or otherwise.7.26
148.
engineers shouldn’t stop at regional or national borders, or race, or gender, etc. when
talking about how ethical issues will affect the public. Engineers need to keep in mind
everything, not just a close-minded view of what affects them locally, when making ethical
decisions 7.30
149.
the interview about the differences between engineering in government and how it differs
from private companies, because government agencies don’t have profits to worry about,
7.36
150.
public regards engineers as experts in a profession, and this responsibility needs to be
taken seriously to continue on the quest to being an ethical engineer 7.42
151.
, they need to place themselves in an environment that allows them to be ethical, and not
compromise their ethical code 7.50
152.
Completely avoiding unethical behavior seems to be an impossible task 7.52
153.
An important part of being an ethical engineer may be to take a class on ethics, and
determine what it means to be ethical 7.59
154.
a big part of it seems to come from the values you were taught growing up.7.60
155.
, “Sometimes ethical behavior is compared to ‘Things I Learned in Kindergarten’ (Share
things, play fair, don’t hit people, put things back where you found them, etc). If you learned
these values early in life and have attempted to live by them, then you have a solid
foundation for the ethical challenges in the workplace.” 7.61-64
156.
So it turns out that both government and privately employed engineers have to worry
about the pressures of corporations pushing profits or budget constraints interfering with
ethical decision-making. 7.66
157.
it goes back to the fact that there needs to be ethical engineers in place to prevent
unethical activity, and if it happens to happen, there needs to be a way to report and correct
the activity 7.70
158.
it is crucially important that engineers remain loyal to their ethical codes, and if placed in
a situation that would force them to compromise their ethics, that they find another
opportunity 7.73
159.
to find a place that allows them to stick to their values 7.75
160.
Ethical engineers need to keep everyone in mind when making ethical decisions, not just
local people of a certain race, religion, or gender 7.83
161.
Engineers are regarded as experts in their fields, and need to take that responsibility
seriously 7.85
162.
. While engineers may not always be consciously thinking about ethics, those decisions
affect people, the environment, health, and so much more, and engineers having a strong
foundation of ethical values will allow mankind to thrive 7.85
163.
In order for ethical engineering to take place, three things are necessary. First, the
engineer must be aware that many, if not all, engineering products are designed with Ethical
Expectations. Next, the engineer needs to be aware of who The Public is and how The Public
will be affected by the Ethical Expectations. Finally, the engineer must be equipped with a
Moral Motivation that helps them to determine and execute a correct course of action to take
when encountering Ethical Expectations that will negatively affect The Public. 8.1-6
164.
it is quite tempting to come to the conclusion that ethics and engineering do not go hand
in hand. The classic argument that “guns don’t kill people, people kill people” comes quickly
to mind as a way to avoid taking on the undesired responsibility for the safety and well-being
8.8-11
165.
many products are designed in a way that has an Ethical Expectation for the consumer,
whether the engineers and customers realize it or not 8.12
166.
Does “public” mean an engineer’s nation,” 8.31
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167.
I would also argue that, due to the great amount of specialization that can be seen in all
technical fields, almost everyone who is affected by the technology will not have a grasp on
the full implication of the technology. Therefore, it is safe to assume that anyone who comes
in contact with a product is “innocent” and their ignorance should be taken into account when
designing a product. 8.35-38
168.
This seems a little overwhelming for any engineer who is unable to foresee events in the
distant future. 8.45-46
169.
engineer is responsible for the products they make and should be on the lookout for
products that will clearly have a negative impact on the welfare of The Public 8.50
170.
particularly meaningful when considered in the context of the role that German engineers
played in enhancing the efficiency of the Holocaust 8.51
171.
, the success or failure of a technology may depend on the regulations imposed on the
technology by the government 8.54 (discusses examples where government regulation would
be essential – head transplants, AI, self-driving vehicles)
172.
I believe that after the engineer gives recommendations to The Public for how his/her
technology should be used, the engineer should continue to work on the usability and safety
of the technology, blissfully secure in the knowledge that the government will make the
ultimate decision on whether the technology should be used and what precautions should be
taken to ensure that The Public is best served by the technology in question 8.61-65
173.
If an engineer sees that the technology has a negative impact on The Public, it is
necessary for the engineer to have the will to solve the issue 8.67
174.
The engineer can be motivated internally or externally to take action.8.68
175.
if a group is led by a strong leader who emphasizes ethical behavior, the group will be
more likely to act ethically (externally) 8.71
176.
I would work to behave in a way that would not disappoint a person that I respect. 8.74
177.
having a strong governing body that is able to punish wrongdoers in such a way that it
would hurt more to cheat and get caught than it would to lose 8.76 (citing article)
178.
money as an incentive not to cheat, so it will have the greatest effect on those who value
money most. Yet if the financial incentive outweighs the risks and possible fines, then the
“strong stand” of the FIA or any other governing body will mean nothing. 8.83-85
179.
it is more important to have an internal Moral Motivation. 8.87
180.
Internal Moral Motivation is something that is strongly affected by what you believe in.
8.89
181.
He said that his belief in moral absolutes as revealed in the Bible was helpful to him in
ethical situations. 8.89
182.
is important for engineers to have some sense that there are right and wrong solutions to
an ethical situation.8.92
183.
(Comparative Ethics article): rigorous examinations do not seem to be the deciding factor
for ethical soundness.8.99
184.
why French engineers are ethically sound is that they believe they can use mathematics
to create the perfect state 8.100
185.
If an engineer has an internal Moral Motivation, s/he will follow this ideal or system of
beliefs since that is genuinely what the engineer will want to do. 8.104
186.
but internal motivations are stronger and more likely to consistently lead to ethically
sound decisions.
187.
Controversy exists about what constitutes an ethical engineer 9.1
188.
Many people, including engineers themselves, first think of personal values and decisions
made in the discipline that comprise of ethical engineers, and I am no exception.
189.
At the core of morality, being able to distinguish the best choice or deriving an alternative
one with regard to ethical virtues and standards is considered ethical itself, which is sufficient
for many engineers in the profession 9.14-16
190.
this is a very narrow-minded approach towards engineering morality, and it does not
consider the long-term impact of the decisions they make; hence, most engineers do not
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fundamentally understand how far their responsibilities go for the goods/services they
provide. 9.16-19
191.
strengthened my understanding of the importance of challenging the complex regions of
ethics, as morality is not just a simple black-and-white choice.9.21
192.
provided a foundation for me to begin questioning my own ethical habits. 9.23
193.
Many engineering problems do not have one solution or series of solutions to them
(which is the primary difference between university class problems and industry tasks 9.31
194.
separation of ethics and intentionality 9.31. unintentional harm while in use or after use
9.35
195.
Harms that are upstream or downstream” Robison says during the engineering design
process, “are a part of the design solution. 9.36
196.
Surprisingly, many of the values I labeled as core ethical engineer virtues were reiterated
by him, such as honesty and integrity 9.46
197.
, respect was also brought up, which directly correlates with credibility, and, furthermore,
accountability 9.47
198.
Individuality also correlates to an ethical engineer 9.51
199.
. Another interesting aspect involves flooding one’s personal life with virtues from the
ethical engineering life. 9.59 upholding these particular virtues at home assist the engineer in
solidifying them as a part of oneself
200.
Expectedly, I received no indication that he would purposefully consider the long-term
effects of his engineering and design decisions, nor the predictions of harm associated with
the misuse of any engineered product/service.9.63-65 (re:interview)
201.
Therefore, I have concluded that many “ethical” engineers do not actively consider the
impacts their engineering and design choices have on the world, especially for long periods
of time, and I further assume that these decisions have been mediated through technology,
especially for engineered products. 9.67-69
202.
my philosophical approach to determining “what is it to be an ethical engineer.” 9.71
203.
I will briefly be analyzing the ethical aspects that many engineers do not consider; an
emphasis will be placed on technology, since I believe technology is the primary mediation
technique for engineers. 9.71-73
204.
these technological design implications can potentially drastically alter the method in
which people experience the world, which, in my opinion, can be considered a form of control
that the engineers have over the general public 9.82
205.
Is the procedure of improving technology a benefit to society 9.91
206.
, both of these concepts should, at the very least, come to mind when planning to design
and release a product to the public, as well as the fact that technology is not a neutral
tool.9.85
207.
analyzing the problems with engineering ethics and implementing solutions are two very
drastic problems 9.97
208.
many issues and concerns revolving around engineering ethical fissures are contextual,
generalized ideas do not provide much reconstruction 9.98
209.
engineers should attempt to think, and possibly philosophize, about all the impacts the
potential products they are designing have on the world 9.106
210.
Many of my previously believed ethical values still support my ethical foundation, such as
honesty, integrity, reliability, accountability, perseverance, and capability 9.109
211.
these virtues provide only one level of engineering morality to me, and I am just
beginning to delve into the further categories 9.112-114
212.
independence is an extremely important trait for providing an unbiased judgment on
ethical concerns, and, as such, needs to be practiced to the same extreme that honesty
should be 9.115
213.
many moral issues are contextual, so generalized solutions cannot be formulated that will
properly apply to most situations; 9.117
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214.
the ethical engineer must remain vigilant and critically apply themselves to solving any
moral conflict that arises 9. 118
215.
that technical artifacts are much more than just neutral tools 9.124
216.
many “ethical” engineers are very narrow-minded in their morals, and the true ethical
engineer will need to draw upon multiple disciplines to properly succeed at their engineering
work 9.124-126
217.
that ethical engineering takes on a dynamic form and followers will need to perform
constant, consistent investigations in the field 9.127
218.
Studying ethics, while perhaps not the most exciting subject, is necessary in engineering.
10-2
219.
. Engineers collectively wield great power, and therefore are continually confronted with
ethical decisions.10.3
220.
Bunge – compares science and technology. All technology has inherent ethical properties
10.15
221.
Technology not only has ethical properties, but at times it actively makes moral decisions
10.16 (ICDs as example)
222.
Ethics for engineering is also important because engineering affects people. 10.25
223.
the public is global; it does not stop at country border.10.26
224.
their actions can have widespread effects. 10.33
225.
What does it mean to be an ethical engineer? This is by far a harder question to answer
10.34
226.
The drawback of ethical codes is they are generally just rules; Rules cannot cover all
situations, and so engineers are still forced to make decisions with little outside guidance.
10.36-38
227.
they need to be informed enough to know if there are better options not yet under
consideration 10.42
228.
they must be competent and objective enough to know whether they can execute their
chosen decision 10.43
229.
The way to choose what is an ethical decision is the hardest question to answer. 10.47
230.
Nearly always there is trade-off 10.47
231.
What is best is very subjective, and so the best option is different for each individual
10.48
232.
The engineer must make the decision based on his personal values 10.49
233.
The evaluation of what is right and what isn’t is ultimately up to the engineer, and by
extension, his employer. 10.50
234.
Interview examples – company that aims for sustainability even if some things operate at
a loss 10.57
235.
Also mechanization of manufacturing – what happens to people it replaces 10.63…
236.
, engineers must care about ethics because of what engineering is 10.70
237.
Because of their skills, position, the things they work on, they have power over others.
10.70
238.
, it the end, it is up to the engineer to choose the best decision, based on his personal
values.10.75
239.
code of ethics can help, but it is ultimately a subjective decision of right and wrong 10.76
240.
Engineers are among some of the most trusted professionals in today's work force 11.1
241.
when the public takes advantage of the work of an engineer, they believe that it will live
up to the standards that are set by the public themselves or by what's advertised 11.2
242.
An ethical engineer makes the decision to perform to the best of their abilities even with
these temptations (cutting corners, eg) 11.11
243.
An ethical engineer does not serve themselves 1.13
244.
we hold so much responsibility is because we are the ones who hold all the knowledge of
our projects. 11.21
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245.
I am also being paid to take the time to deliberate over the ethical issues that come with
my projects.11.24
246.
When working on a project, I must always be aware of ethics 11.25
247.
I must constantly be thinking of how the public will handle my product 11.27
248.
My knowledge of engineering allows me to consider different options and solutions. 11.34
249.
Knowing which risks are the most important to eliminate is the hardest thing for an ethical
engineer to do 11.61
250.
It is up to me to decide which are the most dangerous to the public. This decision is not
always just quantitative (such as number of deaths) but is often qualitative too 11.63
251.
There is a thin line between eliminating what I think is a risk to the public and creating a
paternalistic environment 11.74
252.
With the pressure from the company I work for, it will not always be easy to carry out the
most ethically ideal project. 11.84
253.
At a certain point, however, I may have to draw the line where my company does not
meet the ethical standards that I have put for myself. When this happens, it may be time to
either compromise my beliefs or move on. This can be extremely difficult because of how
intimidating and difficult it can be to try and find another job. However, after my interview
with___, , I feel much more comfortable with making the decision to leave a company 11. 89
(relays interviewee experience of quitting job over ethical issue & consequences for new job
– hired because of his ethics) 11.94-103
254.
This story showed me that people value ethical decisions. Because of this, I am less
afraid of quitting for a reason having to do with ethics 11.102
255.
With the power I will have, I must take care of those who do not have the knowledge from
an engineering degree or the time to figure out the risks themselves. 11.105
256.
Engineering is much less clear cut than most people make it out to be. 11.109
257.
When designing products that people use every day, engineering, necessarily, becomes
value-laden 11.110
258.
It has turned out to be one of the most ambiguous, complicated and debatable answers
to a question I’ve been asked to explain 12.2
259.
hard for many engineers and technicians to answer as well due to the fact that most of us
have been programed to think quantitatively through lots of our studies and research 12.4
260.
Ethics isn’t so cut-and-dry like solving a math problem, it has a lot more gray area
compared to the calculus classes most struggle through 12.5-6
261.
Through my semester of research focused on thinking more qualitatively than usual 12.7
262.
stumbled upon many interesting points of view concerning ethics including viewpoints
from other parts of the world and treating technology as an ethical element 12.8
263.
learned a decent amount about myself and my own ideas on what it should mean to be
an ethical engineer. 12.9-10
264.
businessdictionary.com– “The basic concepts and fundamental principles of decent
human conduct. It includes study of universal values such as the essential equality of all men
and women, human or natural rights, obedience to the law of the land, concern for health and
safety and the natural environment.” However if I could change it, I would add the two words
“perception of” to make it say – “The perception of basic concepts and fundamental
principles…” 12.11-17
265.
One of the most important ideas that I have taken away from my studies is that these
principles of human conduct concerning what is right and what is wrong has everything to do
with someone’s point of view and beliefs. 12.18
266.
views on what is morally right can be brought about by religious beliefs, political stances,
scientific knowledge or even daily observations and will highly influence an engineer’s
decision on how to proceed with a give task 12.20 (example building mall in forest)
267.
engineer’s meaning of ethics also can be induced by what part of the world they grew up
in and how they were taught about ethics. 12.28 (cites interview and Downey). France: they
believe that one should not have to study ethics, but should be ready to accept the tough
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choices they will be faced with and keeping the interests of the nation and world ahead of
personal/corporate gain
268.
risk versus reward. “This is something that most engineers will be faced with at some
point in their careers,”12.44 – interview and Hylton
269.
There seems to be a lot of gray area in the world around us, and ethics is not excluded
12.57
270.
When asking “what does it mean to be an ethical engineer,” one must research and
weigh the effects for them working for a specific company where the product or job they are
asked to complete could have ethical problems down the road. For example, if an engineer is
offered a job working for Lockheed Martin and they will be working in their missiles and
guided weapons department, that person must look inside and decide for themselves if they
want to develop new weapons that kill people every day (bad and good people), because that
is what Lockheed Martin needs in order to be able to make a profit. There is a risk versus
reward element here as well due to the fact that if you will be rewarded with a nice paycheck
to provide your family with, but might risk your own emotional wellbeing. A perfect example of
this is the Manhattan Project during World War II when physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer and
a team of US Army engineers conceived the first atomic weapons to use on the Japanese in
order to end the war. 12.63-73
271.
“Engineers should know that the product they design could end up injuring or killing
people or being used in a manner to harm someone or something,” Dr. Middlebrook stated.
“This applies to almost any product.” And if you really think about it, it makes sense 12.74
(people using cellphones in cars). sometimes things go wrong even when you are ethically in
the right state of mind, with your product’s main function not intended to cause harm 12.80
272.
one might ask if technology that the engineer develops can be ethical. Isn’t a bomb’s
main purpose to destroy buildings and harm people? 12.82
273.
Although I’ve read several papers this semester that talk about how technology itself can
be ethical, I have denied this opinion from the start. I believe that it is the developer and the
user of the technology who have to be held accountable for the actions that the technology
takes …. For the Manhattan project, the engineers and physicists took it upon themselves to
unveil nuclear weapons knowing that the world could never be the same, and that these
weapons could be used for strategic political gain. In order for something to be ethical, I
believe it must be able to think ethically itself. 12.85-92 Uncertain what this means
274.
, I personally have found that ethics is a very ambiguous subject that will challenge the
best thinkers and I know now that it is not something to take lightly when one enters the work
force 12.93
275.
when I say think, I don’t mean just quantitatively, but qualitatively as well! Think about
how the quality of life will be with your product in it. Will it be a presence of good in the world,
or something that is made to harm? How will affect the quality of your life? Will the financial
reward be worth the risk of a clear conscience? 12.97
276.
if an engineer can honestly look inside and have a clear moral sense and understanding
of what they are working towards, then they can be considered ethical, no matter what
background or point of view they have 12.100
277.
Every day, members of modern society put their health, finances, and wellbeing in the
hands of diverse professionals. It is necessary to trust doctors, accountants, and engineers to
use their specialized knowledge to protect these items of immense personal value 13.1
278.
This is not to cheapen the ethical duty that engineers have, but rather to put it in the
proper light. Engineers are responsible, like other professionals, to protect the interests of
those whose “innocence” means they are not able to protect themselves 13.21
279.
engineers have this sweeping duty to act ethically 13.24
280.
A Spartan-minded person would respond by saying that an ethical engineer would
perfectly protect the public by completely avoiding mistakes. The human experience teaches
that this cannot be. 13.25
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281.
The solving of an ethical problem, like a physical engineering problem, requires some
theory as well as some empirical experience and gut feeling. It is this mix of theoretical moral
behavior and acquired know-how, applied in an honest manner that makes an ethical
engineer 13.31
282.
Producing engineering codes of ethics is helpful, but not a sure way to produce ethical
engineers 13.36
283.
One issue with the effectiveness of codes of ethics in influencing engineering decisions
emerges quickly in a discussion with the average practicing engineer. Either the engineer
does not reference published codes of ethics or does not realize they exist. Dr. King falls into
the latter group. This does not mean that the average engineer neglects to examine the
ethical element of their work, but just that he or she generally does not do so with a published
code of ethics in hand 13.36
284.
issue with engineering codes of ethics is that they differ slightly between the different
societies that issue them 13.42
285.
Engineering codes of ethics differ more significantly between the cultures from which they
are issued 13.53 (with examples). Also discusses cultural Downey 13.60
286.
. These values, not a code of ethics, guide engineers as they operate in their respective
cultures. 13.82
287.
In reality, all engineers are guided – knowingly or not – by their values 13.83
288.
When asked if he applied particular values to ethical decision in an engineering context,
Dr. King said no. He does not have clearly defined values which he methodically applies to
engineering ethics questions 13.83. However, it was clear when talking to him that Dr. King
operates with a particular mindset that automatically keeps him within the realm of ethical
engineering 13.86 (with examples)
289.
This habit did not result from an ethical deliberation, but rather from experience which
teaches that a good reputation in research can be maintained by producing concrete results.
13.100
290.
Ultimately, it seems that all engineers are guided by their values since values can quickly
guide decisions 13.107
291.
. Codes of ethics are and other such tools are too cumbersome for the fast paced world
of engineering decisions. 13.108
292.
alZahir and Kombo cite some authors who suggest that codes of ethics are more a
method to enhance the respectability of the engineering profession than to adjust the
behavior of engineers 13.110
293.
“making an honest effort” means developing good values and intentionally applying
them, or reaching a state where they are applied naturally. For older engineers, this comes
through learning from experience. For younger engineers, it is necessary to consult with
veteran engineers to gain from their experience 13.111
294.
Being an ethical engineer means making on honest effort to protect the innocent public
through applying well developed values to questions of ethics 13.117
295.
Young engineers do well to enlist the help of those more experienced when faced with
decisions that have real consequences in a fast paced world 13,124
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Formulated meanings of significant statements: Understanding of professional and ethical
responsibility (numbers refer to statement numbers in “significant statements”)
1. Ethics is complicated 1, 23, 69, 87, 89, 258 (quote)
a. Every situation is different 3, 63
b. Every person has a unique set of personal beliefs and values 3, 76, 88, 136, 231,
265-266
i. Growing up values learned 154-155
c. It’s more than one’s own personal beliefs 5,
d. Constraints of cultural and societal differences too 6, 103, 267
e. Even harder for engineering 4
i. Conflicting obligations: understanding of ambiguity in problems and solutions:
54, 56, 115 (understanding co-workers), 117, 123-124, 193 (compares this to
case studies), trade-offs 230, 274
ii. Multiple factors and parties to consider in design 57, 83, 160
iii. They possess specialized knowledge and this gives them a unique level of
responsibility to public – what that means 31, 66, 150, 161, 219, 237, 238,
244
1. Public” and extent of engineer’s responsibility 40 (government, also
149), 166, 190 (most engineers don’t understand how far it extends)
2. Beyond borders 147-148 (good quote about reflecting on this), 160,
223
3. Public as “innocent” and special duty (good argument here 167-170),
255, 278
iv. Critical decisions go unnoticed 74
v. “intertwined” nature 78, 95 (inherently good), 139 (personal and professional
values are not inseparable 139, 140, 199 quote)
vi. Decisions are qualitative, not just quantitative 250, 275
vii. Ethics is part of the job 245-250
viii. Understanding of why people might screw up 97, 98, 96
ix. Science versus ethics 109; engineering as ethically neutral 164, way we are
taught 259-260
x. Technology issues to consider 203-209, 215, technology makes moral
decisions 221
xi. Worry about how I will do 111, 125, 126, 127
xii. Importance of education on ethics (self and others) 102, 111, 112, 113, 153,
218
xiii. How to help ensure ethical behavior
1. Work for a good company 151, 159 have good people in place 157,
remain vigilant 214, draw on multiple disciplines 216, enlist
experienced engineers 293-5
xiv. Ultimately up to engineers and employers 233 (examples from interview 234235)
f. No simple “yes” or “no” 12, 89, 135
g. Cannot avoid unethical behavior absolutely 152, 280
2. Why it’s important for engineers 58 (technology), 59, 122, 117, 138 (up to them)
3. Questions about ethics I’ve never thought about; change during semester
a. Opened my eyes to new way of thinking about ethics 8, 12, 32, 33, 38, 49, 108 (how
little I knew), 110
b. Added to my (also self) understanding 29, 35, 52, 191, 192 (foundation to question
my own ethical habits)
c. Most helpful to me 30
d. Never thought about it before (personal or professional ethics and values) 34, 53
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e. Insight about ethics for the profession in practice 36, 43, 73, 89 (personal change)
4. Value of interview
a. Learned something new 9, 41, 42, 49
b. A source to consult 7, 48
c. Stories from experience that taught me lessons 12
d. Surprising 44
e. Gained strength from it 116, 252-254,
5. Rules
a. Decisions are above what rules say –13
b. Limited usefulness of rules 55, 79, 120, 135, 226, 239, 282-292 (use quote)
6. Ethics versus profit (& public interest versus company & profit; self-interest): risk vs. reward
a. Ethical decision is more important than profit or market advantage 14, 15, 47, 93, 94
b. Tough to resolve – lots of ambiguity and conflicting priorities 39, 63, 96 (improve
world, not destroy it), 137
c. Self-interest 64, 67
d. Same considerations apply to government work 156
e. Lockheed Martin & weapons considerations 170
7. I’m not alone in making ethical decisions
a. Important lesson – a learning experience, didn’t know this before 16, 17, 45 (good
quote), 51 (paradigm shift), 77
8. Ethics as utility 18-23
a. Not answer he expected and hard to understand, no clear-cut answer
9. Need to consider whole situation – very broad and broader than we think 24, 28 (most
important part)
a. 62 – really good quote – ability to focus is strong point and blind spot
10. Expressions of personal reflection and thinking about what they are reading and hearing
a. Compare reading and interview 25-26
b. Readings – critique – agree and disagree 37
c. Value of course 60 (my journey), 61, 70 (collaboration), 71, 89 (beginning and end of
course)
d. I realized 75, 91 (aspiration)
e. Good definition (trying not to mess up) 80, also 89. Another one 281
f. Reflections on what they learned about ethics and engineering workplace (through
interviews or their own experiences) 99, 100, 101, 102, 104-105 (importance of
reflection and experience – fusion of horizons)
g. External vs internal moral motivation – discussion and reflection is good 174-186
h. Need to consider long-term impact & most engineers don’t understand how far their
responsibilities extend 189-190
i. I have concluded that many “ethical” engineers do not actively consider the impacts
their engineering and design choices have on the world, especially for long periods of
time, and I further assume that these decisions have been mediated through
technology, especially for engineered products 200-201
j. Learned a decent amount about myself 263 and worldview (262), added “perception
of” to definition of ethics = example of reflection 264
11. Values and Introspection 114
a. Think about where I stand ahead of time – similar to quote in my dissertation 43, 85,
86
b. Need for introspection 50, 84, 125-134 (good quote on self-reflection and ambiguity)
c. Sort of a “being in the world” with ethics – prereflective: 142, 143, 145 (good quote),
144 (ethics as core value), 293-94
d. Role of personal values 232
e. Reflect on discover of and thinking about own biases – examples
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f.

New ways of being in the world? New ways of envisioning selves as ethical
engineers. Examples – transformational experiences – expressions of how this class
experience will change the way they think they will behave – pause and observe
selves in act of maturing. Movement need not be a complete shift – how they
encounter themselves considering the view of the Other – acknowledgement that
there might be another horizon (Soloway) – new wisdom about selves
g. Engagement with texts – mindfulness (observing mind in its processes) learning as if
it is a new experience – see last para of Soloway. Embodiment. “Learning was lived
through to new orientations of what it means to be in the world”
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Six Themes from Round One Coding
1. Unprepared – fear of being left alone and fear of losing job
a. Leaving job 3.77, 6.65, 11.84 (did I use this already?)
b. Be willing to admit failure 3.100, 7.71
2. Ethics is complicated and asking questions about what this means: Public, human
aspects, socially situated, technology
a. Public – compare to other professionals & innocence 13.17
b. Market and competition: risk vs. reward 12.44
c. Situational 1-78 and a trade-off 10.47, 11.61 (risk)
d. Ambiguity
i. In industry, problems are seldom clearcut but ambiguous 2.152, 165 (cite
Goldman)
ii. Looking for absolutes 8.91 Bible and mathematics
iii. Good quote (use this!) on ambiguity 11.104
iv. Qualitative 11.63, 12.97
3. Technology as a separate issue
i. Argues against Bunge – we’re doing good things 2-29 struggling with
personal choice vs. imposing choice as ethics 2-41 – it’s the mental
struggle that is important here. Weighing things as a choice. 2-108
ii. Whose responsibility? Government – thinking about the question! 2-119
iii. Critique of interviewee – didn’t consider impacts of technology 9.63
iv. Personal decision and how to make sense of that: 12.66
v. Quote on developer and engineer responsibility for technology 12.85
4. Values and reflection – greater self-awareness and value of that
a. Think about this in advance 2.136
b. General value of reflection quote 6.1-9
c. Experience will help and will change ethics 6.42
d. Growing up values 7.59
e. Flooding one’s personal life with values 9.59
f. Self-learning – independence 9.114
g. Self-reflection use quote 12.3
h. Depends on values 12.18
i. Good summary of where students are at: 12.95
j. How they work in practice 13.84
5. Experience
a. Becomes a subconscious process (practice!) 7.15
b. Getting this experience from older engineers 13.107-115, 122
6. Other – this class (and education) a good way to find out about these things, experience
a. Value of interview 2.131, 1.16, 7.9
b. Voice of experience – value of: 2.169 – advice
c. Importance for engineers to study ethics see 6; 10.2 &.25
d. New way of thinking about ethics section #3 from significant statements
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